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Hastings School of Law 
Law Room 
198 McAlister 
San Francisco, Californ 
November 18, 1981 
CHAIRMAN ELIHU M. HARRIS: The subject of 
hearing is AB 1820 which provides for State Fund 
courts. AB 1820, which was introduced on behalf of 
Council of California, merely states that "notwiths 
provision of law, funding of the Trial Courts 
provided by the State in accordance with the provis 
" 
Obviously, there are many different forms that State 
Funding could take. For example, the Post Commission if 
five options, ranging from full assumption of judicial sa 
(which would cost approximately $40 million) to a total 
of the "Justice System" which would include District 
Public Defenders and presentence probation functions and 
would cost approximately $920 million. 
We will hear today from a wide range of witnesses who 
will comment on the desirability and feasibility of State fund 
as well as on the fiscal, administrative, personnel 
and local control implications of various methods of 
State Financing of the Trial Courts. 
We will hear first from Assemblyman Howard Berman 
author of AB 1820. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HOWARD BERMAN: Mr. Chairman, I i 
this legislation at the request of the Judicial Council. 
seems to me that all the different arguments, 
conceptual ones with respect to the Courts as a 
desire for some uniformity in terms of f 
and the whole role of the judicial system argues for 
State financed. In the wake of Proposition 13, the 
among local jurisdictions as far as their will 
to provide adequate support are not helpful to the 
of justice and any sense of equity. The real prob 
is to devise some formula that allows the State to assume a 
fairly significant additional financial burden at this 
we are so strapped. Is there a way to deal wi the 
ions that we provide in the wake of Proposit 
AB 8 formulas to readiust those monies where 
could pick up the cost of the Judicial Branch, most 
absorbed by Counties? We could also somehow lessen, 
Slthventions to the county use and provide this level of 
uniformity based on legislatively determined polic 
seems like it makes very good sense. Hopefully we ca 
s today as to whether my basic view that it does 
sense is confirmed and if so are there any innovat 
s of how to do this at a t where we 
just augment our state budget by that amount without finding a 
source of revenue somewhere. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: May I ask a question? Do you have any 
position as to whether state financing should include a total 
buy-out or should simply be a total assumption of judge's 
salaries? 
ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN: My view is that it should be a 
total buy-out of all of the support aspects of the Judicial 
System. There is a logic to having some uniformity or at least 
differences determined by a rational state policy and not simply 
a particular county's ability to pay. These are creations of the 
State and the State Legislature and the Constitution so we should 
them that way. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Our first witness is Mr. Ralph 
11, Administrative Director of the California Courts. 
MR. RALPH GAMPELL: Mr. Chairman, Members. Good 
morning. My name is Ralph Gampell. I am the Administrative 
Director of the California Courts, and Mr. Assemblyman Berman was 
enough to say that this legislation was introduced at the 
request of the Judicial Council. State funding of the trial 
courts is not a new concept for the Judicial Council. It's been 
the Council's position for a considerable number of years, and it 
came to the fore again immediately after the passage of 
Proposition 13. You may recall the Committee of both houses that 
received various suggestions. At that time, the Judicial Council 
reiterated its prior position and its essential policy position 
is that it is in favor of state funding of the Trial Courts with 
1 control. I recognize that that has within it a built-in 
anachronism. But, equally well, in discussing with you, as I 
you will remember as the various models which are available 
go forward, you'll see that each one of them has their own set of 
advantages and disadvantages. On the general proposition of 
state funding, it seems to me there can be little to say to the 
What we have in each of count s at all levels is 
courts that are resolving disputes e between the State and a 
zen in the criminal law or citizens on the civil 
But the laws which are and the rules 
are being applied are s You enact the law, 
courts have to deal with it. I can give you example after 
le of what has been ooino on in mv own time. For very good 
reasons, the penalties were increased for drunk driving. We know 
that that will mean that there will be more jury trials. I am 
expressing any opinion of the merits of the drunk driving 
bills, except to say that you enacted a statute which will haue 
impact on the courts. Now, as you see from those pie chartf 
of John Davies, whom many of you know as a senior legislative 
sentative, if vou look at those pie charts, on the bottom 
we have estimated trial conrt costs at $512 to $668 million 
To get those fiaures, \Je took the 1978 numbers of the Post 
-2-
• 
ssion and we applied two multipliers, the of 
cost of living and the actual CPI. The 
and the second is actual. And if you 
you'll see that of the total amount the local 
$457 and $612 million, and the State has 
on the other side. If you look at the revenue s 
fines, penalties, forfeitures, assessments and rest, 
see a figure of close to $400 million that is it 
ties, the counties, and the State. Now, you 
outgoinq is entirely a county cost. Nothing is 
ties and the cities do get a substantial port 
incoming revenues. However, the cities will point out to you 
it's their resources, their police, their meter maids, 
enforcement which produces the criminal bulk of the business 
which comes revenues into the system. The state's portion, 
which goes into the earmarked funds and is not earmarked for the 
courts, all kinds of people have a piece of that, University of 
California, Fish and Game, drunk driving. Our proposition I 
is simple. Somebody has to pick up this tab. The somebody 
is the taxpayer. Are we going to require that wi each county 
amount of resource which is available to the courts that are 
doing the state's business depends on the fis~al success of that 
county? A Municipal Court in Beverly Hills is going to b8 
served financially than a Municipal court in East Los Angeles. 
There is more money around. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me interrupt you Mr. 
Tell me this, what is meant by local control and how 
control exercised? 
MR. GAMPELL: Well, let me answer that what 
think it isn't. I don't think that the Judicial Council, and I 
that the present Chief Justice certainly does not vjsualize 
the New York Model. The New York Model is a th centra 
irection and power flowing down to each level to st 
1. That at the one end, clearly, is not with 
f any body that I know. What we visualized, I 
of the Post Commission was that money would 
count s for judicial salaries and, I could on 
own contemplation, because I know that the Counci 
felt that the determination of how the money would was 
essentially a legislative decision and not one for 
Council to make. Rut, to the extent of the State was le, i 
pick up the tab for the nonjudicial personnel, the 
liffs, the clerks, all the persons who are to make the 
apparatus move, but again speaking for myself 
Council does not take a position, it was not that these pPrsons 
be incorporated into a state civil service but that 
1 would stay with the localities, because judges and 
and the local Boards of Supervisors are best to 
those elements. Maybe there should be some overall 
principles that a judge has X amount for a clerk, and 
in, the Council has never gotten into that. And one 
-3-
le way that was scus 
the State would contract 
authority to provide these ancil 
should pick up the sa s 
judicial branches. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I 
pick up all the costs 
re ibility for determin 
't 
Post Commiss was 
ies for the 
services. But the 
benef s of all 
why the state 
not also exercising 
s. You want us to have a 
court level that is statewide justice system at the 
sistent throughout the state. But you don't have one brand of 
one in Los Angeles County. 
ss there are so~e controls 
even sure what localit s, for 
in Alameda County and 
And, I don't know how you do 
at the state level. I am not 
, should be able to do 
court system. I'm not sure 
equipped to make so-called 
or as relates to the 
particularly well 
on the court system. 
MR. GAMPELL: I think answer to that is, what is a 
decision? You could lay down broad guidelines for count 
return for your subvention, but by the same token, let me g 
a simple example if I might. I talked one time at a meet 
my opposite number in tJew Thev quite recently have 
ized their own court system. took over twenty-eight, 
it was, separate pension plans for employees throughout 
State of New York. Let me put into context. Supposing that 
State were to take over all nonjudicial personnel into a 
tate system. By the very nature of things that would mean that 
a court clerk in Mendocino, who get a very low rate of pay 
have to come up to the level, may be what a court 
gets in Los Angeles. The fferentials that go with an 
lernent of local control, would obviously have to disappear. 
clerk one would have to get the same salary. And I think 
would be a very heavy burden on us. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Wel that s al 
of the state emp s. That s 
we adopt an administrat 
MR. GAMPELL: Yes, 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: 
local decisions are not on 
ssary and well advised, as 
at state level. 
sed to 
the case al 




HR. GAMPELL: Nell, aga , I could use a New mode 
CHAIPJ.'l..AN HARRIS: Let 1 s California 
MR.GAMPELL: Yes, are go to sav, for example, tha 
judge would take the bench ~t 9 and f ish at 5, which is 
kind of state control s ss le but I most 
sirable. Or, that every clerk will come to 
fini at 5. Those would seem to me element 
knowledge of the judges and the court 
on the ground. Now, maybe, this pos 
enunciated by Judge Eagleson who is 
son participating in those discussions 
Commission. I certainly am not reluctant to 
we going to be setting up a juggernaut? 
recognize that I have absolutely no monopo 
area. In fact I am here to learn, as I 
as to how this matter can be handled. But 





As the fiscal constraints become 
to get money out of the local 
You're going to decide, are we going to a clerk to the 
court or are we going to employ another nurse ICU. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN: Mr. Gampell, that this 
should be done because of the service levels 
are now subject to competing appropriation and answer 
the Board of Supervisors, I would not like to let go 
unquestioned. Do you have some specif s - some 
horrendous that has happened to some citizen or to some 
cons tuent because of the present format? 
MR. GM1PELL: Certainly not. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN: Certainly not? 
all those hearings and discuss all this 
reason to depart therefrom. 
So we re going to 
MR. GAMPELL: No, but I think, any j 
Los les will tell you when they go in with 
is competing in these days against what weJfare ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN BERJvlAN: Isn't that 
MR. GAMPELL: No. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BERJv1AN: Why? Every 
agency, the police, the sheriff, the 
everybody else who also performs legit 
1 , even lifesaving functions for the 
their belt, reform and operate and 
you saying that somehow the jud 
HR. GAMPELL: No, no, nothing of 
that they should be in exactly that compet 
r agency that requires money. But that 
Why should county X which is fai 
be able to provide a higher level of service 






1.vi th money 
is a state 
ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN: 
ational development 
lized control, the 
s of influence in the 
lized system much more 
ithic state system or 
heard judge after judge, 
s because they cannot 
the wall to take up the cases, 
computerize, they cannot 
and that sort of 
1 if they were 
the Judie 
tically from an 
wou that, under a 
lligence of various 
about reforms in a 
could through a 
state system. And 
said, berate other 
codgers off the duff to 
cannot automate, they 
tead of other 
less do you think they 
funded system that 
they try to carry out 
MR. GAMPELL: Well, 
1 as I visualize it, wou 
control from the Judicial 
be of the most general 
ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN: 
to automate, the decis 
judges as opposed to more 
s, that sort of th , 
larger the agency, the 
, because you always 
control. But, still, the 
to to assistant clerks or 
judges, to change rules and 
be dampened by the fact 
go to the lowest common 
to satisfy the nay-sayers 




siding judge would f 
rule, he might be ab 
colleague than he 
the reca itrant col 
can do 
MR. GM1.PELL: If a court 
lationship with board 
smelling like a rose, and 
reason, the court and the 
along too well, li 
that out but the 1 
me that does not 
opposite side of that. But 
, if he had some ove 1 
have more fluence on a 
now where 's a kind of one 
who has a on 
to hear, 
or other 
to compete statewide 
s $600 llion 
on a 1 level 
of supervisors 
whatever reason, has a 
it's going to 
in which 
sors are not 
The judges can 
ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN: So, 
level where a judge or judie that 
stead for any number of reasons 
rather have them travel to Sacramento 
MR. GAMPELL: No, it seems to me 
generalized guidelines and the state , 
who are not going to suffer from s result 
local upset there is, the litigants are going 
1 because the level of service is going to 
up 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me I 
this is really a good point. 
should be addressed on a continuing sses 
I would like to know, Mr. Gampell, is Judicial 
Council has a number of specific recommendations, or do they 
simply have observations. Have you reached conclusions as to 
you would see the state assuming financ l respons lity 
the courts and also what kinds of auxiliary controls would you 
see the state having if in fact they assume 1 
responsibility on one or another level. 
has not MR. GAMPELL: Yes, the Judicial Council 
addressed at any time either in this administrat 
the nuts and bolts of it, believing that is a 
function. It seems to me that translating 
or prior ones 
slative 
pos ion transmitted to the Post Commiss 
general guidelines, state funding through 
seems to me where the council essentially was, 
the number 4 option listed by the Post Commiss 
council favors having nothing at all to do 
and public defenders who are within the 
I think, the best translation. But 
should be effective, that seems to me a 
ion. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Well, certa 
think we are really getting the 
that we should be getting on 
For example as to the appellate proce 
courts are financed, you ought to have a posi 
agree or disagree, at least it gives us a po 
own experience and practicality. At least 
pure 
MR. GAMPELL: Speaking froJll rrty mm 
lf of the Judicial Council, I helieve that a 
like New York is not feasible in Californ 




ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN: Do you see state fund or state 
as an implicit monolithic system, shi the power 




MR. GAMPELL: It's 
it should set 
to have some state influence. 
1 lines, but other than 




to the day to day 
levels of service which 
state's business. 
ASSEMBLY~.AN BERMAN: We 1, I 
be interested if the future 
yet to hear, and I 
sses have some testimony 
deprived of adequate court 
stem. Other than, "Gee, if we 
indicate that somebody is 
s because of the present 
state deep pocket we cou 
of us would have to get up earl 
turnover more cases." If that's the so 
a hundred new judges and 
or work harder or 
rationale, it's a 
le mistake. 
MR. GAMPELL: It isn't. We know that, whatever the cost 
the court system, somebody is going to have to bear it, and 
going to come out of the taxpayer's pocket. Is it going to 
out of the taxpayer via taxation locally or is it going to 
of the taxpayer via state taxation central? The money 
to be spent and it seems to me that ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN: The question is which way is 
more efficiently and more f ly? 
MR. GAMPELL: Right, 
ssed in these hearings 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. 
vou would like to add? 
MR. GAMPELL: No, I 
CHAIR11AN HARRIS: Mr. 












ity to be here. 
before legislative 
s the first time I 
I hope that that can be 
11, do you have any other 
't think so, thank you. 
you have anything you 
Our ss is Ralph 
; former 
Courts; former 
Welcome. How are 
, I appreciate 
perhaps hundreds of 
not recently. In fact, 
as a private citj7en. 
It might help if I aave a 1 le bit of background 
then wound up with some o-1= !'1'' own present judgments on it. 
questions actually posed here not have been asked for 
st hundred and twenty s of California's existence. We 
the trial court system that grew out of the needs of peopJe 
own localities both by 
that trial courts shou 
is deeply ingrained in 
It is true of course that you 
announcements that we have a state court 
a been apparent that both the structure 
and their operating procedures come 
titution describes the fundamentals 
ted the procedure to a greater extent 
lse in the United States. In fact, all 
at the Probate Code, the Code 
Procedure and Title 8 of the Government Code 
the State law is determinative as to 
tructured and operate. But that is the 
a state court system. And after you get 
and the generalities, it looks much dif 
Let's take judges as a starting 
are state officers, but upon occasion 
ssified as local officials for part 1 
, as they depend upon the local e 
, their local concerns are going to 
s. And beyond the judges, as we 
on which they depend and the facilities 
extent have always been the respons 
In their daily operations 
the budget mostly as 
So, if you come to this 
stigating the state's financial 
1 courts, you've a pretty clear p 
's share has been rising modest 
a minor element in the trial court 
Commission Report in '75 
in the financing of the 
50 states and that's been 
many years. Historically, the 
1 support to the provis 
1 salaries,to financing a 
all judges, and thereafter to 
of special state interest 
For example, in 1975, when it was 
lling circuit judge program at the 
eked up the cost for it. And 
1 program for the state's j 
was created, the state picked 
stances there was the state 
it was recognized as such. Similarly, 
ion of the cost of establishing new 




This morning's San 
sors filing a 
State isn't meeting 
costs. And this, 
the State could do a r 
and in aid of courts 
mandated costs, this s 
that the State sharing 
the increases have 
years. But it can't 
change in the level of 
And that's why I 
dealing with would not 
comments upon one of 
State to point out that 
s to pick up state 
is one of the ways in 
aid of local 
real did need 
1 costs. To the 
j 1 salar s and 
place almost entirely within 
that made any 
state funding and the 
the kind of question 
asked in the first 120 
California's history, lly, isn't so different 
that of other states. But, a new approach was conceived 
Alaska and Hawaii became states. As part of their statehood 
determined in both instances that the entire 
should be funded and administered by state 
, and both systems were set up that way. Now that 
had real impact on some of the older states, such as 
s, Colorado and Idaho. And they have taken major steps 
direction. But it's important to remember that the new 
s started with a clean slate. They came out of a background 
the federal government provided the entire judicial 
A state-administered judicial system in that context was 
picking up what alrea sted and continuing to 
ster it in new and improved form. But during the 1970s 
was a nationwide momentum toward the "Unification of State 
Systems," and in that movement the state funding of trial 
was a major element. The Cobey Commission, for example, 
that virtually every recommendation for improvement of 
court systems during the years preceding that '75 
recommended a "Unif stem." And their excellent 
of that movement po s out that state funding is near 
luded and it's usual state supervis 
stration. And, Colorado and 
the relief to the local 
s kind of 
surprised if 
courts will lead 
increase can be 
courts Now, California 
ten years, but it ce 
acceptable answers. The 
d this issue before them 
the Legislature was 
all of which were 
So you 
funding 
a cons of how 
better adninistration of 
these issued the 
unab to come up 
Committees of both Houses 
972. Inc 1 , in 
three alternat 
study. 
I would like to that background a 1 b 
ause it indicates the nature of this problem. It 
intractable, incidentally, when we d a substantial surplus 
state level and it will 
seal experts are proj 
budget. In '69, I was 
the Federal Highway 
operation of Municipal and 
sted, obviously, in the 
nicely into priority 
We wanted to pursue and obta 
hundred lower court districts 
attack on the 767 that exi 
to 300, the question is, can 
court study done by Booz, Allen 
came with a recommendation 
, county-based lower court 
of lower court costs is 
a state pick-up of salary costs for 
istrators. The Judicial Counci 
recommenda.tion, the Chairman of the 
ttee, Senator Grunsky, a member of 
it, and it was a big issue 
the same time, Assemblyman 
sembly Judiciary Committee and a 
had previously commit 
fully state financed. He 
we opposed his bill on the 
and they were in the 
best step was to work on 
le) he put his bill in his 
ttees got the bills out of the 
committees, both were kil 
study. But that wasn't all. 
ted to the then Chief Justice 
in the trial courts. That 
members appointed by the 
and three by the State Bar. 
f court system and came 
created not what the Council 
a unified trial court and 
ial salary costs. That, of 
to further study. 
That complicated background 
still continuing interest goe 
considered it further in '73 
proposal in '74. In '76 the State 
agreed to present another propo 
course, Senator Song created, 
ssion, which as you know, 
proposal in 1975. The Counci 
r one in '76. None of this, 
support, either in the Legislature 
s, or among the iudges or lawyer 
il decided in one of its st 
11-
that it was going to 
upon which to a 
s with whom it was then 
have all been 
session, this was 
got perhaps 1 
House. And I 
1 pending, and as 
getting by way of 
over that period 
continuing debate on the 
servers will agree that 
the concept of trial court 
in California. I might 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I am not sure 's a val 
ion, but let me say s. We're ly aware of the 
, we are aware of the confl we're obviously seeing 
it. What I am interested is, what makes sense 
your standpoint. The and I understand 
certainly appreciate being to date. What s 
? We want to know what 
MR. KLEPS: I 
and unification. I do 
in the Bench or Bar 
1 level and ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: s 
and unification toqethe 
ipal and the super 
and maybe, while 
s attached, the real 
re a logic to 




the problem is a 
Cl 
The proper way, I 
principles that have 
should put its money 
a program that will 
istration as the reason 
s are concerned, and I d 
the Judicial Council never 
udicial salaries up to 1978. 
and Proposition 13 prob 
take the whole cost." But 
thing that has been 
tate which fixes the 
rest of the judicial sa 
improvement in the system? The reason 
, judges would be taken off 
s are concerned, whether t i 
ccounting that is going to shift j 
s. They are so concerned 
costs us back from the county that 
s a real tangle in the use of 
Fiscal considerations have 
wants to accept help, for 
would increase flexibility 
se the judges' sense of respons 
tern as a whole, and on the ju 
ve got jurisdiction equal to tha 
would create the possibility of 
do with the municipal court j 
administration of judie sa 
the Controller's office, 
istrative problems created. 
a long time, and I think 
step forward if it wou 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: What wou 
s of that? 
MR. KLEPS The Cobey 
twenty million dollars. 
11, at the forty 1 
tern, and it will be what 
for a visible result 
is to have the state 
form salaries through the 
a day when the superior court 
of salary and then the State 
zing them statewide. And I th 
t works and I think it wou 
ASSEMBLYMAN BEEMAN: And 
MR. KLEPS: To get a judicial corps that is not only 
made up of state officers with state fixing their salary, 
creating any admini problems of central 
stration. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LARRY STIRLING: ... and the way the state i 
going to pay for that is out of the general fund or by 
transferring revenues from the courts that the counties presently 
to the state and paying it directly? 
MR. KLEPS: I hardly need to say that revenue shift at 
local level is one of the reasons that all of these programs 
I just described haven't gone anywhere. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: That's the reason I am trying to 
understand the basis for your premise. It is somehow again the 
pocket factor, that the State has 20 million bucks to come 
up with. 
MR. KLEPS: Yes it is, that is right. It is ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: That's a lousy approach. 
MR. KLEPS: It's an obligation of the State to pay the 
of State officers and that's a minor amount of money to 
in getting a corps of judges to feel that they are state 
and have some response to state level policies. 
ASSEMBLY~~N STIRLING: If we follow that logic, then 
lice officers are all state officers. 
MR. KLEPS: No, no. I think, you do it one issue at a 
and you figure out what the benefits are, and if you see 
more benefits than the 20, 30 million dollar cost, it's worth 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: 
the evil being compla 
, if it's factual 
getting judges between 
Well I was only trying to find 
of is. You cited one that is 
somehow there is a tangle of 
count s to cover ... 
MR. KLEPS: It's a major issue. And there is no need 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: I have never heard that, havinc: 
involved in local government for 10 years, and some little 
experience with the criminal justice system. 
1. 
MR. KLEPS: Well, this all takes place at the accounting 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: So, it's the accountants we're 
to please here? 
MR. KLEPS: No, I am 
ications in the flexible use of 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Do 
because Orange County wou not 
s County, or vice versa? 
MR. KLEPS: I think you could 
statement from the Judicial Council on 
s was a serious problem during the t 
sible. And as I say, it has 
recommendation right from 1972 by 
that the one thing the State cou 
, is to pick up judicial salaries. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: I am 11 
MR. KLEPS: Well, I have stated my 
's the best I can do. 
CHAIP~N HARRIS: Thank you much 
MR. ALEXANDER AIKMAN: Good 
, Members of the Committee, I am 
Senior Staff Attorney with the National 
Courts in its Western Office here San Franc 
you don't know what the National Center for 
just say briefly that we are a 
zation that works with and 
country. In the Western office we 
tates, althouqh occasionally we do work 
I am yet another witness who is not 
lly what would be most appropriate 
we are not in a position to make that 
the facts, it's not our 
you for a few minutes 
, what states are picking 
are some of the prob as 
financing or ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Is Cali a 
terns are currently administered? 
MR. AIKMAN: Well, the organiz 
are similar. Obviously, Cali 
else. But I think, if you look 
lar, and perhaps for some of the 
about, they are newer, they are 
of the political problems as exist 
basis, you find the Western State 
the costs of the courts, then Cali 
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, years ago it used to be st, and is still among the 
st in the country. And the trend across the country in the 
last few years has been for more and more state assumption of the 
costs of operation of the courts just voted on it two 
ago, and they are going to state funding. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Can you tell us also whether or not 
controls accompany increased state funding? 
HR. AIKMAN: Almost all of the states that have gone to 
state financing do have a line item at the state level with 
administrative control coming down from the state, at least with 
respect to personnel. Depending on the size of the jurisdiction 
speed with which the State assumes that responsibility may 
But ultimately most states, are few, Pennsylvania 
may be the biggest that does not do that way. Pennsylvania 
has X dollars that they just pay to the counties, increased from 
t to time. But almost every other state, large and small, 
says, "this is our system and we are going to run it at the state 
level." 
What I'd like to do is to get three issues that were 
sed in Hr. LeBov's letter announcing this hearing, what costs 
shoulrt be included, how do you spl up the revenue, and then, 
how much authority should the state assume. This last question 
is the same one the Chairman asked. With respect to included 
costs, I think Mr. LeBov may have shared my full remarks, which I 
am not going to give you this morning. I have a table in there, 
following page 2 of the full remarks which indicates the elements 
o expense that are associated with the judicial system and how 
many of twenty states that nov7 large assume state financing, 
how many of those twenty states picked up those particular items 
costs. 
In general, most of the states assumed all of the 
sonnel costs and all the costs of the system except 
ilities. Facilities in state have rema the most 
fficult issues to be resolved. And, in seven of the 
states have attempted to p up the facil s. 
But when you look at personnel and costs, most of them 
picked up all of those co only ten of those 
states for which we have fund iuvenile 
probation services and only seven adult probation. Because 
of the historical placement of in California in the 
Executive Branch that's probably not going to be a significant 
ssue in California. I assume would not be regarded as part 
the judicial system, for the se of picking up costs. 
Personnel within the judicial normally is assumed to 
the clerks, although Vermont and West Virginia, 
small states, for political reasons, the clerk's offices 
were not picked up as part of state funding. But even if the 
c is constitutionally an independent officer, the State has 
assumed the costs of the clerks themselves if not the clerk, at 
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of the staff 
been a problem 
only fifteen of 
s. In part, because 
even though they are 
In states where the 
ttle bit more than 
they assume financ 
to let the count 
and witness fees. 
lt to resolve in a few 
offices. I forget 
Kleps who referred to 
f the public defender is 
a lot of counties are 
counsel to handle con 
defender's office is 
So private counsel gets 
almost always are assumed 
system. 
If you look for models 
The states have done 
costs. They have carved 
large areas. With re 
is even greater. 
approaches that the state 
s the maximum relief to 
revenue down there. The 
ck up none of the revenue. 
all of the revenues as 
tates do that. If you look 
page 4 which shows the 
in fifteen of the state 
tate is to assume all 
fees with the 
revenue down there. 
s this assumption of 
New York, for 
they assume financ 
years. 
of expenses that 
then you'll also 
some of the counties and 
on what is essential 
cal problem that's worked 
going through. 
s and cities take Y, and 
that," and the bill 
rationale for that, 
If you looked at of control over personnel, 
the one the Chairman was cannot at that issue 
independent of how you are system. For 
instance, if you were to of '11 give them so 
many dollars and let way they want," 
s obvious implications run personnel 
system the way you want and we If you are going to 
make your system a line where pick up certain 
identified costs, then you'll say, "all right, 
we are going to make you at the same time," that has 
an obvious impact on how to control them. There 
seem to be three methods , obvious line item 
budgets, we have just mentioned of a cost 
reimbursement where the s say we spent X on our costs, on 
our courts, and then the State s a for X, and then the 
third is the one that Mr. Gampell was sting, where you make 
a lump sum available to the s. As I indicated, most of 
the states that have gone to state f ing have gone to line 
item budgeting, for the same reason that the Chairman indicated. 
That is, the states now feel a responsibility for this 
stem and they are not will the operation of the 
tern over, or leave it with the s or cities. Well, they 
all the checks, regardless of counties or cities 
So, normally, when the states assume the financing, they do 
also go to a line item budget state control follows. Cost 
reimbursement takes you away an effective state personnel 
system and therefore is the context of California, 
which is so big and so comp But there are problems 
with the cost reimbursement scuss all of them. 
(SPEAKER UNKNOWN) 
the costs? When do the s 
If it's at the end of the fiscal 
reimbursing them the costs, 
twelve or more months after 
than they're getting 
the relief they 
lly, what costs are 
a, I guess Mr. Berman, 
to do when they 
11, they suddenly 
don't do that, you have 
who may be getting $15,000 and 
pretty much the same work 
same work in a bigger stem 
Los Angeles or Orange counties 
20,000. Are you just 
think, we just write the 
to try to set up some 
$15 in one county and $35 
't care that one county is 
11 give us the same service 
maximum salary, you are not re 
When do you get 
ify their costs? 
, then you're never really 
write will be 
That's 
not an ongoing, is not 
1 system. What 
to re se? You referred 
about Mendocino is 
state is paying the 
Even if 
in Mendocino 
clerk is doing 
pretty much the 
same work in 
getting $18,000 or 
care what you 
is? Or are you 
cornputer programmer 
r, are you going say, we 
us $35 and another county 
an ? If you set a 
all of the costs, and if 
't, then you are at the 
lities for reimbursement. 
zation of salaries or accounting 
when Los Angeles bills you for a certain cost, 
same cost that Alpine is billing you, then 
to set up a separate accounting jus 
system to comply with this new process 
MR. AIKMAN: The admini 
simplicity of cost reimbursement. 
with respect to (inaudible) also 
as simple as they would appear to be. 
shed a study for the State of Arizona , 
slative session, considered financing. And we 
figuring out what their costs and revenues , 
the administrative consequences of state tern are 
One of the things we examined was what kind of a block system 
cou you create for Arizona to make it work there. We said, 
's take their costs on a per judge basis, or per lat 
sis, or per filing basis. There was no way we could come 
a single block grant that is fair to all of count 
zona. The range of expenses in those counties the 
spent the least to the county that spent 
, that it really was not possible to come 
grant figure, that would have been fair to 
you were trying to get some uniformity to the system at all. 
thing the block grant does do, I think, is provides a 
The state is saying, within any county, no matter 
or how small, we think at least X per j or X ten 
people for filing should be spent. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: ... can 
a way that you deal with that for and 
floor almost ... or geared to some deal, 
do you understand what I am saying? mean, 
might deal with the allocation of state 
, not a full buy-out but a part 1 
strative costs and then 
... its spends by revenue ... 
MR. AIKMAN: Sure, and 
sylvania is doing, because their s 
not cover the costs of Pittshurqh or 
stance, but it may cover the costs of one 
s. 
(SPEAKER UNKNOWN): So what you say is, 
a floor for you, we are going to give 
so much relief, X dollars, it is. 
s, or you, San Francisco, or you, Santa Rosa, want 
money than X on your judges and on your judicial 
to have a better system then, that is th us. 
to help you out to that extent, and 
1 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: 
you get into with 
double or triple 
just wondering what kind of 
stem. Does that, in fact, add 
? 
HR. AIKMAN: You 
today because of what you 
study from California we 
lowest to the highest is 
t s on a per population basis 
was spending one seventh per 
spending the most. You would 
formity on this effort to 
you would be doing is, simply 
saying our pockets are a litt 
you so much to help you out. 
same problems you have 
if we did the similar 
range from the 
Well, it was seven 
spending the least 
what the county that was 
not be achieving any 
stem more uniform. What 
to the deep pocket, 
than yours and we'll give 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Do we have those figures? 
MR. AIKMAN: Which ones? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: 
the counties. 
, the differentiations among 
MR. AIKMAN: For Arizona? I have provided the 
zona ..• I don't know for Cali We have not studied 
here. This little book has the Arizona study. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Do we 
ifornia? The differences among 
here the possible Arizona range 
seven for ... 
HR. AIKMAN: For ten 
thousand on a per j 
that the costs elements 
be that county A is 
not including. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: 
MR. AIKMAN: But 
t.1R. AIKMAN: 
might well be, 
charge the court 
B may not. It may just assume 
court as having the cost if the 
So 's not going to charge 
usage fee. Some count 
lar figures on 
s? There seems to be 
one to a multiplier of 
It was seven 
those f 
are not simi 
costs that county 
f magn 
bit too obvious, 
services. County A 
use it makes. 
that as a general county 
wants to have a computer. 
individual units with 
The absence of that for 
B would not be a true ref 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Do 
salaries? 
MR. AIKMAN: Yes, the 
Those are picked up 
an issue. There are other 
Chairman? I think that if 
j s 1 
by the state 
issues, if I 
is worth a serious look, a 
trying to make it sound 1 
that's our business, but I 
studying. You don't seem to have, 
, I don't think anyone Cali 
ttee 
that's needed, not only with 
respect to the administrative consequence 
tern that would be created and how it could 
really is needed to make an effect 
whether this is a worthwhile effort. 
take a year or two to get that kind 
be time well spent if it is believed 
consideration in the State of 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Not just 
is going to be a necessity at some 
rather than later. And we certa 
and any advice that your of 
perimeters to questions that we are 
, are not going to get any answers 
s and we are going to need your 
stions. 
MR. AIKMAN: Well, I have 
we have already developed for 
basis available to Mr. LeBov 
that need to be addres In 
have been out here as well. 
checklist. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Can 
Who are you? Are you a 
HR. AIKMAN: The National Center is 
on that does research and consult 
s. That's all we do, in fact. They 
They created this ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: So, genera 
just a pool of experts and if a court 
of studying something, then you're 
Is that the way it works out? 
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MR. AIKMAN: They can also go and hire Arthur Young if 
they want to. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Have you done any work in 
California? 
MR. AIKMAN: 
in years past and on 1. 
, both at the state level 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Such as what? 
MR. AIKMAN: Well, just looking at the last two years, 
we've done a management study Orange County Superior Court, 
which was prompted by the Board of Supervisors concerned about 
costs. We also gave Orange County our estimate of what the cost 
of adding a judge was as a result of the first study. We did a 
management audit of the Municipal Court in Monterey County. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Have you ever done anything that 
shows the implications of various legislation? For example, how 
would prejudgment interest affect the several state court 
processes? 
MR. AIKMAN: Not for California. 
MR. RUBIN R. LOPEZ: Is that do-able? 
MR. AIKMAN: It's do-able. You're going to get a lot of 
people giving you impressions, because it's very hard to measure 
anything. But we could go out and ask people what they think, 
and we can look at other states. The advantage we have is that 
we work very closely with j iaries of every state in the 
country. 
MR. LOPEZ: Is your address and phone number on this 
document? 
MR. AIKMAN: Not on that document, Mr. Lopez. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: 
how many states have the same 
court systems we have in Cali 
give me some indication as to 
of municipal and superior 
? Is that kind of unique? 
MR. AIKMAN: No, most states still have a split trial 
court with limited jurisdiction. The three levels is not unheard 
of, but it's falling by the wayside. What we are finding is the 
limited jurisdiction courts being consolidated single, in 
California, the municipal court (inaudible) and the superior 
court, the general jurisdiction courts begin to form. Most 
states still split one of there ... In fact, Washington, D. C. is 
the only pure kind of jurisdiction in the countrv. And those 
judges are talking about the special ... 
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MR. GAMPELL: The 
county costs is the document 
's office relative to 
counties in California. 
almost eight months at 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: 
Clerks Association 
of those costs and we 
future time. Okay, I 
Judge Schauer, Judge 
Officer of the Superior 
, would you come up ? 
as you so desire. 
JUDGE RICHARD SCHAUER: Mr. 
, my name is Richard Schauer, 
the Los Angeles Superior Court. 
is on my extreme right and also 
, Frank Zolin. 
I came here today really 
sion, either in support or 
minds about that. It , 
details of the state funding, 
It is, of course, going to expens 
s, there is no question about 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Is 
to the taxpayers if 
to the counties in 
that money on the 
on other programs. 
a question of which 
JUDGE SCHAUER: 
really the county 
, so they may be 
people. I think 
and the property tax. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Good 
JUDGE SCHAUER: 
, there would be 
a year. Some estimates 
million dollars a year 
ion dollars a year. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Why 
represent? Hhat would 
represent? 
2 
JUDGE SCHAUER: Well, a number of things. One thing, of 
course, could be the uniform personnel system, the change from an 
accounting system in different smaller units to one statewide 
uniform system for court personnel which would mean that the 
salaries and wages would increase, rather than come down to any 
lower denominator. And then there would be a whole litany of 
additional costs of unification. I don't know that you really 
want to get into that. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: No I real don't, but I was 
interested in what the cost would be, because sometimes we only 
think of the costs being the differences in the salaries of ... 
JUDGE SCHAUER: There would also be the costs of 
changing the forms and retraining the personnel. Municipal 
courts don't do what superior courts do. There have to be 
some .•. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Wouldn't some of that be one-time 
costs? 
JUDGE SCHAUER: Some would be one-time, but the annual 
ongoing cost would be certainly in excess of forty million 
dollars a year. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Are there no offsetting savings that 
you can possibly perceive? 
JUDGE SCHAUER: That plugs into savings, we've run an 
analysis on that which we furnished, I think, to some other 
legislative committees. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Can you give us a copy if we don't 
have it? Do we have one, Mr. LeBov? I don't need it right now, 
thank you. 
JUDGE SCHAUER: Do you have a copy of the letter from 
Judge Eagleson and Frank Zolin? I believe of August of this 
year. In any event, we do believe that there is no compensating 
sufficient benefit for unification if that's poured into st0te 
funding for unification, even separate from state funding. We 
do ••• 
ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN: 
disagree with that? 
do municipal court judges all 
MR. FRANK ZOLIN: I don 1 t think they can shovl you any 
kind of analysis financially. I don't think even the 
strongest ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN: The personal financial ... 
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JUDGE SCHAUER: I don't think 
has been able to any 
ion, indicating there won't 
Maybe, if you project ten 
savings. But that's kind of 
in the present. 
ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN: I could 
be •.. from saving that wou 
courts are underutiliz 
have the whole pool of judges, 
ions .•. (inaudible) to make use 
1 of the particular county 
JUDGE SCHAUER: Well, that's 
that has been made. But I 
and no municipal court judge yet 
unused capacity in his court. And 
year before, every presiding judge 
in Los Angeles County for assistance 
they did not have the available 
of Los Angeles County, but I was 
ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN: One thing 
seem like a very relative question, 
terms of the judicial system and what 
simply changing from certain funding system 
, you ... Well, I might be attracted the 
state funding, I think in the face of 
ing and the fights to get over 
funded unless there is some, more 
fferences that are happening in ... 
s to the judicial system, basic things ( 
JUDGE SCHAUER: Do I think that there 
s from state funding in that sense? Not 
to Mr. Stirling's idea of covert 
deeper and there is 
, I suppose there could 
s. 
ASSEMBLY~ffiN BERMAN: Let's 
pockets now funding the court system 
on there that is just so intolerable 
for a deeper pocket? 
JUDGE SCHAUER: Well, 's 
that it's really a question that you 
son. I did not find so during 
judge. But I think it may be deve 
perhaps in our county and other 
event, I would express our concerns a 
suggested with regard to covert 
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regard to some huge monoli state system, so big and so 
distant that may be more ineffic and more expensive. There 
are advantages, certainly, I think, to state funding of the 
judiciary but there are also 1 If it is decided that 
there should be state funding, I , that the 
judiciary would prefer some subvention or block grant kind of 
provision, local responsibil than a line-item budget 
with inevitable state control. But I'd have very little to say 
other than to tell you that we don't have a final position, a 
really thought out position for or against the state funding as a 
principle. It's going to depend on details. I do ask you, 
however, to proceed with great caution in this area. It's not 
only going to be terribly expens for some taxpayers if there 
is a shift, but additionally I agree with Mr. Aikman, that we 
probably in this state don't have all the information that we 
need to make intelligent projections about the administrative 
results of this. It could be an administrative nightmare if we 
get into state funding, or it could be somewhat advantageous 
administratively. But I do ask you to proceed with caution. I 
believe I can speak for my other two colleagues here and we stand 
ready to be of any assistance we can in connection with the 
actual analysis. Thank you. I'll take any questions I can. You 
may want to hear both Mr. Zolin and Judge Eagleson. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you, Judge. Mr. Zolin. 
MR. ZOLIN: Well, good morning, Mr. Chairman. It's a 
pleasure to be here. I hope you all have copies of my letter of 
November 17, in which I make specific proposals regarding state 
financing. I would like to summarize the major points and the 
highlights of this letter. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. Zolin, will you please introduce 
yourself just for the purpose of the transcription? 
MR. ZOLIN: I am Frank Z 
the Los Angeles Superior Court. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. 
, the Executive Officer of 
MR. ZOLIN: First of all to clari your problem, 
current state accounting budgets is making t extremely difficult 
for counties to continue to f current level of court 
operations. Inflation and revenue problems are anticipated in 
the future, making it extreme fficult for the county to 
continue to maintain the current level of financial support 
mandatory court services. As we ject into the future, as 
stated on the second page of my letter, I project that increased 
need for Los Angeles Superior Court of about 39 judicial officers 
by 1990. That's a very modest 15 percent growth rate and I ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Are you talking about court personnel 
as opposed to judges? 
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MR. ZOLIN: Judges 
se of 39 judges. I assume 
the State of Cali 
pattern. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Once 
ionary assertion. We bl ly 
that there is going to be 
problems and that sort 
I also want to know what the 
stration to reform itself and 
11 for example, our multiple 
present court rule, 
or the judges' part to 
) ? 
MR. ZOLIN: I can answer on that 
s Superior Court has authored and 
streamline operations. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: 
that ... Let me ask you 
firms are going to 
research capability 
MR. ZOLIN: There is a ... No we' 
arrangements (inaudible). 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Do you see 
You know, we're, me and all 
that are deteriorating, wel 
sort of thing. And when I see a 
1-dressed, very important men come 
do something about more money, 
stions and they not 
selves more e I am 
MR. ZOLIN: Well, 
sent any major reform 
ooking at roughly 14 or 
now and 1990, that certa 
to streamline the 
ASSEMBLY~~N STIRLING: Well, 
MR. ZOLIN: I believe 






into them that you do fighting 
bill on court unification. 
Would you put the zeal and sweat 
s' bill and maybe Stirling's 
MR. ZOLIN: We have advocated large reforms and I've got 
a few on my desk, and I'll be happy to bring them to you at the 
next session. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Well, that's fine, as long as you 
put the energy in them. But I'd like to see an equal amount of 
energy be expended on reform as with pleading the case of poverty 
on behalf of the judicial system. 
MR. ZOLIN: I don't believe I am pleading the case of 
poverty. I might be advocating the short pocket proposal rather 
than the deep pocket. And that is, if we do accept the fact that 
the court system requires some expansion in the next few years, 
we have to address the issue of how that expansion is funded. 
At the present time the State of California funds less 
than 9 percent of the operating costs of trial costs of the 
Superior and Municipal Courts and Justice Courts in the State of 
California. County general funds bear 91 percent of the 
operating costs. Now, that does not seem to be a full 
partnership and California is lacking a little in the level of 
financial support of most states in the United States. 
I think the most effective way to provide additional 
state funding for profitable operations is to expand current 
block grant programs or subvention. And I'm trying to get into 
some details here in regards to the administration of such a 
subvention program. First of all, I think it's more appropriate 
to look at net operating costs rather than gross operating costs 
to determine what level of additional financial assistance the 
state should provide. And, I think, when you analyze the revenue 
pictures you reach the conclusion that you will require a 
two-tier level of subvention. 
As you know, superior court judges authorized since the 
passage of SB 90 now receive a subvention of $60,000. There is 
no state subvention provided for mun 1 courts. \·Je are 
proposing that a $200,000 subvention be provided for every 
superior court judicial officer and a $100,000 subvention be 
provided for every municipal court judicial officer. The total 
cost of that to the State will be approximately 211 million 
dollars. That represents about two-thirds of the net county 
costs to operate a court system. That would not include county 
costs incurred for defense services, police services and 
prosecution services and other such related services. 
Why do I recommend the use of a subvention or block 
grant program over a complete state buy-out? I think that are 
several advantages and I list them all on paqe 5. First of all, 
-28-
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Ye 
ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN: 
MR. ZOLIN: S 
ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN: 
grant on population, 
words, you real 
you provide 
MR. ZOLIN: That's 
ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN: 
system is committed 






find the same kind of 
lock grants tho 
ifferences, or are 
MR. ZOLIN: accept the 
differences. Let me of the specific 
questions your Committee s are on page 6. But 
one question you posed is, be included in trial 
court budgets if and when Well, I think you will 
have to look at on an remental is we will start with 
the production of unit courtroom itself. So, I 
think, a logical beginning is courtroom staff, the costs 
directly related to court And Mr. Kleps testified 
very persuasively earl s morning that perhaps the state 
should pay all judges salaries. ly makes sense, but 
as you can see in my letter, I not only all of the 
salaries of all of the judicia but the courtroom 
clerks, court reporters, bailiffs s and the supplies and 
the materials necessary to court. Now if you wish 
to limit state support at that could probably stop at 
that increment, but suppose you move on and finance the direct 
support activities. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Well, I understand that. I don't know 
why anybody wouldn't go for that. But it seems to me that there 
is also some need to at least ss the concept if not the 
specifics of someone who is control. In other words, you 
don't just turn over the All block grants have some 
restraints. I am saying, are we just to turn over the money, or 
are we just going to say "here is $100,000 for each of your 
judges and that's that." 
MR. ZOLIN: I 1 
I believe you now exercise 
on a number of judie 1 off 
that's a legitimate concern. And 
own control. You achieve control 
zed the area ... 
CHAIRHAN HARRIS: \'Jell not now. Basically what we 
do is getting a letter from Board of Supervisors 
indicating that they would resolution the creation of 
the judges, and we as a perfunc matter simply pass that on. 
Those are consent items. Have you ever had any problems with L. 
A. County wanting more j not get ... 
MR. ZOLIN: 
justifies the needs ... 
CHAIRf\1AN HARRIS: 
need is demonstrated, I 
able to get any addit 
MR. ZOLIN: You 
must recognize thRt 
and support costs. 
z 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: We 1 re not 
the County Board of Supervisors 
approve and want these t 
that it is a consent 
costs. 
0 
ls analysis that 
But as soon as the 
that's not been 
s on that basis. You 
additional operating 
ing anything, because 
s that they in fact 
That is the reason 
pays most of the 
MR. ZOLIN: That's been true for the last few years. I 
guess, it's a popular thing. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Let me ask you if I may. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. Stirling. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: For example, if the state did go 
into this block grant, would the judges support the concept 
wherein the state said, you don't need money for a bailiff in a 
civil suit when there is no potential fisticuffs? 
MR. ZOLIN: Well, under the block grant program those 
decisions will be made on the local level. As you know, in Los 
Angeles County we are not staffed (inaudible) bailiffs and we are 
experimenting a court attending program, and we have been 
(inaudible) the savings of our hundred thousand dollars a year 
for any license •.. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: The question would still be, 
should the state have authority to say that the court does not 
need an armed guard in a civil suit, unless it's a dissolution? 
MR. ZOLIN: Well, perhaps the state should have this 
authority and would flow with the block grant proposal. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Would not or would? 
MR. ZOLIN: Would not. The block grant is the available 
money, the current little block distributed on the ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: So, the answer is that we like 
the money to stay 1n but no subsequent controls to it. Even •.• 
MR. ZOLIN: Only those controls established as applies 
to the action. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Well, I mean, this Committee 
makes a statute. Mr. Chairman is trying to ask, to get the feel 
for, what kind of controls you would subject ••• 
MR. ZOLIN: You're right, that's specifically what you 
are saying. The state supporting less than 9 percent of our 
operations. We believe this is a method to increase the state 
share to finance the trial court operation. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. Judge Eagleson. 
JUDGE DAVID EAGLESON: Mr. Chairman, I am David 
Eagleson, the presiding Judge of Los Angeles Superior Court. I 
didn't know where this hearing is going. So, I really carne 
unprepared. But, if I may, I'll address myself to the questions 
which have been asked. You wanted some examples of local 
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control. One is the power of assigning judges. I have a judge 
now that simply has fallen out of favor with those of his 
district with good reason. I intend to shift him forthwith. I 
would hate to have to go to a committee in San Francisco or 
Sacramento to wait for an authority to do that. We have an 0. R. 
program, where we release people on their own recognizance and 
they work closely with the sheriff's office. You may know that 
in our county we have so many people in jail that I am signing an 
order letting them out, as the sheriff drives up to door with a 
van load to put more in the front door. And, of course, the 0. 
R. program permits people of certain risk, if there is such a 
thing, to release, to return to their first assigned criminal 
court date. 
We have a very ambitious escalation of our arbitration 
program in Los Angeles County, and I have asked Mrs. Owen to 
staff up to handle it. I didn't get any permission from anybody 
in Sacramento or San Francisco to do that. I felt that now is 
the time to go with the program and we had dramatic results. But 
that is something that is handled locally. I don't know how you 
could draft a guideline statewide to apply to the different 
counties with their different levels of needs. 
Another simple example is the question of attorneys' 
fees. In Los Angeles County, I think is fair to say, lawyers 
have more ambitious views of reasonable fees that they might have 
in other counties. I think we have to pay a minimum of $40.00 an 
hour to get somebody to come down to take a look at a case, 
whereas perhaps $25.00 is the going rate in Fresno. I just don't 
know how you would ever accept an office somewhere and draft 
something that would fit the parochial views of people who do 
this kind of work in 58 counties, it boggles my mind. I don't 
think it could be done. I don't think Ralph Gampell could do it. 
I don't think Kleps could do it, and the two of them together 
couldn't do it. This is my view. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: What do you think of the idea, though, 
of the state establishing some minimal foundation level? If we 
allotted so many dollars per judge, or some figure that we 
determine is going the state's support level on a person to judge 




JUDGE EAGLESON: Yes, that's the only thing that makes 
without bringing the labor unions down on your head or 
pay the clerk in Mendocino the same as in downtown Los 
You'd open a hornet's nest like you wouldn't believe. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: If we have to pay a hundred 
thousand for an additional new judge, we are going to look at it 
a little differently than when it's being sixty thousand. 
JUDGE EAGLESON: That's true. A hundred thousand does 
not come anywhere near what Mrs. Owens suggested to me as an 
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appropriate level to increase state funding to. It probably 
could come to three hundred or four hundred thousand dollars per 
superior court judge. 
ASSEMBLY}ffiN STIRLING: When it is two hundred thousand 
dollars for a superior court judge, how far down the list does 
that get you? Does that get you to the library and equipment? 
JUDGE EAGLESON: Yes, it would get to that first group 
of courtroom staff. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. Berman, you asked a question. 
Yes. 
JUDGE EAGLESON: Mr. Berman, you asked the question 
about the municipal court judges and how many utilizations 
thereof. Governor Brown has recently appointed many of the 
judges to our court from the Los Angeles Municipal Court, and 
without exception, Jim Nelson, the P. J. called me on the phone 
begging to let those people stay on. He simply could not 
function without those judges staying on his court until he had 
his replacements appointed by the Governor. I have done that. I 
thought that his needs overruled mine. There is no 
under-utilization, at least in my county. 
ASSEHBLYMAN STIRLING: Your Honor, your reputation for 
procedure, management ab1lity, and aggressiveness is excellent. 
But for example, when somebody files a civil suit in the 
municipal court and a cross-file, a cross-complaint at a higher 
rate, doesn't that remove jurisdiction for the Superior Court? 
JUDGE EAGLESON: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: And don't you have a double 
filing encouraged specifically by the bifurcation of the courts. 
JUDGE EAGLESON: Not a double filing. They just put a 
proper .•. 
ASSEMBLY}ffiN STIRLING: One clerk system, one record 
system. 
JUDGE EAGLESON: They put another case number on it. 
They put another banner on it and put it upstairs. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: That would have been unnecessary 
had we not have the jurisdictional bifurcation? 
JUDGE EAGLESON: Well, that's true. We're talking about 
five minutes per additional ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Well, a delay of scheduling and 
that sort ... I ask in your court system ... 
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JUDGE EAGLESON: No, there is no delay in that, no sir. 
That case, that you're talking about ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: There is an inherent delay when 
you withdraw from one court and go to another in the service of 
the public. The person who filed the complaint supposedly has a 
legitimate grievance now when moved from one jurisdiction, which 
may be in their community, to a court that may not be in their 
community, most likely is not in ... Do you have, or do you allow 
individual judges, or do you require individual judges to the 
calendar (inaudible) done by some central calendaring process. 
JUDGE EAGLESON: We have in our criminal division 
downtown, we have, what we call direct calendar, which doesn't 
work in civil cases. We have a master calendar in the central 
civil area. We have a direct calendaring and master calendaring 
in the other divisions of our court, based upon again upon the 
personalities of the players. When you talk about a justice 
system, it's not just a judge, it's not just the law, it's the 
public defender, the sheriffs, the D. A. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: I understand that, your Honor. 
Could I ask my question again? Do you require the judges to do 
their own calendaring? Once you assign the case, the judges from 
then on is the delay or advance of that case his or her 
responsibility? 
JUDGE EAGLESON: As I say, we have different systems in 
different areas in our court •.. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: I didn't recognize your 
terminology, that the reason ... 
JUDGE EAGLESON: ... Central civil area, the cases come 
to us based on the age of the case. In the criminal division 
downtown, the individual judge will move the cases on his 
calendar as he can process them. He is in direct control of his 
calendar. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Of that particular case? 
JUDGE EAGLESON: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYHAN STIRLING: And you don't do that on the 
civil side because ... 
JUDGE EAGLESON: Oh, for a lot of reasons. Number one, 
their different skills Some judges are not as skillful as 
others, they can 1 t process cases as fast. If you start parceling 
cases out willy-nilly to forty-five judges, you're going to find 
some person with a t\venty case backlog and some person with a two 
hundred case backlog. 
-34-
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Wouldn't that cause you to call 
in the one with the two hundred case backlog and have a 
heart-to-heart chat with him? 
JUDGE EAGLESON: I have to be frank, sir. Some people 
are more skillful than others. If they don't have it, they don't 
have it; if they do, they do. I have no control over the 
players. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: No control over the players? 
JUDGE EAGLESON: Whoever is sent to that court by the 
power of myself 1s assimilated and they do the best they can. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: It's not incumbent upon the 
judiciary to police its own, its colleagues and those that are 
not productive, or even though the best political evaluation of 
going in was that they will be a good judge, and if the on the 
job performance indicates not, isn't that your responsibility to 
call that to somebody's attention and either improve them or can 
them? 
JUDGE EAGLESON: Well, I can't can, number one. 
Secondly, it's like people that play football. Some people are 
very fast and some people are not so fast. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: I only see the judiciary system 
saying, some of our colleagues are weak, we didn't appoint them, 
we're not going to embarrass them by getting rid of them, give us 
some more judges to make up for those weak colleagues. That's 
the direct impression that the entire judiciary gives. 
JUDGE EAGLESON: Well, I am sorry if that's the case. 
The first part of what you say is correct. We do not appoint 
them, number one. Number two, I have no authority to dispense 
with them ..• 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: If I were one of your junior 
superior court judges and you call me downtown to your 
wood-paneled office and stern face and said, Stirling, turn those 
cases out, I would. Yes, it could scare me. I would be a little 
more attentive to my duty than to a golf game. 
JUDGE EAGLESON: Again, all I really have a right to 
expect is that the person who works a reasonable workday do the 
best they can. Having said that, there are vast differences in 
capabilities, in skills, in swiftness, intellects, concern, and 
all I can SRY to you is that you should work X hours a day and to 
do the best you can. But still the work product of judge A is 
going to be twice that of judge B. And to ignore that is just to 
ignore reality. That may be true of this, of this body here, I 
don't know. 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Do you 
add? We keep interrupting you. 
process. 
anything you'd like to 
's nature of the hearing 
JUDGE EAGLESON: In response to Mr. Berman's earlier 
question, Los Angeles Superior Court came up with an omnibus 
pretrial concept in 1971, together with 38 other proposals. We 
sent someone up here for six months to and lobby the 
proposals through. One passed the other 38 were shot down. The 
motions to suppress was part of the omnibus pretrial hearings, 
deliberated by the California Judges Association when I was 
president a couple of years ago, and we decided not to support 
the bill. We felt that the public defender, and this is based 
not on guess work, it is based on hard core experience, was 
confronted with a due date on filing his pretrial motions. He 
worked all 37 of them, and then he would have those to go through 
one at a time, but if you gave him time to sit through his case, 
get his thoughts in order, talk to the defendant, do the things 
that public defenders have to do, he might hit you with one or 
two and that's what you have to field, and not the vast number of 
these motions that can be filed. It's a matter of discretion, 
and those who practice criminal law as lawyers and those who sit 
in trial judges, criminal trial judges were convinced beyond a 
shadow of a doubt, that the omnibus pretrial concept was a step 
backwards in terms of saving judicial time, and that's why they 
didn't support it. Now, the L. A. Superior Court still has the 
position that I announced; we had it for over ten years, but the 
statewide experience is •.. Actually I see the Chairman shaking 
his head, perhaps he knows. That's the answer to that question. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. Mr. Stirling has another 
question. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: How about the coordination of 
your judges s research, write his opinions ... 
JUDGE EAGLESON: Great idea! All we need is money. 
ASSEf\1BLYMAN STIRLING: 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: 
obviously need additional 
very skeptical of any restr 
(Inaudible) 
the bottom line is that you 
support, but you'd be 
that would be put 
on that Is that right? 
JUDGE EAGLESON: What I would call to day operations 
controls, would 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: So 
day to day 
acceptab to you. 
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as it does not interfere with 
restr may, in fact, be 
JUDGE Of a broad nature, yes. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. Very good. Thank you 
gentlemen, very much. Ms. Hoffman, please. Forgive 
me, I you inadvertently. Otherwise you could have 
been up Thank you. 
MS. BEATRICE HOFFMAN: No problem. Some of what I was 
going to say was said by Mr. Aikman. Let me introduce myself. 
My name is Hoffman, and I do not represent an 
organization, just myself. I am a San Francisco resident. I own 
and a small consulting firm, Court Research Associates, 
which provides research and assistance for courts and law 
offices. I done work in California along with about sixteen 
other states, many of which are state funded. 
ing the firm, I was director of Research 
and Deve the Colorado State Judicial Department, 
starting there at the same time the state funding was first 
implemented 1970. And over a seven-year period my 
responsibi s luded data collection analysis, planning for 
courts and probation departments, data processing and records. 
From '78 to '81 I was a member of a two-person evaluation team 
which semiannually reviewed the progress of the state court's 
admini office in implementing ... in the unified court 
system. member of that team ... Law School and former 
Colorado Court Administrator completed a study in 1979 of 
more than state funded judicial systems. And he found so 
much variation among the systems that it was virtually impossible 
to construct meaningful models for comparison purposes. This 
diversity s that it is difficult to make general 
conclus advantages and disadvantages of state funded 
systems per So, I would like to make a few comments on the 










, one of the most pressing problems 
state funding legislation is the distribution 
local municipalities are loath to give them up. 
, however, one of the most nagging questions 
ili s. Let me explain this, I see these 
The qeneral pattern has been that the bulk 
revenue started to (inaudible), particularly 
s from general jurisdiction of courts. In the 
period, the county was very happy to 
s in exchange for being relieved of the 
idizing the courts. However, as time 
they made a very good bargain, and they begin 
fiscal responsibilities toward the court 
about states that have taken over substantial 
facilities. This local resentment 
state systems paid rent. There is controversy 
the basis for payment. How do governments 
le) space of the points that are taken up and 
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they particularly opposed having to provide new courtrooms or 
enlarge court offices whenever the state adds a new judge or 
additional personnel. Court administrators may even have to 
negotiate for janitorial service, or electrical repair, or simple 
upkeep of the physical plant. 
Since it would seem financially diff lt for the State 
of California to take over funding of all the state facilities, I 
would suggest that the proposed legislation would specify clearly 
that somewhere within the confines of local governments for their 
general funds to cover among other purposes court facilities and 
maintenance costs. Another matter I wish to discuss is 
personnel. 
And I bring in an example of what we talk about in terms 
of state funding and local control. If California goes to a 
buy-out, I believe strongly in a separate judicial personnel 
system. The ABA has stressed the need for a separate independent 
personnel system in order that the judiciary maintains itself as 
an independent and respected branch of government on par with the 
executive and legislative branches, in order to take 
responsibility for administering its own affairs effectively and 
efficiently. There are advantages to installing a state judicial 
personnel system. It allows for equalization in pay scales for 
like duties, permitting accountability to the Legislature. It 
provides career ladders for judicial system employees, allowing 
them to transfer across county lines, and allows the system to be 
cost effective. 
In most states where the court system has been state 
funded, statewide personnel rules have been adopted by the 
Supreme Court. This transition from local to state 
classification takes substantial time to work, with much review 
by judges and non-judicial personnel. In most states this has 
taken about two years and would take at least that in California. 
I think it's critical for such a system to work well that local 
jurisdictions are allowed to hire locally, and administer the 
system locally within the regulation of the state system. The 
state office should do reclassifications, assist and monitor the 
local jurisdiction in compliance with the rule and have an appeal 
board composed of judges of the courts. That's my example of how 
you have a state system, but you have local control. In other 
words, the hiring of staff is done down there. Nobody in 
Sacramento is telling Los Angeles or San Francisco who they can 
hire and who not. And I think the same example can occur with 
operating expenses and capital outlay as well as personnel. We 
found out that when state funding is proposed, neither the 
Legislature nor the judiciary recognize the need for adding 
sufficient qualified administrative staff to help operate the 
system and provide accountabil The is, that just as in 
the executive branch and the Legislature, state judicial 
system needs administrative staff to transition work and 
the system operate efficiently. 
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and Mr. Kleps that 
between various 
1 and state 
suff 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Very good 
insights. Welcome. to see you. How are 
you? 
JUDGE ROY WONDER: Mr. Chairman. Thank you for inviting 
me and 
Very briefly, I'd 
respect to this 
state funding 
that some of 
s Association to come and comment. 
like to state the position of the CJA with 
slation. The California judges support the 
trial courts, but only where it provides 
be left with the local jurisdiction. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You can say total control, or do you 
think that perimeter control might be established? 
JUDGE WONDER: Perimeters of the control, and Judge 
Eagleson has given some examples of the control of the presiding 
judge of course, who must be elected locally, in our opinion, and 
the presiding judge must have the responsibility for making 
assignments in the courts and taking care of personnel matters, 
which I think Mr. Stirling has alluded to. That generally is our 
position. You had a lot of testimony. I'd be happy to expand on 
that, although 's 
CHAI~~N HARRIS: I think that there is no question that 
we are going to be heading into the direction either this 
legis or some other legislation, is going to bind the state 
into assuming more of a role in the funding of the local courts. 
And the real st is what controls will in fact give us the 
we are not simply providing the deep pockets but also 
make the system is efficient and effective 
not just adding money to fuel the fire. 








t instead of a cost reimbursement for the 
that there be an essential needs formula 
disagree with my colleagues from Los 
thousand dollar subvention. I believe 
has s own pecul ties, and that there 
established. And once that formula is 
perimeters that local jurisdiction 
within 
That is correct. 
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needs formula as 
state? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I see. That's an interesting concept 
we ought to look at. Thank you. I apprec it, Judge Wonder. 
Okay. I would like to call up three witnesses if I might. 
Frederick R. Ohlrich, Jim Simpson and Carl Olsen. Welcome 
gentlemen. 
MR. FREDERICK K. OHLRICH: Thank you. I am Fritz 
Ohlrich, Court Administrator of the Newhall Municipal Court, 
representing the Municipal Court Clerks Association. I'd like to 
try to list my comments first and specif address the three 
items that Mr. LeBov's memo raised. The Municipal Clerks 
Association would support limited court financing of the 
municipal courts in California. Our Association would endorse 
the proposal that judges' salaries and the block grant approach 
similarly which is now being used in the superior court be 
expanded to include the municipal court. I see no reason why 
this is not presently done. One of the questions Mr. Stirling 
has raised consistently all morning is why would we do that for 
the municipal court judges? In the last few years there has 
been, at least in my county, tremendous pressure, sometimes not 
very direct, but always there, placed on the municipal courts to 
generate more revenue. The judges, I think, are taking the place 
of the tax collector, or tax assessor, since Prop 13. "We want 
more money, let's go to the courts. We want a new typewriter, we 
want a new automated record system, how much money can you give 
us, how much can you increase the fines. 11 I think, the judges 
must be isolated from that kind of situation. As long as you're 
dealing with traffic tickets, you are obviously dealing with an 
enormous amount of money. In Los Angeles County we collect a 
total of somewhere around a hundred and fifteen million dollars 
in revenue last year. But I think, you need to try to isolate 
the judges from that direct pressure. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Let me say something. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. Mr. ing has a question. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: I am not sure that I 
philosophically agree with that. I don't think judges should be 
in the mainstream, nor in the political fabric which is really 
the allocation of resources. At the same time it is only judges 
and the ancillary court personnel that know the reforms that are 
available. We cannot do it because we don't practice inside the 
courts. We don't know what the guts of the inery are, we 
don't know what opportunities for reform are there. We don't 
know what the latest state of the art running a clerk 
operation is. But the times that I have looked into it, I have 
found them to be lly And the technology has not 
been brought to bear, and the only mes out of the 
whole ancillary situation is, us more, same as every 
other operation has said in s state. So becomes incumbent 
on the professionals and the brothers to demand, first of all 























we as court 
However, I would 
s County, our 
traffic 
a year. 
It is not 
met enormous 
And I think, 
revenue hasn't 
s just a of money. 
tern as large as Los 
an incentive to make 
back. That is changed, 
productivity program 
there. Certainly, as 
we have introduced 
one other thing. 
on 1 court efficiency 
, in December, and we would 
profession, from the c , 
the courts as to how 
our disposal try to 
that this is an 
from Mr. Stirling's 
other legislators as well, 
does the court want to do. 
more money, at some point 
s that may be considered to 
But if we are not getting any 
41 
you will probably 
receptive to our 
measures. The second 
forfeitures, and I 
judges salaries 
money. His lly, 
cities and 
to get a 
assessments and 
quite a fast rate. 
costs of the action. Three years ago, when the municipal court 
jurisdiction was five thousand dollars, it cost approximate $50 
to file a fifteen thousand dollar lawsuit Los Angeles County 
in the superior court. Now that same fifteen thousand dollar 
lawsuit is filed in the municipal court for $25. does not 
make good sense to me. I think that there is 
to look at a sliding scale in that particular area. 
The second area has to do with traffic 
forfeitures. We think the traffic infraction f 
misdemeanor fines need to be increased. In 
not been increased since infractions were created 
The level should be raised. There was great 
fine schedule, the bail schedule in traff infractions. We 
would go so far as to endorse a statewide schedule forfe 
traffic fines, set by a state board and that f would 
all assessments. You will now find $50 but it's real 
$70 because of the assessments, and that will be 
the first of the year. We should be saying what 
overall fine is, and increase it perhaps to the maximum of a $150 
- $200 on infractions. We should simplify the distribution s 
and forfeitures and get rid of the complicated formulas that 
one can understand. And I would say that without except 
including the state auditors office and all of us that deal th 
that. And there are portions of it that we all disagree on. 
Very, very complicated! 
Let's find a formula that can be split three ways and 
share those fine revenues among city, county and state. The 
state should increase or should receive the increase newer ones. 
I would basically suggest that the county's and the city's 
portions of fine and forfeiture revenue could be frozen at 
current levels with some kind of inflationary escalator to al 
a-slight increase each year. But let the new revenue, from 
and forfeitures, accrue to the State General Fund to be 
pay for judges, municipal court judges salaries. 
Finally, as to the third question Mr. LeBov raised 
v10uld be unrealistic to assume that the state should assume any 
additional authority over state municipal court personnel. If 
you want me to answer any questions, I'd be happy to. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. Jim Simpson 
MR. ,JH1 SH1PSON: Jim Simpson, representing the County 
Clerks Association. I am taking the position that we are not 
asking for any money. We are neutral on the question. He did 
conduct a survey in 58 counties. We got 40 responses. We asked 
questions about what is the cost to operate the superior, 
municipal, justice and county clerk in your county. What is the 
total income generated, and what is the net cost to the county. 
We received 40 county responses. The one-line figure looks like 
$162 million for those 40 counties that is being subsidized by 
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the government. We did a proj on missing 18 and looked at 
them based population and consumer planning and that looks 
like another $26-1/2 million. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Are they just estimates, excuse 
me, I didn't understand. What was the gap, money coming in, what 
were you trying to ? 
MR What I am trying to say is, right now it 
looks to us, s s from data from budgets that were just 
approved in July, that there is $190 million that has been picked 
by local government. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: On the operation of ••. 
MR. SIMPSON: ... operation of superior court, municipal 
court, justice court ... It's very difficult to find numbers. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Could you give us some breakdown by 
county of the disparity among counties on a population basis 
similarly to Mr. Aikman's statistics for other states? 
MR. SIMPSON: I did not bring them with me, I tried to 
summarize them. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Could you make them available to us? 
Thank you. 
MR. SIMPSON: We also would agree with the Municipal 
•court Clerks Association, and the County Clerks have tried 
repeatedly and have been very successful in trying to change 
things. You know, we live with millions of files that are 
handreds of years old, Rnd why do we keep all that paper, so we 
came down this year and got a bill through that allows us to 
select. We're looking for those things. They are 
housekeeping That costs money. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Mr. Simpson, did you write me on 
my court unification bill? 
MR. SIMPSON: Yes, sir. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: You know, the only correspondence 
I've ever rece you and your association is what you're 
against as opposed to what you're for, and that, unfortunately, 
sets the tone of tude towards your organization. You say 
you support se re , but there should be a flow of those, 
and if we're not picking up on them, you should be insisting that 
we look at s letter was the only correspondence I have 
ever received from you and your organization, as were against 
some proposed in the system. Not even the 
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discussion thereof. Not even recommended changes. We're simply 
against any changes to the system. That doesn't sit well. 
MR. SIMPSON: 
I wrote you one letter 
discussed the bill and 
change or two would be 
Well, with all due respect, Mr. Stirling, 
because you had that one bill and we 
looked at the bill and we thought maybe a 
in order. 
ASSEMBLYt1AN STIRLING: What I am saying, that's fine, it is 
your First Amendment right to do that, but I think you also have 
the responsibility as a professional to be constantly, 
profession in general, to be constantly looking for reforms and 
improvements in the efficiency of the system. Nobody else 
where they are. The responsibility is yours. 
MR. SIMPSON: I'd be happy, sir, to send you a list of 
the bills we sponsored in the last four years ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: .•. And what they have done. 
Terrific. How about a list of the ones that you want to sponsor 
in the next five years? 
MR. SIMPSON: I'd be happy to send those too. 
CHAI~~N HARRIS: Thank you. Sir. 
MR. CARL OLSEN: I am Carl Olsen, County Clerk from San 
Francisco, also supporting the County Clerks Association's 
position. I only have one thing to add, other than to point out 
that some of the comments which have been made previously about 
the administrative problems and some things like courts might 
occur, and the the salaries and pension plans in the various 
counties throughout the state which would become a burden 
administratively, I believe, for toleration. Also, the fact that 
there now is possibly bringing bailiffs and other important 
personnel under this umbrella, now they're separated out from 
other officers of the system. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you, thank you very much, s 
Okay. We have a number of witnesses who are not going to testify 
but they have made their testimony available and I would just 
mention John McCammon, Lari Sheehan, Robert Laurie as well as 
John Gardenal. Someone is here from the CTLA, so I won't mention 
that. Mr. Vic Bellerue, would you come forward please? Welcome. 
How are you sir? 
MR. VIC BELLERUE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I am Vic 
Bellerue from the Orange County Counsel's office. I really 
didn't bring any prepared remarks, I did bring severaJ copies of 
the study that was alluded to earlier, conducted by the National 
Center for State Courts with regard to the New York County 
situation. Thank you. 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you very much. We appreciate 
your being here. Mr. Stirl is not going to let anyone get 
away ..• 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Well, I am not trying to be 
officious, but what motivated your court to go out and fund a 
study or did the state implore you to do ? 
MR. BELLERUE: I don't know for sure. I know that our 
Board of Supervisors has been actively involved in determining, 
trying to come up with a figure in terms of increasing the $60 
thousand block grant. Our County Administrative Office has done 
extensive studies to come up with a figure that is frankly higher 
than the figure you see here. This study was, I think, motivated 
by the courts and, I believe, the final decision made by the 
Board of Supervisors was in the area of $13 thousand, which is 
very close to the figure you have here. The point being, that 
the figures are all over the ballpark. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. Mr. Campbell. Good 
afternoon, how are you? 
MR. JOHN CAMPBELL: Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. My 
name is John Campbell, I am the Executive Secretary of the 
Economy and Efficiency Commission in Los Angeles County, that is 
an advisory committee appointed by the Board of Supervisors. I 
have some very brief verbal remarks. I have a little written 
statement. The E&E Commission was asked about six months ago to 
undertake an analysis of the congestion of the courts. The 
commission consists of several lawyers and several people who are 
professionals in other fields. I have provided the Committee 
with a copy of the study. We published that study in October and 
one of the fifteen recommendations addresses the question of 
state subsidy. 
In E&E Commission analyses, the commission had 
recommended state financing of the trial court system, but only 
within the framework of a comprehensive restructuring of the 
entire local government system, counties, cities and so forth. 
In this report we did not repeat that recommendation, instead we 
said that the level of state subsidy needs to be tied to the cost 
of the services provided, and when we use the word cost, we are 
referring to total costs of all the departments and all the 
operations addition to the costs of facilities, costs of 
maintaining facil s. We don't see any realistic possibility 
of one hundred state financing. In the area of fines and 
forfeitures, that you've asked about, our commission stated that 
the formulas need to be revised to base the distribution of 
revenues on again cost of the services that they were 
intended to finance. If you do go to buy-out of the trial court 
system, I would suggest, of course, that all revenues go to the 
state, except that whatever it is that's allocated to cities for 
law enforcement should also be allocated to counties for 
unincorporated area law enforcement. 
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As to the area of personnel standard, work statements 
and job descriptions, and so forth, our comment would be that, in 
the event of total buy-out then the state should assume those 
kinds of responsibilities. Of course the operating management 
responsibilities are necessarily decentralized on the local 
level. This report that I referred to, Mr. LeBov has a copy of 
it, contains a fairly comprehensive approach to resources and 
resource management issues. We address, for example, deeper 
service questions within the context of their possible use as 
incentives to create community pressure, legal pressure on, for 
improvement kinds of issues. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. Campbell, let me ask you a 
question. Do you have a feeling or a position one way or the 
other as to whether not a uniform standard for state subvention 
would be appropriate as opposed to the formula allocation that 
Judge Wonder advocated? Should we use a needs formula for the 
county if in fact the state is going to assume a greater role in 
the funding? 
MR. CAMPBELL: Our recommendation was proportionality of 
costs. The idea of a floor is not too appealing intuitively, 
because it eliminates incentives. The idea of recognizing within 
your allocation system that counties are different, the nature of 
litigation is different, the nature of the judiciary, the kind of 
formula that was suggested that would take those differences into 
account, hopefully not on an entitlement basis, based on 
population, but perhaps rather on some measure of complexity, 
some measure of production. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you, thank you. Our next 
witness is Mr. John Guthrie, the Finance Director of the City of 
Oakland. Mr. Guthrie. Good to see you again. 
MR. JOHN GUTHRIE: Mr. Chairman, Members of the 
Committee. If any of you are wondering what Oakland's interest 
is in this, it's purely financial. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I see. 
MR. GUTHRIE: In relation to the question of how fines 
and forfeitures "collected by the courts" should be distributed, 
I'd like to make you aware that in the case of Oakland they are 
not collected by the courts. They are collected by the City of 
Oakland. We issue and collect all of our parking citations and 
moving violations. The only point where the courts get involved 
in this is the point where they go into warrant. Accordingly, 
Oakland keeps about 78 percent revenue. The county gets about 22 
percent for the court system. In the case of Oakland, these 
revenues amount to about four million dollars, or 3.4 percent of 
Oakland's general fund budget. Now, I don't want to spend a lot 
of time here, telling you how poor Oakland is. I think you have 
heard this before, but Oakland, nonetheless, has had to make $22 
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million worth of cuts over the last three years since the 
passage of Prop 13. s is a good portion of revenue to 
Oakland. I would just like to request that you be cautious of 
any forms of allocations of the fines and forfeitures 
that are col In this case, especially the case of 
Oakland, you'd robbing a very, very poor Peter to pay Paul. 
Oakland needs money too much. We use the money for general 
operations, and the case of moving violations that is 
virtually the only money we're spending right now on 
improvements. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: That is interesting. 
MR. GUTHRIE: I'd like you also to consider that there 
is a possibility that were this money rechanneled there could be 
some SB 90 considerations and the fact that we are spending the 
money for collections, et cetera. I think, if you are 
considering this approach, you should probably look at some 
approach to pay for incremental costs very similar to the Presley 
legislation, which would raise these and distributions, or, in 
fact, be considered new revenue sources, if the collective wants 
a unification of the court system, perhaps they should be willing 
to pay for it. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me ask a question before you 
leave. As it relates to Oakland's costs, this is a revenue 
generating item for the city of Oakland, the fees et cetera. 
It's not a loser, is it? 
MR. GUTHRIE: Yes, it is a revenue generator, however, 
the costs are not that much below the revenues. In the case of 
parking violations, for example, we receive $2.5 million a year. 
Approximately $700 thousand of that goes into collections and the 
administra of We have to pay for the parking meter 
collectors, all the tickets that are issued. We have to pay 
for the restorat of parking meters. So, in that case, ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Do you have any idea what the income 
versus expenses is on that? 
Harris, 
that. 
would probably, I am just guessing, Mr. 
be a profit of a hundred million on 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: A hundred llion. Okay, I see. 
MR. GUTHRIE: I could actually look that up for you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: No, I understand that, I was just 
trying to get an idea, and that's all I wanted to know. 
MR. GUTHRIE: Again, that million is paying for other 
uniformed officers and parks, et cetera. 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I understand, I understand. Thank you 
very much. Okay. I'd like to call forward Mr. Britton, and Gary 
Cramer, please. Mr. Cramer would you like to come forward? 
MR. BOB BRITTON: Mr. Chairman, Members of the 
Committee. My name is Bob Britton. I am representing Local 715 
of SEIU, and I am here today because we represent court workers 
in Santa Clara County. We're concerned that control over 
personnel, classification of hiring, discipline and things like 
that remain with the County Board of Supervisors, not with the 
judges. We have represented courtroom personnel for about eleven 
years and recently have had some problems with the court in that 
they are telling us that we no longer represent those workers 
And the Board of Supervisors is preparing to file a suit against 
the superior court. In our recent contract negotiations the 
judges of the Superior Court presented to the Board of 
Supervisors their needs and desires in negotiations. A couple of 
these were that they wanted to be exempt from a provision in the 
contract that provided for (inaudible) agreements. They also 
wanted to be exempt from (inaudible). That final (inaudible) for 
worker in court would be with the presiding judge. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Are the court personnel of Santa Clara 
civil service? 
MR. BRITTON: Yes. And that's another problem. The 
judges have decided not to go through the County Merit System 
rules and have set up their own hiring committee. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: That is the case in a lot of counties. 
MR. BRITTON: Pardon me? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I said, that is the case in a number 
of counties. 
MR. BRITTON: Okay. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I am not in favor of that, but that is 
the case. 
MR. BRITTON: Well, we're concerned. We've had the 
problems. We recently won a grievance in arbitration, where the 
superior court was not allowing their workers to go to 
orientation and have union orientations, which is a part of the 
contract. We won that grievance and the County had to pay the 
union ten thousand dollars to provide the orientation. But now, 
it's reverted back again. The court is refusing to provide 
orientation. So, I think, it's not just a matter of where the 
control over personnel stays with the court or not, for us, we 
need the control to stay with the Board of Supervisors. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I see. Thank you, sir. 
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MR. GARY CRAMER: Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. My name 
--------~------~ is Gary Cramer, I Municipal Court Reporter in Los Angeles. 
I am here on Los Angeles Court Reporters 
Association is made of of the Los Angeles 
Municipal and les Superior Court Reporters. I am 
also here on of the California Court Reporters 
Association. we're represented by another local SEIU, 
Local 660 Los s, and I am speaking on behalf of our 
membership as an association and also as a member of local 660. 
And there real isn't anybody who is something other than a 
management or management type that's here to address you. 
Since aren't any specifics in AB 1820, I am going 
to assume for s of discussion here, that the state funding 
of the trial courts will bring in eventual control of the courts 
by the Judicial Council. Our chief concern of state funding of 
the trial courts is the increased power which it eventually gives 
to the Judicial Council, and we're concerned principally with the 
loss of local control, affirmative methods of recording or 
recording proceedings and transcript income retention. We don't 
want to become state employees, nor do we believe the Judicial 
Council can adequately oversee the day to day operations of the 
trial courts, particularly in providing court reporting services. 
Although, mechanical, all court reporters do the same thing, 
there are vast differences in job requirements amount the 
jurisdictions. There are also significant differences in 
salaries from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, which appropriately 
reflect the di job requirements. Some jurisdictions 
employ court reporters full time and some employ us part time and 
we think it's just like a central control which helps to lower 
the costs of providing court reporting services. 
In L. A. County, as well as other counties, we are 
members of retirement system, and we wish to remain 
of that rather than being forced to become part of 
the state system, where our benefits would be reduced. 
Fringe bene court reporters vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. A state takeover of the court reporting services 
would probab cost, with the standardization of benefits, an 
overall increase to the taxpayers of California. In L. A. County 
alone, providing court reporting services vary for full. time 
employed court reporters with the attendant costs of fringe 
benefits. The individuals being employed full time without 
benef to ition agencies providing reporters on an as 
needed basis all of which lowers the costs, or the overall costs 
of providing court ing services. 
Court reporting at times can be an extremely difficult 
we be 1 control provides that impetus for the 
re 
they serve s 
necessary and 
among all the reporters. The 
tween the local reporter groups and the courts 
an outstanding example of why local control is 
des le. Reporters Association of Los 
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Angeles conducts examination for the court, we conduct seminars 
for reporters during bar week, we formulate scheduling every 
quarter, we orient and rehire reporters, we've developed a number 
of publications in conjunction with and for the court and at no 
expense to the county or the court, or anybody else. The 
representation we received by Local 660 in L. A is outstanding. 
We believe our rapport with both the municipal and superior court 
administration is excellent. We wish to continue to be 
represented by Local 660. We believe, though we may have our 
differences from time to time, the court and the county of Los 
Angeles collectively, have treated us fairly. Many of the court, 
and this has been brought up, I think perhaps indirectly, 
the court personnel decisions are duplicative of those within 
county government, and it's standard practice to increase 
salaries. If the state required salaries of court reporters to 
be different from those of comparable county personnel, there 
would probably be morale problems and a lowering of efficiency. 
The reporters of Los Angeles County for at least ten 
years, that I am aware of, have been tied to a salary movement to 
include the legal stenos and legal secretaries of the county. 
The advantage of local control and its flexibility is 
demonstrated by the fact that in Los Angeles Municipal Court the 
court reporting services are provided in a strict pool system and 
in the Los Angeles Superior Court they are provided in a modified 
pool system, which best serves each of those court's needs. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me interrupt you. I think we're 
getting the gist of what you got to say. You submitted this in 
writing, right? 
MR. CRAMER: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Would you like to summarize and 
conclude, because I think we understand that you are really 
interested in local control, but I think I understand why. 
MR. CRAMER: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You have emphasized that very well and 
with very poignant example. I think we've gotten that point. 
MR. CRAMER: Basically, we're concerned that the loss of 
local control will result in, not only increased costs generally, 
but no advantage in terms of providing court reporting services 
to the courts throughout the state. We think that local control 
is necessary to hold down the costs. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you very much. That concludes 
the hearing. Thank you very much. 
# # # # # # 
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Interim Hearing on State Funding of Trial Courts 
On November 18, 1981, the Assembly Judiciary Committee will 
hold an interim hearing on AB 1820 (Berman), which would 
provide for state funding of the trial courts. 
AB 1820, which was introduced on behalf of the Judicial 
Council of California, merely states that "notwithstanding 
any other provision of law, funding of the trial courts 
shall be provided by the state in accordance with the pro-
visions of this chapter." The Judicial Council requested 
that the bill be referred to interim study in order to ob-
tain the necessary information and the viewpoints of the 
potentially affected entities before adding specific pro-
visions and details of its plan for state funding to the 
bill. 
BACKGROUND 
Following the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978, Chief 
Justice Bird called a special session of the Judicial 
Council, at which the Council unanimously passed a reso-
lution calling for state funding "in view of fiscal 
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pressures being exerted by boards of supervisors on the 
courts." According to the Judicial Council, many courts 
were advised that their budgets were to be cut by specified 
percentages, thereby directly affecting court staff and 
services and "threatening the ability of the court system ••• 
to carry out its constitutionally mandated responsibilities." 
The Council has also recently noted that while the legis-
lative "bail out" of local government lessened the immedi-
ate threat of the judiciary, "substantial danger continues 
to exist as the full impact of Proposition 13 begins to be 
felt." The Judicial Council has also argued for state 
funding on the grounds that it would simplify the system 
and probably save administrative costs. 
In a statement released at the time of the bill's intro-
duction, the Judicial Council noted that "the issue of state 
funding of the trial court system raises a series of funda-
mental questions that will have to be discussed and re-
solved: 
a. What costs ought to be included within the 
trial court budgets if state funding is to 
occur? 
b. How should the fines and forfeitures collected 
by the courts be distributed? 
c. How much authority should the state assume over 
job classifications, salary levels and workload 
standards of trial court personnel? 
Clearly, the cost to the state of funding the trial courts 
system cannot be finally determined until decisions are 
made on these issues." 
OPTIONS FOR STATE FUNDING 
Under existing law the State pays the major portion of the 
salary of each Superior Court judge. It also pays the em-
ployer's contribution to the judge's retirement system for 
municipal and superior court judges, the employer's con-
tribution to the Meyers-Geddes health plan for Superior 
Court judges, a $60,000 annual block grant for each superior 
court judgeship created since January, 1973 and the total 
salaries of authorized circuit justice court judgeships. 
Under existing law, the counties pay a designated portion 
of the salaries of municipal and justice court judges, and 
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the total salary and fringe benefits of clerks, bailiffs, 
marshals, constables, and other officers or attaches of 
each superior, municipal, and justice court. 
The estimated 1981-82 trial court operational costs are 
between $512-678 million, with $457-613 million to be paid 
by the counties and $55 million by the state. The esti-
mated total trial court receipts from fines, forfeitures 
and fees for 1981-82 are $373.5 million, approximately 
$62.5 million of which goes to the state, with $185-193 
million going to the counteis and $126-131 million to the 
cities. (Note: please see accompanying Legislative Ana-
lyst and Judicial Council memos for a more detailed break-
down of costs and revenues.) 
Following the passage of Proposition 13, Governor Brown 
established, by executive order, the commission on Govern-
ment Reform (commonly referred to as the "Post Commission" 
after its Chairman, Alan Post.) The Commission's Task 
Force on "Transfer of Program Responsibility from Local 
Government to the State: Courts" issued a report on the 
fiscal alternatives and implications of the state's 
assumption of financing of all or selected elements of the 
existing trial court system. The Task Force Report out-
lined five options, as follows: 
Option 1 
Buy-out the superior, municipal, and justice courts; 
public defender and probation (presentencing report 
costs) including transfer of employees to the state 
system. (Estimated 1981-82 cost: $671.2 million) 
Option 2 
Buy-out the superior, municipal, and justice courts 
including transfer of employees to the state system. 
(Estimated 1981-82 cost: $465.6 million) 
Option 3 
Bail-out (as a temporary expedient) the cost of su-
perior, municipal, and justice courts; district attor-
ney; public defender; and probation (presentencing 
report costs) or any combination thereof, based on a 
percentage of the 1977-78 actual expenditures. (Esti-




Buy-out the same elements contained in option 1 or 
2, but do not include transfer of employees to the 
state system. Provide overall management Judicial 
Council in terms of standardizing, to the extent 
feasible, accounting, budgeting, and reporting. 
(Estimated 1981-82 cost: $465.6 or $671.2 million) 
Option 5 
Buy-out superior, municipal and justice court judges' 
salaries. (Estimated 1981-82 cost: $38.1 million) 
(Note: see accompanying excerpts from Task Force 
Report for explanations of the five options as well 
as discussion of implications to the Justice System 
of each.) 
The Task Force's listed options of course do not represent 
the totality of alternatives for state funding. However, 
they are representative of the range of possibilities of 
methods of increased state financial participation. Among 
the approaches considered by the Task Force were: 
A. Buy-Out would be a permanent transfer of the 
local court costs of the county to the state, 
with a resulting increase in the state's author-
ity to supervise court operations. 
B. Bail-Out 
A "Bail-Out" would be the use of state funds 
to cover all or part of the local court costs 
on a temporary, year-to-year basis, and with 
little or no increase in the state's authority 
to supervise court operations. 
C. Reimbursement 
"Reimbursement" involJes the payment in arrears 
for costs of pro~rams determined to be eligible 
for state financial participation based on claims 
submitted to the state. 
D. Shared Revenue 
"Shared revenue" involves providing funds to 
counties on a block grant basis with strings 
attached to require a given level of service 
in the court system. 
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Clearly then, state funding of the trial courts can refer 
to a range of alternatives and can include or exclude 
various agencies that are part of the broader aspects of 
court activity. (e.g., district attorneys, publ de-
fenders, probation, etc.) 
The National Center for State Courts has supplied the Com-
mittee with a "Check-off List of Items to be Considered 
Connection With Possible State Financing of Trial Courts 
(enclosed). It illustrates much of the range of issues 
which must be considered in any plan for state funding. 
Among the questions raised in that list are: 
I. Functional Scope of Assumption 
are clerks offices to be included? 
are juvenile court social programs to 
be included? 
are court officers or bailiffs to be 
included within the judicial branch or 
left with sheriff and law enforcement 
agencies? 
are law libraries at the county level to 
be included? 
II. Specific Types of Costs to be Assumed 
are facility costs to be included? 
can the state assume trial court oper-
ating costs without attempting to recti-
fy required disparities in spending? 
how does the state handle costs of employee 
fringe benefits? 
III. Revenues 
Is the current system of court-generated 
revenues (fines, costs and fees) efficient 
and fair or does it require restructuring? 
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IV. Types of Assumption 
Which of the following types of state assumption 
are anticipated? 
inclusion of trial court operating costs 
in state budget; 
reimbursement by state to localities for 
actual costs of operating trial courts; 
a state subsidy to localities without any 
direct connection to operating costs, e.g., 
- a grant or remission of court generated 
resources; 
some mixture of the above. 
COST AND CONTROL 
The most significant fundamental issues inherent in any 
consideration of increased state responsibility for fi-
nancing court operations are cost and control. As summarized 
in the document "Current Status of State Financing of Trial 
Courts", which was also supplied by the National Center, 
opponents of state financing frequently cite the objective 
data generated by those states which have made the trans-
ition to state financing to indicate increased cost under 
state funded systems. Proponents, on the other hand, cite 
qualitative improvements and expectations of cost reduc-
tions to provide equivalent levels of service over the long 
run. Further, it is stated that the issue of altered state-
local relationships and the shift in the control of court 
operations which results from state financing are even more 
important than cost considerations. According to the "Cur-
rent Status" paper, "State funding opponents fear the loss 
of local control over policy and procedure which accompanies 
increased centralization of state financed system. In con-
trast, proponents cite both qualitative and economic ad-
vantages to system-wide administration of state funded 
judicial operations." Please see the enclosed "Current 
Status" document for a more complete analysis of the cost 
and control iss~es. 
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EXHIBIT B 
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE-1981-82 REGULAR SESSION 
ASSEMBLY BILL No. 1820 
Introduced by Assemblyman Berman 
March 27, 1981 
An act to add Chapter 1.6 (commencing with Section 
68300) to Title 8 of the Government Code, relating to courts. 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
AB 1820, as introduced, Berman. Trial courts: funding. 
Under existing law, the state funds a portion of the 
compensation for superior court judges. 
This bill would add unspecified provisions for state funding 
of trial courts. 
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: yes. 
State-mandated local program: no. 
The people of the State of California do enact as follows: 
1 SECTION 1. Chapter 1.6 (commencing with Section 










CHAPTER 1.6. STATE FUNDING FOR TRIAL COURTS 
68300. It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting 
this chapter to improve the administration of justice. 
68301. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
funding of the trial courts shall be provided by the state 
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HEARING DATE: 5/13/81 
This bill is intended to provide for state funding of trial 
courts. 
3:LL DESCRIPTION: 
Under existing law, approximately 10 percent of the total 
annual operating budgets of the California trial courts is 
paid by the state and the remaining 90 percent by the 
counties. 
This bill would provide that funding of the trial courts 
would be provided by the state in accordance with unspecified 
provisions. 
SOURCE: 









AB 1820 -2- HEARING DATE: 5/13/81 
COMMENT: 
1. The Judicial Council has advocated state funding of the 
trial courts "in view of fiscal pressures being exerted 
by boards of supervisors on the cou~ts ... (which) 
threaten ... the ability of the court system, as a 
separate branch of government, to carry out its 
constitutionally mandated responsibilities." 
2. The bill's source has informed Committee staff that the 
author intends to ask that the bill be referred to 
interim study because "the issue of state funding of 
the trial court system raises (the following) series of 
fundamental questions that will have to be discussed 
and resolved: 
a. What costs ought to be included within 
the trial court budgets if state funding 
is to occur? 
b. How should the fines and forfeitures 
collected by the courts be distributed? 
c. How much authority should the state 
assume over job classifications, salary 
levels and workload standards of trial 
court personnel?" 
Further, the source states that the cost to the state of 
funding the trial court system cannot be finally 
determined until decisions are made on these issues. 
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WALTER W. STIERN 
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EXHIBIT C 
ALFRED E. ALQUIST 
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BILL GREENE 
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Hon. Elihu M. Harris, Chairman 
Assembly Judiciary Committee 
Room 6031, State Capitol 
Sacramento, California 
Dear Assemblyman Harris: 
LEGISLATIVE ANALYST 
WILLIAM G. HAMM 
925 L STREET, SUITE 650 
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95814 
(916) 445-4656 










In response to the request of Mr. Ray LeBov of your staff, we have 
updated a task force project report to the former Commission on Government 
Reform on county costs of the courts and related functions. As requested, 
we have updated the cost figures displayed in the tables on pages 9, 22, 
and A1-A5 of that report. We used the same sources, indirect cost, and 
inflation assumptions as were used for the task force report. 
The report listed five options for full or partial state funding of 
the various court functions. Using the 1978 assumptions, we estimAte the 
1981-82 state cost of these various options as follows: 
Option 
1 (page 19) 
2 (page 20) 
3 (page 20) 
4 (page 21) 











Hon. Elihu M. Harris -2- November 9, 1981 
Because the 1978 assumptions may no longer be valid, the actual 
costs of the five options could vary considerably from these estimates. 
However, the amounts shown above probably realistically reflect the rela-
tionship between the costs of the various options. 
Enclosures 
Sincerely, 
W i 11 i am G • Hamm 
Legislative Analyst 
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Table Page 9 
1981-82 Estimated County Costs of 



















Table Page 22 & A-2 
Summary of Combined (State and Counties') 







Superior Court Judges' Salaries 
Judges' Retirement Contributions 
Assigned Judges 
Block Grants 
Supreme Court (including 
Judicial Council, Commission on 
Judicial Performance, and 
Legislative Mandates) 
Courts of Appeala 
Court-Appointed Counsel 
(Appellate Courts) 
Justice Court Temporary 
Judgeships 
Subtotal 
Total, Estimated 1981-82 
Court System Cost 
Estimated 1981-82 















a. Does not include costs of facilities for new court division in Orange and 
Santa Barbara Counties, and a new court district in Santa Clara County. 
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Table Page A-1 
1979-80 Actual Costsb 
Estimated Indirect 




(15 percent growth) 
Estimated 1981-82 
(10 percent growth) 
Estimated 1981-82 
Bailiffing Costs 
Summary of Estimated 1981-82 
Local Government Court Costsa 









Total, Estimated 1981-82 $227.7 $226.5 
Justice Total Court 
Court Costs 







a. Includes direct and indirect costs of superior, municipal, and justice 
courts, estimated court-related services of the county clerks. Grand jury, 
jury commissioners, court reporters and certain fixed assets are not 
included. 
b. Source: State Controller's 1979-80 Annual Report, Financial Transactions 
Concerning Counties. Since staff benefits are not reflected under the 
respective budget units (they are reported under "Other Genera 1"), a derived 
basis was used to determine and allocate these costs. 
c. Represents countywide support services costs allocated to budget units. 
d. Growth factors were not applied to justice courts because they have 
experienced a decline in numbers due to conversions to municipal courts. 
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Table Page A3-A5 
Estimated 1981-82 County Costs for 
Public Defender, District Attorney, and 
Probation (Presentencing Only) 
(in Millions) 
Public Defender 
1979-80 Actual Costs 
Estimated staff benefits (13 percent) 
Estimated indirect costs (20 percent) 
Total, 1979-80 estimated costs 
Total Estimated 1980-81 (15 percent growth) 
Total Estimated 1981-82 (10 percent growth) 
Less State Reimbursements 
Net Estimated 1981-82 Costs 
District Attorney 
1979-80 Actual Costs 
Estimated staff benefits (13 percent) 
Estimated indirect costs (20 percent) 
Total, 1979-80 estimated costs 
Estimated 1980-81 (15 percent growth) 
Estimated 1981-82 (10 percent growth) 
Probation (Presentencing Only) 
1979-80 Actual Costs (total probation) 
Estimated staff benefits (15 percent) 
Estimated indirect costs (20 percent) 
Total, Estimated 1979-80 estimated costs 
Estimated 1980-81 (15 percent growth) 
Estimated 1981-82 (10 percent growth) 
Estimated 1981-82 presentence costs 
























CHECK-OFF LIST OF ITEMS 
TO BE CONSIDERED 
IN CONNECTION WITH 
POSSIBLE STATE FINANCING 




There fo+lows a listing of the threshold questiqns that must 
be addressed by policymakers in states considering the 
assumption of trial court operating costs. The purpose of 
the listing is to provide a discussion format and to ensure 
that relevant topics are systematically covered. The listing 
is divided into six parts: 
Functional scope of assumption 
Specific type of costs to be assumed 
Court revenues 
Key groups affected by assumption 
'I'ime phasing of assumption 
Types of assumption 
Not all of the items will be applicable to each state. More-
over, there may be some items which cannot be addressed for 
lack of information.* However, most of the items should lend 
themselves to discussion by state teams. 
* A companion hand-out is a paper on court financial 
data. It is entitled Developing Financial Data 
on Courts • 
2 
-67-, 
CHECK OFF LIST ON STATE ASSUM?'J'ION 
OF TRIAL COURT OPERATING COSTS 







Which trial courts 
are to be encom-
passed by state 
assumption? 
Are clerk's 





- general jurisdiction 
courts 
- limited jurisdiction 
courts 
- municipal courts 








- clerks of general 
jurisdiction · 
courts 
clerks of special 
jurisdiction 
courts 
clerks hired under 
special federal 
programs (title 








• optional inclusion of 




court authority over 




. whether clerks at 
each level are 
elected or 
appointed 
. whether clerks have 
non-court functions 
which are difficult 
to separate from 
court functions 





State assumption Of trial court 
costs is administratively 
difficult in a state where 
trial court structure is 
fragmented. Normally, state 
assumption occurs after or si-
multaneously with some degree 
of horizontal unification 
(uniform state-wide juris-
diction of each court level) 
and some degree of vertical 
unification (administrative 
mechanisms centered in the 
supreme court and extending 
to trial courts) . 
Clerical·offices can be absorb-
ed into a state budget but 
special problems exist where the 
clerks are elected, paid from 
fees collected from litigants 
or perform such non-court func-
tions as recording deeds, issuing 
licenses or election registration. 
It is possible that some clerks 
can be included (e.g., appointed 
clerks lower tier courts or 
clerks on civil service in home-
rule counties) , while elected 
clerks are excluded, at least 
initially. 
CHECK OFF LIST ON STATE ASSUMPTION 
OF TRIAL.COURT OPERATING COSTS 






Are social services Treatment of: 
for adults to be • adult probation 
included? • family counseling/ 
Are juvenile 
court social 
programs to be 
included? 
other counseling 




















• extent to which adult 
probation is a func-
tion of a state-level 
corrections depart-
ment 
• extent to which adult 
probation is locally 
financed 
. unions 
• overlap with prose-
cutors or social 
agencies in referral 
programs 











Adult probation is not neces-
sarily a judicial branch 
function for budgetary pur-
poses. Not uncommonly, some 
probation officers are on the 
court payroll, some on the 
executive branch payroll • 
Some perform parole officer 
functions. The inclusion of 
adult social services in a 
court budget is determined by 
gover~~ental organization in 
each state 
Juvenile courts are often 
difficult to fit into a 
state-financed svstem, 
because so many social or 
correctional services are 
handled non-court agencies. 
The final deci a~ain is 
determined by govern~ental 







CHECK OFF LIST ON STATE ASSUMPTION 
OF TRIAL COURT OPERATING COSTS 
Part I - Functional Scope of Assumption 
Issues 
Is the cost of 
assigned counsel 
fees and tran-
script fees for 
indigents to be 
included? 
Are the costs of 
the jury system 
to be included? 
Are the costs wit-
nesses and guard-
ians ad liteM 
to be included? 
Subissues 
Treatment of: 
. jury commissions 
. sequestered juries 
. grand juries 
. jury size 
• juror fees 
Treatment of: 
. regular witness fees 
Special 
Considerations 
Existence of public 
defender offices 
at the state level 
. ability of judicial 
branch to adminis-
ter system 
. whether indigent 
defense is paid 
from a special fund 
. jury management at 
the state level 
requires adminis-
trative mechanisms 
which may be beyond 
the capacity of 
judicial branch 









Indigent defense costs tend 
to get passed up to the 
state level. Often courts 
are burdened with handling 
payments because no other 
agency exists to handle the 
chore. Where there is a 
state-level defender, the 
chore could go to that office. 
Some states earmark certain 
costs for indigent defense, 
in which case the system may 
be relatively self-supporting. 
Juries are integral to adjudi-
cation and are a logical 
state assumption if the costs 
of general jurisdiction court~ 
are assumed. The problem 
tends to be partly adminis-
trative since thousands of 
jurors must be paid through 
a state system. 
The use of one-day, one trial 
jury calls can possibly be 
addressed on a state-wide 
basis. 
There is a wide variation 
among states in treatment of 
items. They can be sig-
expense to states, 
particularly the costs of 
ionals appointed by 





CHECK OFF LIST ON STATE ASSUMPTION 
OF TRIAL. COURT OPERATING COSTS 
Part I - Functional Scope of Assumption 
0\ 
Issues 




Are court officers 
or bailiffs to be 
included within 
the judicial 
branch or left 




ies at the 
county/parish 
level to be 
included? 
' 





. sanity exams 
. attorney fees 








dearee to which 
court officers 
are regular, more 








These costs are logical 
inclusions but are escalating 
in recent years. They are 
not minor items. 
Normally in rural states the 
need for bailiffs is so 
sporadic that it is economical· 
ly advisable to leave the 
bailiff functions with sheriff, 
However, in urban courts ~ith 
full-time bailiffs, it may be 
desirable to include bailiffs 
on the court budget. Occasion· 
ally, bailiffs are used as 
law clerks and should be on 
the court payroll. 
States vary markedly in how 
they view libraries. Some 
include them as part of the 
court budoet, includinc 
librarian~. Not atypically 






CHECK OFF LIST L STATE ASSUMPTION 
OF' TRIAJ. COURT OPERATING COSTS 
-~~~~-~~ Sp~_~i~ic ~y~~s of Costs t~-~-~ssumed ______________________________________________________ _ 
......,] 
Issues 
Are facility costs 
to be included? 
Can the state assume 
trial court operatin9 
costs without attempt-






. Methods of reimburse-
ment 
- square footage 
rental 
- repayment to 
localities for 
court share of 
building opera-
tions costs and 
debt services 
- simple allocation 
to localities of 
court revenues 
in an amount suf-
ficient to cover 
facility costs 
- difference between 
space in county 
court houses and 






- sheer amount of 
facility costs 
. Differences in salary 
levels for same job 
. Differences in staff-
ing equipment 





Assumption of facility costs 
is very expen9ive, perhaps 
20% of the total budget, and 
administratively complex to 
handle. It can involve multi· 
ple negotiations and unending 
political bickering. It is 
commonly ducked in the initia: 
stage of state assumption of 
trial court costs. 
It is hard for a state to 
assume court operating costs 
without attempting to create 
some rough equality in 
itures. When trial 
courts become a state system, 
some incremental spending to 







CHECK OFF LIST ON STATE ASSUMPTION 
OF TRIAL COURT OPERATING COSTS 
Part II - Specific Types of Costs to be Assumed ---- ----- -------------------------------------------
Issues 
Should the state 
take title to all 
supplies ahd equip-
ment of courts as 
one aspect of state 
assumption of trial 
court costs? 
If the state 
assumes financial 
responsibilities 
for trial courts, 
which agencies 
should assume the 




vided by local 
govP.rnments? 
Subissues 
Authority to transfer 
equipment from one 
county to another 
(obviously not feas-
ible if county owns 
court equipment) . 





. reaction of local 
governments 
• need for an inven-
tory of equipment 





if county retains title 
















• degree to which 
state executive 
branch can or 
should provide 
management support 
• possibility of de-
centralizing man-
agement through a 
system of pres 




A state can simply pick up _ 
newly acquired court propert 
as it is acquired with state 
funds, but normally all cour 
property is taken by the sta 
on a date certain since the 
~urden of maintaining 
all court property passes to 
the state. It is a complex 
administrative problem to 
inventory court property and 
then to build this inventory 
into ongoing administrative 
systems. 
A commonly ignored cost of 
state assumption ·is the admi 
istrative overhead costs 
associated with financial ar 
personnel management. Sone 
strengthening of court adMin 
iEtrative offices ts alwars 
a necessity. 
Such strengthening need not 
a strong trial cour 
level. 
preparing a budget 
t, making minor pur-





CHECK OFF LIST 0~ STATE ASSUMPTION 
OF TRIAL COURT OPERATING COSTS 
Part II - Specific Types of Costs to be Assumed 
Issues 
How does state 






• employee benefits 
that are better 
than those offered 
by state 
• vested interests in 
pension plans or 
leave entitlements 
under union con-





ties of transferring 
employees into a single 
system, special short-
term accommodations to 
protect legal rights 
Comments 
Governments budget for fringe 
benefits in various ways,· 
often treating them as a 
central overhead cost and not 
allocating them back to 
particular agencies. Thus, 
compensation costs of local 
courts are often underesti-
mated. The aoolication of 
state frinae benefits usuallv 
drives uo costs state-wide 
but mav still not be the 
equivalent of benefits in a few 







Part III - Revenues 
Issues 
Is the current. 
system of court-
generated revenues 
(fines, costs and 
fees) efficient 





portion to the 
expenditures of 
courts or simply 
retained where they 
are collected? 
CHECK OFF LIST .. { STATE ASSUMPTION 










- to state 
- to counties 
- to cities 
- to other 
recipients, 




• Average case costs im-
posed, amount too 
high? 
• Number of discrete 
costs? Is system 
administratively 
unwieldy? 
• Use of court cases to 
generate money for a 
variety of government 
programs. 
• Extent to which lower-
tier courts have 
"surpluses" 
Extent to which upper-
tier courts have 
"deficits" 
. Probable opposition of 
cities to changes 
which affect revenues 






State assumption of trial 
court costs, usually prompts 
a look at offsetting court 
resources. Normally, this 
look reveals that the system 
of costs, fines and fees re-
quires some revision. 
It is unfortunate, but not 
uncommon practice, to view 
trial courts as entities which 
should be self-supporting. 
Generally, lower-tier courts, 
particularly municipal courts, 
have a stake in keeping 
revenues where it is 
collected. They make a 
"profit." However, as states 
assume more trial court costs 







Part Ill - Revenues 
Issues 
To what extent 
do court revenues 









CHECK OFF LIST ON STATE ASSUMPTION 







courts special fines 
fed by a particular 
court cost or fee 
• Use of court costs to 
feed pension funds or 
library funds and 
even facility funds; 




Court costs may be earmarked 
for a variety of purpose£, 
many related to courts. 
There may be vested legal 
interests in these funds 
which must be respected. 
Often they represent a 
diversion of money from the 
general fund, as well as a 
dubious imposition on 
litigants. 






Differences, if any, 
By Chamber 

















stated Positions or 





























of Major Counties 
or Cities 
Stated Positions or 













PAF:T IV KEY GROUPS AFFECTED BY ASSUMPTION 
Stated Positions or 




PART V QUESTIONS ON riMING 
What are the key dates in the political and 
governmental cycle? Specifically: 
- elec~ion of judges 
- state budget cycles, budget submission 
dates 
- local budget cycles 
- other dates of significance (for example, 
da~es relating to pending constitutional 
amendments) 
What lead time would be necessary to implement a 
state assumption of trial court costs, if the 
amount of state assumption was substantial? 
Specifically, the time to recruit needed per-
sonnel and to obtain contractor help; to identify 
affected personnel; to do desk audits; to prepare 
job definitions and individual classifications; to 
do a pay plan; to handle employee appeals; to set up 
a personnel system for the affected employees. Also: 
to do a state-wide trial court budget; 
to establish control over cash flow in 
trial courts and deposit of funds: 
to ~rain and orient trial court personnel 
in new systems; 
to establish payroll and accounting systems; 
to do property inventories and to have 
purchasing and maintenance systems 
established; 
to have settled major union or employee 
interest problems; including new bargaining 
uni-:s; 
to identify federally funded positions and 
possible assumption of costs. 
The above steps would have to be authorized in the legislation 
on state assumption, and the date for assumption. The scope 




TYPES OF ASSUMPTION 
~ich of the following types of state assumption are 
l ~~ticipated? 
inclusion of trial court operating 
costs in state budget; 
reimbursement by state to localities for 
actual costs of operating trial courts; 
a state subsidy to localities without any 
direct connection to operating costs, 
e.g. - a grant or remission of court 
generated resources; 
some mixture of the abov~J 
Is the state assuming trial court costs of only a particular 
geographic segment of the court or excluding some geographic 










• General Jurisdiction 
• Limited Jurisdiction 
• Special Jurisdiction 
• Municipal Courts 
• Probate Court 
• Juvenile Court 
Annendix A _.L.J..:..: ___ _ 




• Administrative staff 
• court personnel 
• Clerk's office 
• Adult probation 
• Juvenile probation 
• Juvenile detention 
• Jury commission 
• Uefense services 
• Security/bailiffs 
• Diversion programs 
• Pre-trial release 
• Administrative services 
• Referral services 
• Family counseling 
EXPENSES 
• Law Library 
• Jury fees/expenses 
• Witness fees/expenses 
• Sanity exams 
• Travel 












SALARY AND WAGES 
• Permanent positions 
• Temporary positions 
• Match funds 
• Overtime 
• Shift differential 
• Acting assignments 
• Reclassification 
• lloliday pay 
• New personnel 
• Longevity 
Appendix B 
SPECIFIC TYPES OF COSTS TO BE ASSUMED 
FRINGE BENEFITS 
• Hospital Ins. Prem. 
• FICA 
• Li[e Ins. Prem. 
• Workman's Comp. 
• Accrued vacation 
• Pension 
• Education (tuition) 
• Prior pension con-
tributions 
• Unemployment comp. 
• Cost of living adj. 
• Unused sick leave 
• Optical plan 
• Uental plan 
• Clothing allowance 
• Uond premiums 






• Data Processing 
• Witness fees 
• Grand jury 
• Appointed counsel 
• Jury fees 
e Prof/contractual serv. 
• Sheriff fees 
e Visiting judges 
e Sanity exams 
(medical/psychiatric) 
• Court reporting services 
• Bail interviews 
• Prob. referral agencies 
• Security 
• Laundry/towel service 
(medical/psychiatric) 
• Court reporting services 
e Bail interviews 




• Office supplies 
• l.aw library 
• Judicial chambers 
books 





• Transcript fees 
• Postage 
• Juror expenses 
• Witness expenses 
• Forms 
Equipment/Furniture 
• Purchase (new) 
• Rental/lease 
• Maint./repair 
• Purchase (existing) 
FACILITIES 
e Building rent 
• Parking lot rent 
• Bldg. improvements 
• Utilities 
• Custodial services 




"HIDDEN" ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
Most trial courts are to some extent dependent upon local 
governmental units for central services in many administrative 
areas. These expenses are not usually found in the court's 
budget. They may not even be identified as court expenses in the 
budget of the department proviaing administrative services. 
These "hidden" costs include: 
• Central stockroom • Purchasing 
. Human relations (EEO/AA) . Treasurer 
• Civil Service Commission . Payroll 
• Corporate counsel 
• Maintenance 
















BUDGETS WHICH MAY INCLUDE COURT·RELATED EXPENDITURES 
STATE 
• Supreme Court 
• Executive Budget 
- Bureau of Retirement System 
- State Planning Agency 
- Office of Administrative Services 
• Department of Corrections 
• Department of Social Services 
• Other ancillary Supreme Court agencies 
• State Court Administrative Office 
• Judicial Planning Committee 
• Judicial Council 
COUNTY 
• Court Budget 
• County Building Authority 
• Sheriff Department 
• County Clerk 
• Probation 
• Central Service Cost Allocation 
• Fringe Benefits 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
• Court Budget 
• Police Department 
• Building Authority 
• Fringe Benefits 
FEDERAL GOVERN~ffiNT 
• LEAA 
• Department of Social Services 
• CETA . 
• Urban Corp. Program 
• 
*These budgets may contain appropriations for trial court expenses. 
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EXHIBIT E 
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS IN STATE ASSUMPTION 
OF TRIAL COURT OPERATING COSTS 
By 
SUE K. DOSAL 
SENIOR STAFF ATTORNEY 
NORTH CENTRAL REGIONAL OFFICE 





This paper was written by Sue Dosal of the North Central Regional Office of 
the National Center for State Courts. The paper was specifically prepared for 
the May Training Conference of the Institute for Court Management and the 
State Court Finance Project, National Center for State Courts. 
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The purpose of this paper is to assist those states actively considering 
political action to bring about increased state financing of trial courts. 
The paper assumes that a policy decision has been made on the merits of 
increased state financing and addresses the strategic considerations germane 
to this transition. These considerations have been gleaned from the 
experiences of those states which have already undergone the transition from 
local to state financing of trial courts and those states which have tried and 
failed to make a transition. 
The major strategic considerations which emerge from this examination of 
both successful and unsuccessful state financing campaigns can be categorized 
as follows: 
• Political dynamics of assumption; 
• Scope of assumption; 
• Phasing of assumption; 
• Budgetary methods of assumption; and 
• Administrative mechanics of assumption. 
It is hoped that these accumulated experiences will assist in the 
identification of possible political obstacles and will suggest possible means 
of overcoming these obstacles. Representatives of each state will determine 
for themselves how the lessons learned in other states can be applied to their 
own political environment. 
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A. Political Dynamics of Assumption 
The major groups which potentially may be galvanized for or against state 
financing of court operations include: judicial branch administrative 
officials, trial judges, clerks, local government, the Governor, the 
legislature, the bar association, law enforcement, and the public. While one 
or more of these individuals or groups has taken a leadership role in 
achieving state court financing in the past, experience seems to indicate that 
it 1s difficult to succeed if there 1s active and organized opposition from 
some of these potential opponents. For that reason, the following discussion 
attempts to highlight the bases of opposition by these various power centers, 
drawing upon the history of both successful and unsuccessful state financing 
efforts in various states. 
1. Judicial Branch Administrative Officials 
Although it would be expected that judicial branch administrative 
officials, such as the Chief Justice, members of the Supreme Court, and State 
Court Administrator, would be most likely to take a leadership role 1n 
initiating efforts to achieve state financing of court operations, the history 
of state funding movements reveals that this is often not the case. The Chief 
Justice and other Supreme Court members may be disinclined to initiate or 
actively support efforts to obtain state financing of trial courts for several 
reasons. First, these judges frequently are uninterested in the 
administrative aspects of the judicial system and actively seek to avoid the 
additional burdens of trial court administration which would divert time and 
attention from their judicial responsibilities. Second, the Chief Justice and 
other members of the Supreme Court may have served previously at the trial 
court level. Thus, they may .share the concern of their trial judge colleagues 
that state financing and the associat~d centralization of administration will 
-2-
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replace the historical independence and individual prerogatives of judges with 
a system which place~ greater emphasis on administrative efficiencies and 
system-wide operation. Third, judges traditionally have shied from 
entanglements in politics and many believe non-involvement in state financing 
efforts is required to be consistent with that policy.
1 
Moreover, the 
radical nature of the organizational change involved in the transition from 
local to state financing runs counter to the education and professional 
training of judges, which stress gradualism through case-by-case 
decision-making based on historical precedent. Finally, where the Chief 
Justice and members of Supreme Courts share this reluctance to support 
financing reform, it is unlikely that the State Court Administrator, who 
serves at their pleasure, will play a significant role in initiating state 
funding efforts. 
Nevertheless, the Chief Justice and the State Court Administrator have 
provided leadership in promoting state funding of trial court operations in 
several jurisdictions. For example, the strong leadership of Chief Justice 
Howell Heflin in initiating fundamental reorganization of the Alabama judicial 
system and state financing of all trial court operations 1s well known. 
Similarly, the active leadership of Mr. Jim James, as State Court Administrator 
lrndeed, in several states legal issues surrounding state funding 
necessitated the non-involvement of this group. For example, during the 1975 
state court financing efforts in the state of Washington, the Supreme Court 
prohibited the State Court Administrator from acting in support of a state 
court funding bill because of a pending lawsuit challenging the 
constitutionality of the proposed method of submitting the amendment to the 
electorate. 
2rt is interesting to note that Chief Justice Heflin's efforts to reform 
the Alabama court system cannot be viewed as an internal judicial branch 
1n1tiative. Chief Justice Heflin was elected to that post with a mandate to 
reform the judicial branch and on his promise to do so in one term. 
-3-
-91-
of Kansas, generally is recognized as a substantial contributing factor to the 
achievement of state funding of the trial court operations 1n that 
jurisdiction. While these serve as examples of judicial leadership, judicial 
branch administrative officers have not consistently assumed active roles in 
state financing efforts. 
2. Trial Court Judges 
Trial court judges frequently can be the source of active and organized 
opposition to state financing, since their operations are the primary object 
of reform. Not infrequently, they fear the effects of change more than they 
dislike the weaknesses in the existing system. Thus, organized and effective 
opposition is likely to be marshalled if trial judges perce1ve state financing 
as a substantial threat to their autonomy and authority. 
For that reason, it appears that state financing is a much more difficult 
goal to achieve in judicial systems with substantially diffused and 
decentralized internal administrative authority. For example, in states 
without constitutional or statutory authority for judicial system 
administration vested in the Chief Justice or the Supreme Court, without 
specified state-wide management responsibilities given to the state court 
administrator, and without centralized power to reassign trial court judges 
vertically or horizontally within the system, state financing clearly means a 
major shift in control of trial court operations from the local to the state 
level. In response to such a proposal, the Washington Superior Court Judges 
Association overwhelmingly opposed a state funding plan, fearing that local 
control of judicial operations would be replaced with new and unwanted 




In contrast 1s the experience of a state such as Connecticut which has had 
a long history of centralized administration, including the designation of the 
Chief Justice as the chief administrative officer of the judiciary in 1953, 
and the creation of a single administrative judge, appointed by the 
Justice, for each trial court level in 1959. Given this history of highly 
centralized administration, it was possible in that state to consolidate the 
trial courts and to bring them under the umbrella of state court on 
an incremental basis without organized opposition by the trial court 
In between the two extremes represented by Washington and Connecticut are 
states such as Minnesota, which recently consolidated its trial courts, state 
funded all judges, and provided by statute for a unified and central 
administrative structure, but retained substantial features of local control 
including county funding and peer election of administrative judges for each 
of its ten judicial districts. Yet, in 1978, the District Judges Association 
overwhelmingly opposed state financing of trial court operations. The bases 
for this resolution included the generalized opposition to further state 
intrusion and the feeling that there was nothing to be gained by shift the 
funding burden. 
State financing perhaps is less likely to be opposed by trial j when 
it accompanies proposals for fundam~ntal restructuring of the judicial system 
to eliminate widespread public dissatisfaction with "cash registe~' and 
"speed-trap" justice dispensed by fee-paid and often non-lawyer judges of 
m,unicipal or justice of the peace courts. Typically, state financing easily 
is carried on the coat tails of such popular reforms as is evidenced in the 
states of North Carolina and Alabama. Even in Kentucky, where the County 
Judge's Association publicly opposed state financing for fear that the state 
would not provide as adequate a level of funding as the existing system, 
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popular support for eliminating alleged abuses overwhelmed the opposition of 
this group. 
Based on the experiences of these states, it ~s possible to speculate that 
trial judge opposition is less likely when state funding is tied to trial 
court reorganization or at least to increases in judicial salaries and 
benefits. The Minnesota experience would seem to indicate that, in absence of 
either of ~hese elements, state financing is perceived by trial judges as 
offering only a diminution of their individual prerogatives. 
3. Clerks of Court 
Frequently the most powerful and outspoken opponents of state finaAcing 
are the clerks of court. Traditionally, court clerks are elected county 
officials with independent political power bases. As a result, there are a 
number of reasons why clerks of court may be opposed to state financing. 
First, the centralized administration which accompanies state funding 
tends to limit the autonomy and flexibility of the court clerk. Under local 
funding, clerks work independently with local judges and are free to develop 
their own procedures and office practices. State funding inevitably leads to 
statewide standardization of budgetary, accounting, records, filing, and other 
office practices. 
Clerks under the decentralized system may be charged with responsibility 
of judicial budgets, and at the very least, control their own office budgets. 
They negotiate directly with local governing boards on funding matters, often 
without any consultation with local trial judges. Moreover, as elected 
officials, the campaign platforms of clerks typically center on their ability 
to minimize judicial expenditures and maximize revenues collected and 
submitted to the local unit of government. In some states, cl~rk'~ office 
operations, including the salary of the clerk, are funded d~rectly by fees 
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collected for the serv1ces provided to the public. Typically, where this 
financing method is employed, clerks of court have total financial 
independence, free from local government appropriations approval and from all 
pre-expenditure review. State funding eliminates the central role and 
independence·of the clerk 1n fiscal matters under any locally based financing 
method. State funding is perceived by this group as a system of centralized 
budgeting and appropriations in which clerks may have some input, but over 
which they have little control. This loss of power over fiscal matters 
primary impetus to the organization and successful lobbying effort of Florida 
court clerks in excluding complete state funding and unitary budgeting from 
the 1972 proposed amendment to the judicial article. 
Additionally, court clerks often oppose state funding because of the added 
administrative responsibilities with which they may be burdened. ly, 
state funding carries with it increased local workload and financial reporting 
requirements and causes clerks to devote substantial attention to the 
justification of budget requests and evaluation of on-going operations and new 
programs over that currently necessitated to obtain local funding. This 
spectre of additional administrative responsibilities was a significant cause 
of clerk opposition to state funding in Kentucky. 
Clerks also tend to oppose state funding when it is accompanied by, or 
, 
perceived as the precursor of, a movement to change their po~itions from 
elective to appointive. It is strongly felt that this change in method of 
selection means a loss of power, status and independence. In North Carolina, 
the provision to appoint court clerks was withdrawn from the unification/state 
3 financing package to gain clerk support for the proposal. 
3In the mid-Atlantic states of West Virginia and Virginia, elected 




Finally, perhaps the most vehement opposition to state financing proposals 
arises from clerks of court who are charged by constitution or statute not 
only with the clerical responsibilities of trial court operations, but also 
with executive functions such as election registration, licensing and county 
recording. Since state funding in such jurisdictions would encompass only 
that portion of the clerk's office relating to judicial activities, it is 
inevitable that proposals will emerge to sever the judicial and executive 
functions since it would seem unworkable to require that two separate 
administrative policies (including classification plans, compensation levels, 
fringe benefits, leave policies, etc.) operate simultaneously in one 
office. 4 In such states, it is natural to expect active opposition to state 
funding by clerks since splitting the office would reduce the clerk's scope of 
authority and responsibility, and retention of one office would result in an 
unreasonably cumbersome administrative structure. 
Examination· of previous successful state financing efforts indicates that, 
regardless of the potential benefits of state funding for the judicial system 
as a whole, court clerk support of state financing proposals is likely only if 
a majority feel that state financing will result in an increase in personal 
compensation or at least more adequate funding for their office operations. 
4. Local Government 
Local officials, including county comm1ss1oners, city council members and 
mayors, have opposed state financing in the past for two reasons. First, 
local governments fear the loss of political control over local judges. For 
example, in Alabama, the League of Municipalities strongly opposed 
4Yet, the New York state funding plan has resulted in this dual 
administrative structure of the clerk's operation in which some clerk staff 
are county employees and the remainder are state personnel. 
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consolidation and state financing in part because it would eliminate the 
mayor's power to appoint local judges. Second, state financing and unitary 
budgeting are opposed by this group since traditionally local governments have 
financed many public service functions from court-generated revenues. State 
financing typically requires that n1ost or all of the fines and fees generated 
locally be transmitted to the state treasurer. For these reasons, 
state financing packages have been defeated by the active opposition of 
municipal associations, as 1n Idaho. H~wever, other states, which have 
successfully enacted state funded court systems, have dealt with this local 
concern by excluding municipal courts from the state funded system as 
Oklahoma and Kansas; by including a provision allowing municipal courts to opt 
into or out of the state funded system by local resolution as in Alabama; and 
by providing substantial distribution of court revenues to local government as 
1n West Virginia, where 60% of fees and 100% of all fines of its limited 
jurisdiction courts are paid to local government. Additionally, when 
ordinance jurisdiction is included within the state funded judicial system, 
the processing of parking violations is almost always established as an 
administrative activity within municipal government, which results in 1 
retention of substantial levels of revenue. Such provisions also tend to 
lessen local opposition to state financing proposals. 
In contrast, county governments are increasingly supporting state funding 
of trial court operations. This is true for two reasons. First, some states 
have severely limited local government discretion over court system 
expenditures. In Colorado, the Supreme Court held that the county commission 
may not control court expenditures unless the county can show the court's 
actions to be arbitrary and capricious. In Michigan, trial court personnel~ -
although locally funded, are held to be state employees, not subject to local 
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government personnel policies and compensation plans unless such inclusion 1s 
deemed by the court to be in its best interest. Without fiscal control of the 
court system, county boards are inclined to support actively proposals to 
shift the·financial burden for court operations to the state level. It was 
this argument by county boards which resulted in state funding of the Colorado. 
judicial system. County governments also are increasingly supportive of state 
financing proposals purely as a local property tax relief measure. Local 
pressure in Massachusetts was the main reason for the enactment of state 
funding of trial courts in 1978. 
5. The Governor 
Although governors are sometimes 1n the forefront of judicial reform, 5 
generally they lack enthusiasm for state financing because of its fiscal 
implications. State funding was defeated in 1967 in Idaho primarily by the 
governor's opposition to the proposal on the grounds that there was a lack of 
sufficient information on the fiscal impact of the measure. During the Kansas 
state financing movement, the governor successfully delayed the introd4ction 
of a state court financing bill also for lack of fiscal impact information. 
Even after an in-depth study provided the information sought, the governor 
recommended further delays in state assumption of the full financial 
responsibility for trial court operations. Comprehensive fiscal impact 
information would seem to be a major factor in reducing executive branch 
opposition to state financing proposals. 
5Governor Milliken of Michigan has made state financing of courts one of 
his prime objectives; former Governor Dukakis of Massachusetts made court 





integral part of the patronage system of that state. With the enactment of 
state funding, the legislature has guarded this prerogative, in part, by 
severely limiting the size of the state court administrative staff. 
Currently~ there are approximately 10 professional employees (exclusive of 
data processing staff) to administer a system comprising of over 5,000 court 
positions. Legislative appropriations for state level administration equals 
7/10 of 1% of the total judicial branch budget. The exercise of legislative 
power to control judicial branch "empire building" by restricting the s1.ze of 
its central administrative staff is evidenced 1.n West Virginia and other 
states as well.. 
7. Law Enforcement 
When state financing l.S tied to a trial court unification effort, law 
enforcement officers may oppose the program. Typically, such proposals 
include the elimination of justices of the peace and non-lawyer judges, which 
reduce the total number of judicial officers throughout the state, and make 
the warrant issuance process more difficult and time consuming for law 
enforcement officers. Particularly in rural areas, where the proposed system 
provides for a single judicial officer in a county or for a designated 
judicial area comprised of several counties, law enforcement officers within 
that jurisdiction must travel substantial distances to appear in person and 
swear under oath before a judicial officer to the facts alleged as the basis 
of the warrant. Typically, this has been resolved by the provision of 
magistrates as in South Dakota. However, other states with large sparsely 
populated areas have refused to authorize non-lawyer magistrates to issue 
warrants. Although this problem is not directly caused by state financing of 
trial operations, it typically is inter-related since historically court 
consolidation appears to be a condition precedent to state funding. 
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8. Bar Association 
State bar associations frequently represent a maJor force in initiating 
court reform efforts, including state court.financing, as was illustrated in 
Alabama and Kentucky. In other states the potential for disruption of 
existing local relationships and practices has generated the opposition 
trial attorneys who have learned to manipulate th~ existing system to their 
best advantage. Greater centralized administration of trial court 
(including standardized rules relating to judicial assignment, c 
management and administrative practices) curtails not only the individual 
prerogatives of trial judges but also the flexibility of the attorney-judge 
working relationship. When state funding is accompanied by proposals for new 
rule-making authority to be vested in the supreme court, attorney opposi 
seems even more likely. In Washington, the state bar association and several 
local bar associations publicly denounced the state funding proposal on the 
grounds that if the supreme court were granted rule-making authority, the 
trial courts would be inundated with numerous procedural changes, which in 
turn would severely disrupt trial practice. 
9. The Public 
The examination of previous successful and unsuccessful state funding 
efforts indicates that active, broad-based public support is unlikely in the 
absence of widespread belief in the existence of abuses within the judicial 
system, as was the case in Alabama and North Carolina. Indeed, Ln several 
states rural citizens organized successful campaigns to prevent the loss of 
control over the local judge who they feared would be assigned to other parts 
of the state under a state financed system. States such as Oklahoma and 
Kansas were required to exclude municipal courts from the purview of the state 
funded system to achieve widespread support for the proposal. 
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E·. Scope of State Funding Assumption 
A second strategic consideration in developing a state financing program 
relates to the breadth of the new state responsibility which is proposed. The 
scope of the assumption clearly is interrelated with, and often dependent 
upon, the identification of sources of opposition to state financing. Having 
identified likely opponents, it may be possible to make decisions relating to 
the scope of the assumption which can defuse substantially these forces 
resisting change. In the past, state funding strategies developed around 
scope of assumption considerations have involved limiting the definition of 
the state funded judicial system by function or by court level. 
1. Functional Limitations of State Funding 
The exclusion of specified functional activities from the state funded 
program is a strategy which has been successfully employed in a number of 
state financing efforts to increase the likelihood of success. The essence of 
the strategy is a narrow functional definition of court system scope to keep 
the state appropriations within politically acceptable limits. 
Typically, the following functions may be considered for exclusion: 
• indigent defense 
• sanity examinations 
• witness fees 
• juvenile detention 
• adult and juvenile probation 
• clerical functions performed by elected clerks 
• bailiff functions performed by elected sheriffs 




The ultimate decisions on exclusion are widely varied and are detailed in 
Table 2 of Current Status of Financing of State Courts, prepared as a 
companion piece to this paper. 
The most frequently excluded functions are adult and juvenile probation, 
6 
yet even these functions may not be totally excluded. In North Carolina, 
for example, urban jurisdictions had probation staffs serving the 
directly, while most other courts were provided probation services a 
executive branch department. When the state assumed trial court costs, only 
the locally funded probation officers in urban areas were included in the 
state judicial budget. 
Clerical services have been excluded 1n a number of states, more 
political than financial rasons, but the exclusion has made state assumpt 
more palatable. As indicated earlier, the mid-Atlantic states have largely 
excluded elected clerks as an item of state assumption. In Oklahoma, a 
largely state-funded system, counties still pay part of the personnel cost of 
court clerk operations. 
The open-ended somewhat volatile costs associated with indigent defense, 
sanity examinations and witness fees are not eagerly included in sta 
judicial budgets, but they often end up there for want of a better budgeting 
mechanism. Where state public defender systems exist, courts can be relieved 
of indigent defense services (Wisconsin is in the process of such a transfer now) 
Eventually, jury costs may gravitate to the state level, but stringent 
management is needed to limit unnecessary costs, once the local governments 
are released of this expense. South Dakota, though state funded, has left 
jury costs with local governments. 
6rt should be noted that probation is considered a state level executive 
function 1n many states and is excluded from the state judicial branch budget 
for that reason. 
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2. Ccur:..: Level Limitation 
Other states have limited the scope of state assumption on the basis of 
court level as a strategy in achieving substantial increases in state 
financing of trial court operations. Typically, this strategy has been used 
to undercut the strongest forces of opposition to state funding. Illustrative 
of this strategy are the state financing proposals enacted in Nebraska, 
Virginia and Maryland. In all three states, reorganization and consolidat 
of the limited jurisdiction trial courts accompanied state funding of those 
operations. However, the more powerful general jurisdiction trial courts 
(including the offices of elected clerks of court) which were unaffected by 
the lower court reorganization reform, remained outside of the state financing 
proposal and continue today under local financial control. 
Similarly, municipal courts were excluded from the state financing package 
~n over half of the state funded judicial systems because of pervasive local 
. . 7 . . 
oppos~t~on. Opposition mounted aga~nst state fund1ng by these local 
officials has been reported as the most powerful opposition force to financing 
reform. In fact, it is speculated that successful passage of state funding 
bills in most of these jurisdictions would have been unlikely without the 
successful neutralization of this group. Some or all municipal courts are 
excluded from the state funded judicial system 1n Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, 
Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island 
(Provid~nce only), and West Virginia. 
A variation of the municipal court strategy is the exclusion of 
specialized courts from state funding proposals. This approach was used 
primarily in the New England states where the funding of the probate courts ~n 
7counties have, on the whole, been more sympathetic to state assumption 
than cities and are now active in support of state assumption in some states. 
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Connecticut, Rhode Island and Vermont remained a local responsibility, even 
though essentially all other trial court costs were shifted to the state level. 
Finally, state funding strategies have included special deference to large 
and politically powerful geographical areas of states. To secure successful 
passage, the Nebraska reorganization/state financing package, which created a 
single limited jurisdiction county court system within the state, included a 
provision for the retention of locally funded municipal courts in the two 
largest cities of the state, Lincoln and Omaha. 
C. Phasing of Assumption 
The third strategic consideration 1n planning a state financing effort is 
the identification of a time phasing approach to state assumption which best 
meets the unique needs and circumstances of a particular jurisdiction. Four 
time phasing approaches have been used by the 22 jurisdictions which have 
adopted state funded judicial programs. These include: 
• Percentage phasing, 
• Geographic phasing, 
• Functional phasing, and 
• One-time assumption . 
1. Percentage Phasing 
State assumption of trial court costs through percentage phasing is an 
approach which entails the immediate inclusion of all court expenditures 
(identified within the scope of the assumption) in a single state judicial 
budget and provides for increased levels of state contribution to the total 
cost over a period of time--typically, 3 to 6 years. Phased state assumption 
has two major advantages. First, it eases the financial impact on the total 
state budget. Second, it provides for immediate implementation of statewide 
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administration and fiscal control of trial court operations even though state 
assumption of the total financial responsibility is delayed. The percentage 
phase-in approach has been used in such states as South Dakota, New York, and 
Kansas. 
2. Geographic Phasing 
Only in North Carolina has a gradual approach to state assumption of trial 
court costs been accomplished on a geographic basis. Initial state assumption 
took place in 1966 with the inclusion of all costs of court operations in five 
of the 26 judicial districts. The initial five districts, which included 
small, medium and large jurisdictions, were selected on the basis of 
cross-representativeness and district willingness to be brought under state 
funding. In 1968, 19 additional judicial districts were added to the state 
judicial budget, followed two years later by the remaining six disticts which 
had indicated the least interest in early state funding assumption. It should 
be noted that state funding in North Carolina was accompanied by a major 
reorganization of the lower trial court level so that state financing and 
lower court reorganization became effective simultaneously. Thus, in addition 
to easing the financial impact on the state budget, the geographic phase-in 
approach in North Carolina provided the opportunity for valuable 
experimentation. By selecting a relatively small, but representative, group 
of judicial districts, it was possible for North Carolina to test operations 
under a centralized administration and to resolve problems 1n its functioning 
before applying the system to the rest of the state. 
3. Functional Phasing 
Phasing state assumption of trial court costs by functional activity is 




This approach schedules total state financing of specified judicial functions 
over a fixed time period. For example, in Alabama, all judges salaries, 
related benefits, travel, and office supplies; juror costs; witness fees; and 
the salaries and benefits of circuit clerks and registers were funded by the 
state during FY 1976-77. In the following fiscal year, the state assumed the 
expense of the remaining non-judicial personnel and all other trial court 
costs with the exception of utilities and space. 
In Alabama, the usefulness of this approach related primarily to the 
mechanics of implementation. Lead-time necessary for planning the details of 
implementation was limited. The enabling legislation was enacted less than 
three months before the effective date of the first phase of assumption. 
Thus, those functions for which fiscal impact could be readily ascertained and 
relatively easily administered were included in the first stage of 
assumption. State assumption of the more complex budgetary items was delayed 
one year to allow sufficient planning and to synchronize implementation with 
the beginning of the new fiscal year. These included the assumption of such 
items as non-judicial personnel salaries which required the development 
state-wide classification and compensation plans, and equipment which 
necessitated a state-wide property inventory. 
4. One-Time Assumption 
Finally, states have elected to assume the total cost of trial court 
operations included within the definition of the state funded judicial system 
on a specified future date. This approach was used in such states as Colorado 
and New Mexico. Like the percentage approach, one-time assumption provides 
for the immediate implementation of statewide administration and fiscal 
control of all judicial system operations. Additionally, however, one-time 
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assumption provides certainty of r:otal state financing which is not always 
guaranteed under the percentage approach. For example, the original South 
Dakota state financing implementation bill established a schedule of 
increasing levels of state financing of trial court costs to total &tate 
funding. However, as passed, the implementation bill provided for state 
funding contributions to trial court costs of 50% in 1975, 62 1/2% in 1976, 
and 75% in 1977 and thereafter. The state contribution remains at the 75% 
level today. 
D. Budgetary Methods of Assumption 
The fourth major issue to be considered in developing an effective state 
financing strategy is the development of the budgetary method by which 
increased state funding is to be accomplished. Generally, five approaches 
have been employed. 
• central lump sum, categorical or program budget, 
• central line item budget, 
• central budget with local reimbursement, 
• central budget with local chargeback, and 
• local subsidy . 
As 1s discussed below, the method of state funding assumption is significant 
1n determining the location of authority for fiscal administration of state 
appropriated funds, which in turn may be of strategic importance in obtaining 
system consensus for state financing proposals. 
1. Central lump sum, categorical or program budget 
State assumption of trial court costs under this central budget approach 
provides a single state appropriation to the judicial branch which encompasses 
all Bt.:lte funded artivities with few categorical breakdowns, if any. This 
budgetary method of state assumption max1m1zes judicial branch discretion in 
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the allocation and expenditure of appropriated funds. This approach 
authorizes internal distribution of funds as deemed appropriate by judicial 
branch administrative officers usually without additional external 
(legislative or executive) authorization. Typically, judicial systems which 
have adopted this assumption format are characterized by highly centralized 
fiscal control and administration. States which have employed the central 
lump sum, categorical or program budget approach include Alaska and 
2. Central line item budget 
The central line item budget approach to state assumption results in the 
appropriation of state monies on the basis of individual budget items such as 
each position, each piece of furniture and equipment, and each category of 
operating expense such as supplies, postage, and printing. This more rigid 
and detailed appropriation format typically shifts administrative and resource 
allocation control from central judicial branch administrative officers to the 
legislature. Tight legislative control appears to have been a motivating 
force in the adoption of the line item budget in Massachusetts. 
In turn, by tying the hands of central judicial branch administrators, the 
central line item budget tends to increase local fiscal control in the sense 
that it assures trial courts that the appropriations fixed by the legislature 
are not subject to reallocation by central judicial branch administrators. 
Massachusetts, for example, has over one hundred line items in its judicial 
budget. New Mexico also illustrates heavy use of line item categories. The 
New Mexico budgetary format provides for a lump sum, centrally administered 
state appropriation for all limited jurisdiction courts, but mandates a line 
item appropriation by individual judicial district for the more politically 
powerful general jurisdiction trial courts. Indeed, for budgeting purposes, 
each of the 13 district courts is viewed as an autonomous state agency. 
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3. Central budget with local reimbursement 
A third approach to assuming increased state responsibility for the costs 
of trial court operations entails the submission of a central judicial branch 
budget request which includes a direct reimbursement to local government of 
monies in support of specified operating expenses or court activities. This 
approach is used in Kentucky where the legislature appropriates funds not only 
to cover the cost of those activities included within the judicial branch 
budget request, but also for direct reimbursement to local governments for the 
cost of trial court facilities. This approach makes possible both continued 
local control of specified court support items and simultaneous recognition of 
state financial responsibility. 
4. Central budget with local chargeback 
The fourth assumption method employed by several states in accomplishing 
increased state court funding provides for legislative appropriation of state 
funds to cover all costs of state funded activities, on the basis of a central 
judicial branch budget, but specifies a percentage reimbursement to the state 
from local governments at the end of the fiscal year based on actual court 
expenditures. This method not only assures maximum state-level financial 
control, but also eases the fiscal impact on the state budget. Currently, 
Kansas, New York, and South Dakota employ this approach to state assumption of 
trial court costs. 
5. Local subsidy 
A final method used to increase state funding involves state grants to 
local government 1n reimbursement of costs incurred for the administration and 
operation of the trial courts. These local subsidies are paid directly to the 
local government general operating fund with no requirement that such funds be 
spent directly for court support. 
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Of the five state assumption approaches, the local subsidy method provides 
the greatest degree of local government control over the administration of 
state funds appropriated for trial court operations. However, such subsidies 
do not necessarily increase the amount of funds made available to trial courts 
nor expand the control of trial court judges or administrators over fiscal 
administration of their operations. Indeed, the use of local subsidies is 
entirely unrelated to the administration of trial courts. Because the 22 
currently state funded judicial systems have tied state financing to 
state-level supervision of trial court expenditures, the local subsidy 
approach to state assumption has not been employed in these jurisdictions. 
It appears that only Pennsylvania and Oregon are using the subsidy system 
as a way of increasing state-level financing of the court system. Such 
subsidies were approved for the first time in Pennsylvania in 1971. In that 
year $8 million was distributed to the counties on a pro-rata basis, 
representing approximately 12% of each county's expenditure for court costs. 
For the last several years, the total annual subsidy appropriation was $24 
million, which represents approximately 30% of the total trial court cost. It 
is of some interest to note that these subsidy appropriations were made 
possible by federal revenue sharing funds. As a result, their continuat 
may be dependent upon the future availability of such federal monies. 
A different formula approach is used by Oregon in appropriating direct 
subsidies to local governments as partial reimbursement of trial court costs. 
In that state, the legislature annually apppropriates a fixed dollar amount 
per circuit judge to defray the costs of each judicial office. An additional 
fixed sum per circuit judge is paid to local government annually as 
reimbursement to the counties for the cost of indigent defense. In the 
current biennieum, the state legislature appropriated an average annual sum of 
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$44,500 per circuit court judge to defray judicial related expenses and 
8 
$20,000 per circuit judge per year for indigent defense costs. 
E. Administrative Mechanics of Assumption 
The final area of strategic consideration to be explored in developing 
state financing proposals relates to the numerous administrative policy 
decisions which must be made and administrative activities which must be 
undertaken to ensure a relatively smooth transition to state financing. 
Inadequate attention to these details will cause severe difficulties in 
implementing the state funded system and cause on-going operational problems. 
The following identifies the significant administrative issues which most 
frequently arise during state funding transitions. 
1. Specific Identification of Items to be Assumed 
The most serious transitional problems are caused by the failure of the 
enabling legislation to identify specifically those personnel, activities, and 
other items of expenditure to be included in the state funded judicial 
system. This lack of specificity created major implementation problems in 
Maine. Virtually every expenditure item required individual considerat and 
was subject to extensive negotiation before reaching a policy decision to 
include or exclude it from the state budget. This included such expenditures 
as the sheriff's cost to transport prisoners to state penal institutions, the 
cost of indigent defense transcripts, the salaries and related expenses of 
court bailiffs, the cost of law enforcement officer appearances in court, and 
reimbursement charges for services provided to the court by local government 
such as facilities, maintenance, utilities, and equipment purchase and repair 
Brn ~he first year of t~e current b:ennieum $43,000 per circuit judge 
for judicial expenses was approved. In the second year of the biennieum, that 
amount will increase to $46,000 per judge. 
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expenses. Negotiations to resolve these outstanding issues spanned a two and 
one-half year period and created significant intergovernmental conflict during 
this time. 
These problems have been avoided in other states by conducting adequate 
pre-implementation planning. For example, in Colorado a series of studies was 
conducted over a three-year period to determine precisely the total 
impact of a state funded judicial system, including the ident f all 
issues relating to the scope of inclusion within such a budget. Based on this 
information, the legislature was able to enact implementing legislation which 
specifically enumerated items to be state funded. In similar fashion, the New 
York state financing legislation listed in great detail those items to be 
included and excluded. Indeed, complex expenditures such as security costs 
actually were itemized within the legislation as state or local 
responsibilities. 
2. Identification of State Funded Personnel 
Even when the implementing legislation provides clear definition of budget 
items to be included or excluded from the state funded judicial 
variety of policy decisions in these areas are still required during 
implementation. For example, in many jurisdictions it is discovered in 
transferring court personnel into the state system that a number of employees, 
particularly in rural counties, are assigned to work for the county 
commission, county treasurer and other county offices as well as for the 
court. In Maine, this issue was resolved by giving the individual the option 
to work exclusively for the court and be included 1n the state judicial system 
or to be excluded as a county executive employee. A more difficult problem 
was encountered in New York, where the county clerk by statute is charged with 
executive functions such as county recording and election registration in 
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addition to court clerical functions. To implement the transition to state 
funding, it was necessary to perform on-site visits in each court location 
throughout the state to distinguish those employees performing county 
functions; who would be excluded from state funding~ from those employees 
performing court duties to be included in the new statewide court system. 
3. Personnel Classification and Compensation 
A related and time-consuming activity required 1n implementing state 
financing of trial court costs is the development of a statewide 
classification and compensation plan for all court employees to be included 
within the state funded budget. The time required to develop such a program 
has ranged from almost three years in New York (9,000 employees) to just over 
three months in Maine (250 employees). Several specific classification and 
pay 1ssues frequently arise in implementing state funding systems. 
First, most states have found it prudent to mandate by statute or 
administrative rule some procedure for limiting increases in employee 
compensation during the interim period between enactment of state financing 
and the subsequent implementation date. In New York, the implementing 
legislation provided that no court employee could be granted a salary e 
pending implementation of the statewide court personnel system without the 
approval of the chief administrative judge of the judicial branch. Similarly, 
in Colorado, by administrative order of the Chief Justice, all salary increase 
requests during the transition period were required to be approved by the 
state court administrator's office. 
A second issue which arises in transferring court employees to the state 
system relates to the difficulties in developing a salary plan which 
accommodates the disparate compensation levels of the various trial courts 
throughout the state. This problec,) i,o more difficLlt when cost-of-living 
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differences exist in particular jurisidictions within the state. For example, 
in Maine, it was found that the prevailing labor market compensation levels 
were higher both in resort areas of the state and in those labor markets 
dominated by paper manufacturing compan~es. Nevertheless, as a matter of 
policy it was determined that geographic differentials would not be applied 
and it was expected that the job security and better fringe benefits features 
of state employment would offset the higher direct salary levels of 
industry in those locales. Even in New York, which would seem the most likely 
candidate for the application of geographic differentials to the basic 
compensation plan, only a relatively insignificant annual sum of $200 is 
authorized for court employees in three high cost geographic areas. However, 
the consideration of the necessity and appropriateness of area salary 
differentials almost always arises during state take-overs. 
Finally, the classification and compensation process requires the creation 
of some method of employee appeal from the classification of his/her position 
within the state funded plan. Typically a review board of three or more 
members is established, independent from the state court administrator's 
office, to hear these appeals. In New York, the appeals board is of 
three members, one member appointed by the State Comptroller, by the Director 
of the Civil Service, and by the Public Employees Relation Board. In 
scheduling the state funding transition, sufficient time and funds must be 
provided for the appeals process. 
4. Employee Unions 
A further personnel issue ~n implementation relates to the status of 
existing collective bargaining units upon transition to state funding. In New 
York, this 1ssue was resolved by statutorily p~eserving existing bargaining 
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units. Through negotiation, judicial branch administrative officials securec 
agreements from union representatives to bargain in coalition by geographic 
areas. In doing so, the state effectively was able to reduce the number of 
bargaining units from over 150 to a much more manageable number of 41. 
5. Fringe Benefits Issues 
Fringe benefits issues also ar1se upon the transfer of trial court 
personnel to the state system. The most important relate to retirement, 
insurance, and accrued vacation and sick leave. The implementation process is 
made more difficult when clear direction is not given by statute for the 
treatment of these administrative aspects of transition. 
Where state and local retirement systems are not integrated, typically 
employees are g1ven the option to come under the state retirement plan or to 
remain in the local plan, into which the state will pay the employer's 
contribution upon assumption. Practical and political considerations require 
that the state grant trial court employees pr1or service credit to facilitate 
their merger into the new system. The factors to be weighed in determining 
criteria for pr1or service approval are complex and the financial impact is 
always very substantial. 
Decisions must also be made relating to 1nsurance coverage for merged 
employees. Transferred court employees may be required to accept the state 
insurance program as in Alabama and Maine, or may be allowed by statute to 
elect to remain under the local government health plan as was provided in New 
York. 
An additional benefits issue in tranferring trial court employees to the 
state system involves the treatment of accrued sick and annual leave. 
Generally, these accruals are unfunded liabilities of local government and 




if local government payoff of these liabilities is required upon state 
assumption of trial court expenses, it will represent a significant one-time 
cost to local governments. For that reason; states which have accepted the 
financial responsiblity for trial court operations typically have assumed 
these accruals without local government reimbursement. In Alabama, each local 
unit was required to certify to the state court administrative office the 
accrued vacation and sick leave for all employees to be transferred 
state system. For employees of trial courts without a leave policy or written 
record of accruals, the Alabama court administrator applied a standard formula 
for crediting such employees with a deemed rate of accrual upon transfer to 
the state system. 
The fringe benefits 1ssue potentially is the most difficult transition 
item. Decisions relating to fringe benefits have substantial cost 
implications and can be the source of prolonged litigation. Thus, it 1s 
essential that adequate time and careful attention be devoted to this 
administrative aspect of implementation at an early stage of state fund 
consideration. 
6. Administrative Support 
Recognition of the need to erect a court administrative structure to 
manage the state financed system also is critical. If a statewide system is 
to assume the costs of financing and administering the operations of trial 
courts, it is necessary to create an administrative structure within the 
judicial branch to replace the administrative support services previously 
provided to the courts by local units of government, including purchasing, 
accounting, budgeting, data processing, and such personnel-related functions 
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as recruitment, testing, classification, and payroll serv1ces. The 
development of this internal administrative support structure requires both 
adequate lead-time and staff. 
Past experience indicates that adequate lead-time is rarely provided by 
the legislature. The Massachusetts state funding experience is the most 
extreme illustration of this problem. Although the implementation legislation 
was passed in mid-July of 1978 it was made retroactively effective as of 
July 1. Since state funding was a fait accompli, judicial administrators were 
not afforded the luxury of transitional planning and organization. While 
those who have been involved in state funding implementations generally 
believe 18 months to be a minimum lead time, most states have provided the 
court system one year or less to organize the transition. 
Moreover, legislatures frequently fail to provide monies necessary to 
obtain adequate staff to undertake the administrative duties involved 1n 
planning and executing the transition to state funding. Indeed, most maJor 
state financing transitions in the last five years have been underwritten 
primarily by LEAA funds. To achieve in the judicial branch the level of 
accountability which legislatures have come to expect of executive agenc 
comparable administrative support must be provided. 
Where sufficient lead-time and resources to acquire needed in-house staff 
are not made available prior to implementation, it may be necessary for the 
judicial branch to rely on the performance of some of these functions by 
either the state executive branch or local government. Responsiveness to the 
operational needs of the court system is jeopardized when substantial 
administrative support is provided by external agencies over which the 
judiciary can exert no control and little leverage. Consequently a critical 
strategic consideration involves the early determination that: 1) thP-
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necessary internal administrative components to operate a state funded system 
currently exist and are in place, or 2) leg:alative commitment to provide 
adequate resources to develop such a structure has been obtained or will be 
forthcoming. 
7. Other Administrative Issues 
The final group of administrative issues involved in transition 
relate to two significant court expenditure items: equipment and facilities. 
Frequently the treatment of these items is not clearly articulated in enabling 
legislation. Even if the implementing legislation provides adequate direction 
in regard to these items, the treatment selected by the legislature will have 
substantial implications for central court administrative staff during the 
transition period. 
Jurisdictions which have enacted state funded judicial systems have 
treated the provision of equipment to trial court operations in three basic 
ways. In states such as Kansas and Missouri, furniture and equipment (as well 
as operating expenses) remain a local funding responsibility. This 
arrangement has created some dissatisfaction since increased cost to 
government is automatically mandated when the state acts to increase staffing 
levels. A second method of dealing with this expenditure is illustrated 1n 
such states as New York, South Dakota, and Maine where all furniture and 
equipment used by trial courts as of implementation must be continued to be 
made available thereafter. However, in all three states, the purchase of new 
equipment or furniture is a state financial responsibility. Finally, in 
Massachusetts, Colorado and Alabama, implementing legislation provided that 
all equipment and furniture in the possession of the court became state 
property upon the effective date of state funding. If this latter method of 
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handling equipment ~s selected, it is almost imperative that the transition 
period include the performance of a statewide property inventory. If state 
responsibility is to extend only to the acquisition of new equipment and 
furniture, the transition period will require at least the development of a 
statewide property inventory system to be incorporated into on-go~ng 
administration. 
The method of dealing with facility expenditures also has impl 
the administrative burdens of the court system during the transition period 
and after implementation. Four basic methods of handling facility expenses 
have been used by state funded judicial systems. First, states such as 
Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, and Rhode Island build and maintain all trial 
court facilities. Under this system, unless the administration of these 
activities is provided by the executive branch, the judiciary is required to 
obtain specialized resources to manage this function. Second, states such as 
Massachusetts and Delaware have assumed the cost of trial court facilities on 
a square footage rental basis. This method of handling facilities requires 
that central court administrative staff be available during the transition 
period and thereafter to participate in negotiations for leasing 
and to execute resulting rental agreements for all trial court space 
throughout the state. Some states have been overwhelmed by the problems 
caused by this method including the use by counties of whipsaw tactics in 
contract negotiations and the substantial difficulties ~n securing state fire 
marshall approval of most local courthouses. Finally, at least one state has 
funded trial court facilities by lump sum reimbursement to local governments 
on a pro-rata basis. In Kentucky, this method has proven to be a satisfactory 
compromise in retaining local ownership of court buildings, yet providing a 
sufficient financial contribution to give the state leverage to obtain 
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adequate facilities for trial court operations. Typically, however 
jurisdictions which have failed to assume the full financial responsiblity for 
trial court facilities expenditures can expect to encounter both transitional 
and on-going reluctance by local government to improve or build court 
facilities. Several of these states anticipate the need for legislative 
resolution to this problem in the near future. 
Conclusion 
The strategic considerations which prove to be important ~n organizing an 
effective state financing program take a unique form in each jurisidiction. 
The history, political climate, court system organization, and individual 
personalities of key actors in each state determine the elements necessary to 
build general system consensus on this issue. The basic strategic 
considerations outlined above have been offered to provide the state teams 
with an historical perspective of problems encountered and compromises made to 
secure financing reforms, and with an understanding of some of the 
administrative problems which make the transition a long and difficult 
process. It is hoped that these illustrations will provide useful guidance as 
seminar participants evaluate the feasibility and desirability of increased 
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Over the last two decades, as more and more states have considered and 
adopted structural reorganization and simplification of their state court 
systems, there has been an ever-increasing interest in, and concomitant 
controversy about, the ways in which state court systems should be financed. 
This debate not only has centered on the relative merits of state vs. local 
funding, but also has revealed differing views of what constitutes a state 
funded court system. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide seminar participants with a 
general framework of information on the status of state co~rt financing 
throughout the country. This overview will focus on the following three 
areas: 
• Level of state financing by state court system. 
• Scope of financing in totally or substantially state funded court 
systems. 
• Relative merits of state vs. local financing of trial courts. 
Much of the information contained in this document is derived from the most 
recent study of state court financing in the United States conducted by 
1 
Harry 0. Lawson, et al. Other information has been generated as a result 
of the National Center's State Court Financing Project. 
Levels of State Financing by State Court System 
The trend toward increased state financing of court operations has been 
uneven in recent times. Although a number of states moved to underwrite all 
or substantial portions of their trial court operations during the 1960s 
lLawson, et al, State Funding of Court Systems: an Initial Examination, 
(The American University, Criminal Courts Technical Assistance Project, No. 
J-LEAA-011-78, 1979); hereinafter referred to as the Lawson study. 
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and early 1970s, that trend slowed substantially in subsequent years. At the 
end of the 1960s, state expenditures for all courts in the United States were 
between 27-28% of the total operating costs. By 1975-76, the total state 
expenditure for court operations had increased only slightly to 30% 
. .d 2 nat1.on-w1. e. In the last six years, however, 11 states have moved to fund 
all or most of the cost of state court operations. 
Until recently, state financed court systems were concentrated primarily 
in the less populous states. Early state funded court systems tended to be 
located in the New England area, such as Maine (1961), Vermont (1961), 
Connecticut (1965) and Rhode Island (1965). To those were 
added Alaska (1959) and Hawaii (1965), which carried the centralized system of 
their territorial governments into statehood. State financing subsequently 
spread to other parts of the country, emerging as an element of major court 
reform movements in North Carolina in the late 1960's and later Colorado (1970) 
and South Dakota (1972). 
Only in the last two years has state funding been achieved in the more 
populous stat:es. Besides New York and Massachusetts, North Carolina is the ( 
only other state funded jurisdiction with a population in excess of 5 
million. In contrast to their predecessors, state financing in New York 
(1977) and Massachusetts (1978) clearly was a product of government 
economics. In both states, state funded judicial systems were enacted to 
provide a vehicle for relieving the financial burdens of local taxing authorities. 
At the present time, there are 22 state court systems which are totally or 
substantially state funded. 3 These include: Alaska, Alabama, Colorado, 
2carl Baar. unpublished speech to a joint meeting of the Conference of 
Chief Judges and Assistant Chief Judges, Council of District Administrators, 
and Judicial Planning Committee of the state of Minnesota, St. Paul, . 
Minnesota, October 16, 1978. 
3"Substantially" as defined by the Lawson study includes--state funding 




Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii. Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, 
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia and West Virginia.4 
Table 1 on the following page categorizes judicial systems by p~rcentage 
of stat~ financial commitment to the total cost of their operations. These 
classifications parallel the categories developed by Dr. Carl Baar in his 1975 
state court budgeting work. 5 ·Although the states included within the four 
categories have changed somewhat since that time, the patterns of state-local 
distribution of judicial funding throughout the country continues today. 
Categories 1 and 2 which are shown in Table 1, include 28 court systems 
which are financed primarily at the local level. Limited state funding 
characterizes the first category of state judicial systems which receive from 
0 to 25% of their appropriations from state government. Generally, state 
funded judicial agencies in these states include the appellate court(s~ the 
state court administrator's office, and the Judicial Council or Judicial 
Conference. Additionally, some or all of the salary and travel expenses of 
judges of the general jurisdiction court may be funded by the state. 
Category 2 (25-50%) includes state funded expenditures of category 1 and 
other itemized itures of the trinl courts. 
Typically, these additional specified items include the salaries and 
travel expenses of all general and limited jurisdiction judges, the salaries 
of court reporters and/or judicial secretaries, and related trial court 
expenses such as jury fees, indigent defense expenditures, witness fees or 
psychiatric examination costs. 
4Lawson, supra note 1 at 1. 
Searl Baar, Separate But Subservient: Court Budgeting 1n the American 
States, (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books. 1975). 
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TABLE 1 
PERCENTAGE OF COURT SYSTEM EXPENDITURES FINANCED BY STATE APPROPRIATIONS 
TOTAL/SUBSTANTIAL STATE FUNDING LOCAL FUNDING 
4 










New Mexico I 
New York a 
North Carolina 
Oklahoma 















































~tate funding is being accomplished on a phase-in basis. In FY 1979, the 
state financed 56% of the trial court costs and will pay 100% in FY 1981. 
brne District of Columbia also can be assigned to this ·category. 
cPercentage phase-in to be completed in FY 1982. 
donly assumes personnel costs, effective July 1> 1981. 
-4- , .... .., 
The 22 fal of 
state funded as defined the Lawson The six states 
which are category of state financing are of two 
typ.es. Two Kansas and Missouri$ are in to 
greater state fund may end up in Category 4 in the near 
State the judicial systems of the remaining 
states this c , Nebraska, Virginia and West 
include all state level court agencies, all or most of limited 
court costs and most jurisdiction court expenses with the except 
those funct elected clerks of court. 
Category 4 includes those state court systems which essentially are 
state funded. , expenditures which may remain locally funded in 
these courts are facilities, some or all of the probation function, and 
special court and munic 1 court costs. 
Scope of Financing in Totally or Substantially State Funded Court Systems 
The examination of state appropriations for the 22 state funded judie 
systems revea differences state-local distribution percentages. 
but also di ferences 
commitment to fund 
systems from s 
funded system 
in items inc 
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the breadth or inclusiveness of each state's 
operations. Looking at state funded judie 
ive, it is apparent that what constitutes a s 
among the states. As suggested by Dr. Baar. variat 
state funded judicial budgets may affect " the 
ontrol its internal operations (e.g •• whether 
t) and indicate} the t 
s court-related g •• 
are the judicial budget and 
id are 1 luded) ." 
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systems. As shown in that table, probation and juvenile detention functions 
typically exist as executive branch activities or are included in the judicial 
budget in a limited way if at all. Only in six of the 22 states are 
facilities expenses fully funded by state appropriations, while such expenses 
are entirely excluded from state judicial budgets in 14 jurisdictions. Many 
states do not fund the cost of special courts or municipal courts. A major 
court activity which also is excluded from state funding in five of the 22 
states is the operation of general jurisdiction trial court clerk's offices 
(four of which invdlve elected clerks of coutt). Finally, a similar 
percentage of states exclude general jurisdiction jury, witness, indigent 
defense, sanity exam and law library expenses from state appropriations for 
judicial operations. 
A per capita comparison of state funded judicial system judges, support 
staff, and expenditures for FY 1979 1s presented in Table 3 on page 8. As 
shown in that table, the population of those states which have general state 
court funding ranges from a low of 382,000 in Alaska to a high of 18 mill 
in New York. However the median population of these states is approximate 
2 million. The number of judges and court support staff vary widely as well, 
from a high of 577 judges in New York to a low of 41 judges in Maine, and from 
11,641 court emp 1n New York to 176 employees in Vermont. Tne median 
number of j staff 1s 168.5 and 739, respectively. Total 
state appropriations among these judicial systems range from almost $264 
mill ion in New 
7rn FY 1979, on 
1981, the state wi l 
the court is 
to $7. million in South Dakota. 8 The median level 
($108.97 million) was funded by the state. By FY 
100 percent of i:rial court operations. Currently, 
350 million. 
Brt should 
percent ·Of tria 
of $8 million. 
noted, that the state of South Dakota funded only 75 
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'l. 1-funicipal courts are locally funded. 
J. A portion of facilities ~ental only. 
4. Pre-trial release only. 
5. State •lso funds domesllc relations counselors. 
N/1\ N/1\ N/A X 
X X X X 
xl x -- x 
X X X X 
X X -- X 
)(q -- -- )( 
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N/fl N/A N/11. X 
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)( 
)( -- )( 
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)( )( -- )( 
)( )( -- )( 
N/A N/11. N/A X 
X X 
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N/A N/A N/A 
N/1\ N/A N/A X 
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12. State in process of phasing in all costs of non-judicial 
personnel, Full state funding of this category to be complete 
in 19112. Operating expenses borne 1oca lly. 
JJ. Personnel only. 
docket fee surcharge retained by county 
ion to facilities expense. 
14. Felony cases only. 
15. State funding of trla1 courts to be by July 1, , 
state emoloyed doctors. 16. Personnel only. 
17. One juvenile ion of 
State funded conducted 


























































CMI'IIIl!SON or STIITE fiii!OCO JUDICIAl. SYST£11 JUOG£S 
SIJI'!'OilT Sll\rr, 1\NIJ EXPtiiOI Hmr s" .ry 1979 
-
Average 
Numb11r Number of Tohl Porulatfon llveraqe 
Staff Judicial d e per Judqc>/ Population Total Per Capita 
fmploye~s ' Ju~tice per StaffP. .lippropr I at I on Expend! ture1 ' 111 
lilaba11111 3,665,000 218 l 168 1,3116 16,811.9 3,137.8 s 28,409,600 $ 7.69. 
A lash ]82,000 47. 3<l7 IJ,095.2 1,091.4 20,411?,300 5J.Ii2 
Colorado 2,583,000 216.25 I ,327 .4 I ,543 .6 u ,944 .5 1,945.9 :n ,586 ,869 
Conn!'ctlcut J ,117,000 17.2 1,9511 2,0110 25,54'?.2 1.591.9 30,708,000 
!Iawall 48 H7 795 18,479.2 1.187.4 14,9111,301 11.611 
K~nsas 22~ 1,71111.5 1,5!) 10,2119.5 1,526.8 IS ,491,1J5 6.70 
Kentucky 3,42R,OOO 222 1,807.25 2,029.25 15,44!.4 1,896.8 39,390,!00 
Maine J ,070,000 ~I 266 307 26,097.6 4,022.5 7,797.620 
M.lryl<!nd 4,144,000 ~55 1,714 1,969 16,251.0 2,417.7 24,028,664, 5.80 
Hfssourl 4,778,000 326 S07.1 833.1 14,656.4 9,423.1 l1 ,461,036 3.66 
Nebraska 1,553,000 108 509.5 617.5 14,379.6 3,048.1 10,551,086 6.U 
N'!w Mf!xico 1,168,000 125 441.5 566.5 9,344.0 2,645.8 12,911 ,000 il.HI 
N!'w York 18,01!4,000 571 11.641 12,218 31,341.4 1,553.5 263,993,3919 1 1.02!1 
!forth Carolina 5,469,000 212 2,957 3,169 25,797.2 1,849.5 61,841,751 11.31 
Oklahoma 2,766,000 212 223.5 435.5 13,047.2 12,375.8 21,339,485 7.84 
Rhode lsl~nd 927,000 44 362 ~06 21,0613.2- 2,560.8 9,156,969 9.88 
h h South Dakota 6116,000 54 430.1 404.1 12,703.7 1,594.9 7,027,7091 10.251 
Vermont 476,000 44 176 220 10,810.2 2,704.5 3,643,350 7.65 
ll!'st Y.frqlnla 1,821,000 63 731 794 28,904.8 2,491.1 14,726,046 8.08 
Total 59 ,31'1,000 3, 153.75 28,544.85 31,758 332,020.2 59;065.3 $735,593,412 S219.1S 
l'lean J,li!l,789 165.99 1,502.36 1,662 17,474 3,106 s 41,331,483 s 12.28 
Hrdlan 2.065,500 168.5 739 1,090 15,414 1,8% s 20,910,893 $ 10.07 
Rani)P.: High tll,OR~.ooo 577 ll,MI 12.218 31,341.4 12,375.8 S26l,993.39l s 53.62 
low 311?.,000 41 176 220 9,0'15.2 1 ,091. 4 $ 3,643,350 s 5.80 
Snur.:e: J ... w~l>n, et at, ll"~!:_un!'!!'i_!'~ Cnurt_Syat.,ms: An tnttl_~!_Ul!!!"!.f_n_,,!J!'!t. TnhiPs VI, Vtt 10nd tx; with ineluslon of bn~tas and ltentucky judge11 
""d nnpr.ort nt11ff d~t~ oht~lnrtl frnm their rpnprctiv, Stntl' Court Admlnl~trntfve offlcP.. 
" F'or J'llt'Pose~ of thte tnble, expenditur"" 11re 11ynonyoontuo vith ftpproprhtlona. 
}, Ol!tft not suh•ltted by three o( thP 22 9tate rundrd judicial BYRtt!WI8 (Mnssttchusl!ttll, Vlr~tinl.a, and Delavsre). 
c llnAed on Bur•"'u of Cl'nsus 1976 p.>J>ullltton eJtti ... tell. 
d . 
nors nnt lncludl! juRtlePA or the PI'RcP, Wlttnlcfpal court jud~tes, or special court J•mRPR, Rnd their staffs who •re not etata fundPd. 
" Ml!twnurl datil ware nelurlad In cnleulattn~t thP """URU Rncl ranjll', bP.clluae Mlattoort vlU not be liltat~ funded untU July, 191U (for trial c<llilrt 
1). ll:nnsn111 d•ta ""''" 10l11n e,.eludP<I, hnt m~ly In cRteul~<thtlt the """'rn~~:e "''" "'"II"" for the totlli appropr!atl<>n and per capita e~:rea4iture 
~lneP IC""'"lllll h In till! l'lr"""""' nf rlut~ln11-ln ~t.,tr fundlnl\ whlf'lt will not IMo erwt>h?tP until 19111. 
r fnr affUhlt«!d "1\<'ndP.!I fur M,.rylnnd'11 ·•rpetbt«> court,. vhlch cn.,ld oot be induclee! b• 
u,., n 19 lmdi(Pt requl!ltt in this nre11. 
IIi H""' lahl" onh included. """'""""· th'!! &>er e .. pita l!l!j>endHul'll> Ul!ltlrl! 
l'liii.'C:lil!l~ the ~:o11U 
of state financing in these largely state funded judicial systems is almost 
$21 million. Per capita expenditures for state funded systems range from 
$53.62 in Alaska to a low of $5.80 in Maryland. The average per capita 
expenditure for the state court systems in these states is over $12., while the 
median per capita state expenditure for court operations is approximately $10. 
Relative Merits of State vs. Local Financing 
Empirical information concerning the advantages and disadvantages of state 
financing is limited. However, the perceptions of system participants in 
those states that have made the transition from local to state financ:ing9 
and the issues frequently raised in considering increased state responsibility 
for financing court operations generally relate to two issues: cost and 
10 control. 
Cost 
Cost considerations are an important issue in the state funding debate. 
(opponents frequently cite the objective dat~ generated by those states which 
have made the transition from local to state financing to indicate increased 
cost under state funded systems. Proponents, on the other hand, cite 
qualitative improvements and expectations of cost reductions to provide ,, 
equivalent levels of service over the long run._j The most frequently cited 
disadvantages and advantages of state funding are as follows. 
9"Experience of States with State Funding of the Trial Courts", 
Minnesota Judicial Planning Committee, September, 1978. (Survey responses 
received from 10 states: Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, 
Massachusetts, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Dakota, and West Virginia.) 
lOsee e.g. Baar, supra note 4; Larry Berkson and Susan Carbon, Court 
Unification: History, Politics and Implementation (Washington: Nati~ 





because of the necessity to equalize 
the state and to grandfather in all existing 
because of the necessity to upgrade 
transition to state funding. 
Cost will increase because it is necessary to employ central 
and local ive staff to perform new monitoring. 
personnel, ial and budgetary management functions. 
Costs 1 increase to accommodate pent-up demand itt poor 
jurisdict pending state funding. 
Funding will be more difficult to obtain since all costs appear 
in one budget, making the expense appear greater.ll 
Funding precarious when the entire state system is 
on only one source of appropria-tions--the Legislature. 
Since state financing does not guarantee greater funding of 
court operations, the process of equitably distributing 
available resources under a state funded system will result 
decreased funding levels for at least the wealthy courts after 
implementation of a centralized system. 
Imposes on local governments one-time costs for payment of 
accrued annual and sick leave, which typically are unfunded 
liabilities (but it is possible to permit transfer of accrued 
days to the new system). 
May eliminate some local courts' surplus revenues, which are 
earmarked or channeled for other local services. 
e financing problems with local governments which have 
imited tax bases and increasingly are becoming tenuous sources 
of te funding of court operations. 
e Relieves local governments of a significant financial burden. 
the long run to provide an equivalent level of 
realizing economies of scale through bulk 
forms standardization and simplification, 
, and el ion of duplication of effort. 
llrh is propos it , however, is not 
ished in 75. Dr. 
borne out by Carl Baar's s of 
court budget 
percentage of court system itures 
differences in the of difficulty 
supra note 4, at 23. 
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Baar concludes that differences in the 
funded by the state do not account 
in obtaining state s. See Baar 
Control 
More important even than cost considerations in the debate over state 
funding is the issue of altered state-local relationships and the shift in the 
control of court operations which results from state financing.~tate funding 
oppone~ts fear the loss of local control over policy and procedure which 
accompanies increased centralization of state financed system. In contrast. 
proponents cite both qualitative and economic advantages to system-wide 
administration of state funded judicial operation~) The major disadvantages 
and advantages of state funding in terms of system control are as follows. 
(1) Disadvantages 
• Local control and accountability of judges and other court 
officials to the constituency which they serve is restricted 
(less so where judges are elected). 
• Initiative and incentive for developing individualized 
administrative solutions to individual local problems is lost. 
• Local problems will be resolved unsatisfactorily in terms of 
increased delay awaiting action from a distant central 
administrative office or because of the lack of familiarity with 
local traditions, problems, needs and operations. 
Creates a new layer of bureaucracy which tends not only to 
increase red tape but also to reject innovative ideas. 
• Imposes new administrative demands in the form of planning, 
evaluation, and justification of operations and expenditures. 
• Centralized administration inevitably emphasizes system-wide 
programs which often disregard individual characteristics of 
trial courts, and frequently are not applicable to all local 
court systems. 
(2) Advantages 
• Provides for a more equitable distribution of resources through-
out the state, which fosters more equitable delivery of court 
services to the citizens of the state. Fiscal appropriations to 
local courts are determined according to need rather than 
relative wealth of the county in which the court i~ situated. 
Makes possible unitary budgeting and centralized administration 
which provide the basis for a more cohesive judicial system and 
the ability to pool resources, so that they can be transfered to 
areas of need. 
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e The revenue sources of the state government, such as the personal 
income and the sales tax, are more inflation~proof than the property 
tax, making it easier to plan for the future and to maintain a con-
sistent level of oper~tion. 
• Enhances the image of the court system as an independent branch 
of state government, rather than an amalgam of administratively 
unrelated departments of local government. 
• Facilitates control of expenditures by providing the vehicle for 
developing comparable measures of performance. 
• Encourages uniform operating and management procedures. 
• Eliminates the pressure on courts to "pay for themselves" by 
generating revenue through finea, thereby freeing judges from 
the pressures of the balance sheet to objectively consider the 
merits of each individual case. 
• Eliminates the appearance and possibility that judicial 
decisions are affected by the dependence of eourts on the 
largesse of local officials. 
~ncourages essential research and planning which typically 
cannot either be afforded or cost justified in an individual 
local court. 
• Provides the vehicle for replication in other courts of 
experimental programs found successful in individual local 
courts. 
• Provides statewide coordination of federal grant projects. 
• Reduces the role of politics and patronage in the employment of 
staff. 
Provides new avenues for career advancement to court employees 
in many states. 
• Insures minimum qualifications of court employees statewioe. 
• Permits uniformity in job classifications and equal pay for 
equal work. 
Conclusion 
The examination of the experiences of the 22 state funded judicial systems 
bears out neither all fears of state funding opponents nor all claims of its 
proponents. However, the s of these states suggest that the 
definition of state fund and the method of its accomplishmept may be 




and control may be dealt with on a state-by-srate basis and tailored to 
individual court structures, traditions and needs. Thus, in developing the 
outline of a state funded court system, it may be of value for each state to 






Developing the functional scope of the court system in narrow terms to 
reduce state financing costs. 
Employing regional differentials, based on cost of living, to reduce 
the expense of transferring local employees to a state funded, 
uniform personnel system and to minimize potential disruption of 
local government compensation scales. 
Permitting local governments to retain some portion of cou~t revenues, 
to soften the revenue loss occasioned by the state taking these revenues 
as a quid pro guo for assumption. 
Control Considerations 
• Defining narrowly the state funded judicial system in terms of 
inclusiveness of court activities to provide an opportunity for 
retention of local involvement in local judicial policy-making. 
• Institutionalizing decentralized administration in such areas as 
personnel management (e.g., state level responsibility for 
system-wide policies with delegation of hiring, firing, and other 
day-to-day operational authority to lor.al courts on a post-audit 
basis) and purchasing (local acquisition of items up to a maximum 
dollar amount). 
• Building-in local partl.cl.pation and policy-making in terms of annual 
budget formulation and system-wide implementation of rules, 
procedures, new programs and state-mandated requirements. 
• Erecting in advance the necessary administrative structure to manage 
a state financed system which includes the acquisition of expertise 
in such areas as personnel management, budgeting, data processing, 
financial management, legislative and other governmental liaison and 
research techniques having familiarity with the organizatiou, 
structure. problems and needs of both the state-wide system and 
individual local courts. ----
-13-
EFFECTS OF SfATE FINAOCING OF TRIAL COURTS 
UPON '!RIAL COURT AIMINISI'RATION 
EXHIBIT. G 
Source# State Court Finance Project of the 
National Center for State Courts 
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INIRODUCTION 
There ·has a , inexorable trend toward state financing of 
tdal courts. Some tto1enty-six states have assuned the primacy 
responsibility funding trial courts;l and while few of these states 
have assumed total financing responsibility, the scope of assumption has 
been ver:y br:oad. the first time it can be said that a major:ity of 
trial court systems are primarily state-financed.2 
S_tate financing trial courts can occur in various ways. It may 
take the f~ of a tightly centralized state budgetary process for trial 
courts, or it can take the fo~ of subsidies or r:eUnbur:sements to local 
govern:nents for court expenditures. 3 The latter arrangement provides 
state financing with a minfimun of state control, but it is r:arely used. 
State financing of trial courts is normally accanplished by including 
trial courts in the state budgetary process and paying court expenses 
from the state general fund. 
The principal result of state financing upon trial courts is to 
remove them fr:om the str:ucture of local government and to place them 
within the administrative framework of state government. This involves a 
difficult and sometimes traumatic change in administrative relationships, 
as local ties are severed and state relationships established. The 
transition is not unccmnonly acccmpanied by clarificaton of the 
administrative lines of authority within the judiciary and an increase in 
the power of presiding judges. 
0. work entitled, State Funding of Court 
Systems: An Initial Examination, (The American University Criminal 
Courts Technical Assistance Project, No. J-LF.M-100-78, 1979), identified 
twenty-two states primarily state-funded court systems: Alaska, 






Alabama, Colorado, West Virginia, New York, 
, Maryland, Oklahoma, Virginia, Missouri, Kansas 
the publication of this work, Michigan has 
a phased state assunption of tt"ial court 
has assumed trial court costs; North 
significant portions of trial court 
is considered that twenty of 
in the last decade. ~ 
to counties for court expenses was 
Oregon appropriates a set subsiQy to its 
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This paper describes major effects of these changes upon trial court 
administration. It is intended for clerks and trial court administrators 
who are facing, or may soon face, a transition to state financing of 
their courts. 
A. State Financing Changes - Administrative Relationships and Controls 
1. Inclusion in the State Budgetary PLocess 
The first and most iliiilediate effect of state financing is the 
necessity for trial courts to adapt to the state budgetary process. This 
means using a new set of budgetary procedures, usually those specified by 
the state executive branch pursuant to legislation. This occurs even in 
states where the executive branch has limited control of judicial budgets. 
T.n addition, the state supreme court may impose internal 
budgetary processes to facilitate development and presentation of a court 
budget at the state level. If, for example, the state has adopted a 
particular form of budgeting (PPB, ZZB), the trial courts will have to 
supply the state court administrator with the infonnation required to 
implement such a system. 4 
Trial court judges and administrators rarely have much role in 
presenting the budget at the state level. They may not even have much 
role in developing the trial court budget, which in sane states is 
prepared by the state court administrator with limited local 
participation. Even budgetary monitoring may be centralized. Absorption 
into the state budgetary process thus may lead to diminution in the 
administrative autonomy of trial courts. 
2. Accountability to Agencies of State Government 
State financing, at the very least, will require increased 
reporting to the state court administrative office. Caseload reporting 
is not necessarily related to state financing, but periodic reporting of 
expenditure, revenue, and personnel transactions is a usual feature of a 
state-financed system. It may also be required that trial courts report 
to executive branch agencies concerned with finances and personnel. for 
example, a State Treasurer, Comptroller, Personnel Office, or Auditor. 
4The South Dakota court system v1as recently required to submit a 
zero-based budget pursuant to state budgetary policy. 
-2-
-139-
Increased o-r executive branch auditing may also be a 
feature of state financing. Such audits may not be restricted to 
finances but may extend to performance. Internal audits may also be 
pe-rformed by audito-rs employed by the state court administrative 
office.S 
Trial courts may find that theit' activities a-re subject to Ct'itique 
by legislative ccmnittees and executive bt'anch budget officials. Thus 
the successes Ot' failures of cou-rts are more likely to be publicized in 
state fo-runs. 
3. Changes in Admininstt'ative Ot'ganization of Trial Cou-rts 
State financing of trial cou-rts is usually accompanied by 
administ-rative changes within the judicial system, most comoonly a 
cla-rification ot'. st-rengthening of ve-rtical lines of administrative 
authority running from the Supreme Cou-rt to the trial courts. Such 
changes are necessa-ry for a cou-rt system to start functioning as a 
state-wide administ-rative entity. 
The changes often include a strengthening of the supreme cou-rt's 
administ-rative authority over trial courts, but usually this is balanced 
by increasing the power of presiding trial court judges. Often trial 
court administrative offices are created o-r enlarged to support presiding 
judges. In effect, the whole internal administrative network of the 
courts is made more coherent. 
The these changes on trial court administration varies 
greatly. The authodty of a presiding judge and administrators may 
actually in an envi rorment where trial court 
administration tionally weak due to the autonomy accorded 
individual judges. a trial court already characterized by strong 
centralized administration, the trial court judiciary and its 
administrative may experience loss of some authority to the 
state-level Understandably, opposition to state financing is 
often found urban trial courts, which have reasonably adequate 
financing and strong administrative authority.6 
5E.g., 
this type 















cout'ts from the structut"e of local 
courts become state entities. they 
~ .. ,Ju~•c~, more that of a tenant than 
effects of this transformation are 
use and renovation beccmes rore a matter of hat"d 
particularly where the state assunes an 
to repay localities for costs of court 
occur over equipment ownership and 
equip:nent repair since the state may 
title to all court equipment;8 
occur over differences in state and local pay 
as over relative abilities to acquire goods 
agencies may remain locally funded, 10 
• prosecutors and sheriffs,) and asstme 
relationship with the court; and 
to pay for trial court 
of negotiation between the 
counties on the funding of 
took place in Alabama under state 
state financing of trial courts has 
officials have frequently expressed 
of state-paid court employees 
court employees. 
, Maryland and Virginia, elected 
courts have remained county-funded, 
court sysem are state-funded 
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o on the plus side, local officials may be pleased that the 
courts no longer require local funding and may actually be 
mot'e coopet'ative, provided that loss of court-generated 
revenue to the state doesn't mean a net loss to the local 
treasury. 
4. Revenue Allocation 
The normal pattern in a state-financed court system is that the 
bulk .of court-genet'ated revenues go to the state.ll This is a natural 
quid pro guo. Ft'om an administrative viewpoint it may only mean that 
coUt't personnel send checks to the state treasurer rather than a county 
treasurer. 
From a political viewpoint the change is roore dramatic. One of 
the major barriers to state court financing is the fear of local 
governnents that they will lose revenue to the state. The fear is 
usually most pronounced in municipal goven:ments. which often have a 
large net gain from operation of a traffic and ordinance court. Counties 
generally have a net loss fran court operations and are less fearful of 
revenue drain. However, even counties will not'tllally seek to retain 
revenue to cover facility costs or other operating costs not assumed by 
the state.l2 Not unccmnonly, state assumption · of trial courts 
operating costs does not extend to municipal courts due to the political 
opposition of those courts.l3 
In the final analysis, trial court administrators will have to 
live with the political arrangements on reallocation of revenues. One 
advantage of a state-funded system is that pressures on the courts to 
produce revenues fot' local government are reduced. 
llSee Lawson, supra, P. 63, Table X. 
12North Carolina imposes a facility cost upon litigants to 
compensate local governments for facilities. 
13rn Oklahoma, the municipal courts remained outside the unified 
system. In Alabama, municipal courts were given the option to enter or 
leave the unified system. 
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5. Competition with Othe~ Trial Courts 
In a locally financed system trial courts may have to ccmpete 
with local gove~nment agencies fo~ funds.l4 In a state-financed 
system, this canpetition ends but is ~eplaced by less intense form of 
competition with other trial courts. Inevitabily. trial courts are 
canpared to one another in such areas as m.mber of personnel. 
productivity and efficiency, usually with some levelling process that may 
curb or cut back the rate of expenditure in more affluent jurisdictions 
and increase resources available to less affluent jurisdictions.l5 
Trial cout"t officials must adjust to the new gt'Ound rules and 
justify theit" resource requests in the broader context of a state-wide 
system. 
B. Availability and Allocation of ResoUt"ces 
1. Access to State Resources; Loss of Local Resources 
For most trial courts, state court financing represents access 
to the state general fund, usually a more stable and richer funding 
source than the general funds of local governments. There are, however. 
a few exceptions. Affluent local govet't'l01ents may be more able and 
willing to support trial courts than the state.l6 · 
14In New Jersey, where trial courts are funded primat"ily by county 
and municipal government, tight statutory constraints on local government 
funding has placed courts in tough competition with local governmeot 
agencies for appropriations. 
15The power of a state court administrator in a state-financed 
system to reallocate funds is a major issue of unification, which 
surfaces even in long-unified systems such as Alaska. Some state-funded 
court svstems, such as Massachusetts and to a lesser extent New Mexico, 
have budgetary formats t.Jhich inhibit reallocation of funds from one trial 
court to another. 
16For example, Minnesota the trial courts in the Twin Cities 
area are well-funded local government, and there is limited desi::e 
among judges in that area for state financing. 
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Even where local govetTII.Ilents are not particularly affluent Ot' 
generous to courts, judges and administrators may prefer the familiarity 
and frugality of local govenment to the more remote and impersonal 
processes of state goverrment. State goverrment financial procedures 
tend to be mo~e complex and sophisticated than local government 
processes .17 
In short~ most jurisdictions will gain financially if the state 
pays the costs of trial courts, but may have to pay the price of reduced 
infl~nce on the budget process. 
2. Changed Distribution of Federal Funds 
The LEAA program, now ending, has since 1976 tended toward more 
centralized allocation of LEAA block funds for courts. The advent of 
Judicial Planning Coomittees increased supreme court control of LEAA 
funds, even in states where trial courts were locally funded. However, 
it is clear that the power of the supreme court over allocation of block 
funds is greater in state--financed systems, where match money canes from 
the state budget, and grants are made on the basis of state-wide 
considerations. 
The majOL future concern of trial courts is the extent to which 
they will be eligible for participation in federal programs for local 
governments. As locally funded agencies, it has been possibe for trial 
courts to participate in the CETA program or local revenue-sharing 
funds. As state agencies, the ground rules change. If, for example, the 
judiciary share in an increased block grant program to states (the 
approach favored by the Reagan administration), it may occur that these 
state supreme courts will determine the allocations for trial courts in 
unified systems. 
3. Participation in Local Funds Earmarked for Courts 
A coomon feature of trial court financing is the existence of 
special funds from which courts are legally permitted to make 
expenditures.l8 These special funds are 
17Harry 0. Lawson observed in a speech to the 1980 NACA-NATCA 
conference that state-funded courts were encountering more and more 
problems in dealing with budgetary con3traints imposed by economy-minded 
state legislatures, in particular FTE limitations. 
l&rypically, certain court costs are paid into a special fund under 
control of the chief administrative judge of the court (e.g., law library 
funds in Dade County, Florida; a fund fed by fees charged by judges for 
performing marriages in Cook county, Illinois). 
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normally created to legislation petmitting the earmarking of 
cetain fees and costs for court use. Such funds are outside the budget 
process and are to courts as a supplemental source of funds •. 
In a state-financed system thet'e is nonnally less tolerance for such 
local funds. 
C. Administrative Systems 
1. Desigp and Implementation of Administrative Systems 
State financing of courts involves design and linplemeotation of 
supp:>rting administrative systems, most cc:mr.only budgetary. accounting 
and personnel systems. Other systems may be involved, such as jury 
management systems and unifatm records systems. The key fact is that 
these systems ·are state systems, reflecting· state-level policy and 
usually designed by state-selected contractors or the staff of a state 
court administrator. 
The role of trial court administrators in designing such systems 
vades. but it is normally not vecy g-reat. Even the training and 
orientation process is usually state-directed. Yet the ultimate 
responsibility for making the new system work will fall upon clerks and 
other administrators. 
System design may recognize variations between trial courts, but 
occasionally this is not the case. It takes a while for state 
administrators to adapt to local variations, and conversely it takes time 
for local officials to accept state-level administration. 
2. New Administrative Support Agencies 
courts depend on local governments for various 
supporting administrative services, among them payroll, purchasing, 
accounting, and personnel services. State financing ends these 
relationships leads to a new set of relationships. Supporting 
administrative may be assuned by the trial court itself, but 
more comronly at"e provided by the state administrative office of 
courts or by a state branch agency.l9 
19t.awson, 
on the execut 




Administ~ative suppo~t services which are geographically remote 
may cause problems or delay, perhaps problems of red tape. Thus. trial 
courts in a state-financed system may be given freedom to handle sane 
administ-rative matte-rs locally. Small pu-rchases may be handled through 
-revolving funds; most personnel matters may be handled locally; and data 
processing. suppo-rt may be handled locally, if such services are already 
being provided by local government.20 
3. Personnel 
The most difficult aspect of state financing is the necessity to 
remove employees from local government and incorpo-rate them into a wholly 
new system, with new classifications and compensation scales and a new 
set of goveming procedures, including new EEO plans and possibily new 
collective bargaining agreements.21 
In the t-ransitional stages of a new personnel system, there are 
a variety of adjustment problems. Fitting individual employees into a 
new job scheme often produces some calssification appeals and some 
disputes over vested interests of employees in local government systems. 
Special problems may occur in incorporating confidential employees of 
judges into the system. 
These problems necessarily involve trial court judges, 
administrators and cle~ks. In fact, top administrato-rs and clerks (at 
least those who are appointed) may find that they have personal 
reservations about their own classifications in state personnel systems, 
as well as their authority over day-to-day personnel administration. 
Generally. however, great authority over personnel management is 
delegated to trial court officials in a state judicial branch personnel 
system. Most basic decisions on employees remain local. subject to the 
caveat that they must conform to the policy and procedures of the 
state-wide system. 
20rt would be rare for local governments to provide EDP services to 
a trial court, after it had become state-funded 
21New York exemplifies the difficulty of dealing with a great 
m.mber of different bargaining units. There are over forty different 




State financing normally involves new accounting lrocedures. 
Appropriations or budgetary accounting is usually a state-leve function, 
but accounting for cash collected in courts is normally performed at the 
trial court level subject to procedures laid down by the supreme court 
and state auditing agencies. 
Cash accounting systems define uniform charts of account, 
unifotm books of account, banking and depository procedures, use of 
business machines, employee bonding requirements and various other 
aspects of a controlled system. Implementation of the system is a 
function of local court officials. 
5. Purchasing 
Purchasing for state-financed trial courts is sometimes 
centralized in the sense that trial courts can take advantage of prices 
negotiated by the state purchasing department. 22 There may even be 
central warehousing of some major equipment items. 
Centralized voucbering is coomon. Yet, such centralization is 
not practiced in all state-financed systans. Some trial courts are 
permitted to purchase goods and services locally and to process these 
purchases through local bank accounts.23 
It can be assu:ned that state financing will usually increa.Je 
constraints on the authority of trial court off:lcials to purchase goods 
and services. 
D. Conclusion 
While the administration of trial courts is affected significntly by 
state financing, many basic administrative functons are largely 
unaffected. Scheduling and caseflow management and the basic 
adjudication activities ranain very much a local concern. New state 
adminstrative systems are initially burdensome but tend to become 
routinized fairly quickly. since these systems impose a uniform framework 









The essential change is in the locus of cont~ol, which shifts to the 
state capitol. This shift means that the~e may be less pe~sonal access 
to the conttolling fo~ces in th~ system and thus a mo~e impe~sonal, 
bu~eauc~atic system of administ~ation. The shift may also appea~ to mean 
that local c~t officials lose status and influence. it is ha~d to 
evaluate such facto~s as status and autonany, but they a~e c~ucial to 
consid~ation of state financing. Fea~ of the unknown is also an 
impo~tant facto~.· 
The plain fact is that state money will b~ing some de~ee of con~ol 
from the state level, but such controls need not be oppressive. · 
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Transition to State Financing of Courts, 





The State Cotn:t Finance Project of the National Cente-r fo-r State 
Cou-rts, since its inception in July 1979, has been involved in the many 
changes occur~ing in the financing of state courts and the management of 
court financial systems. This roonograph is a distillation of the 
ex~ience gained by Project staff in assisting states in transition to 
state financing. The monograph is "intended as a reference work fOt" 
judicial administ~ators entering or involved in the ?rocess of transition 
to state financing. 
Since this monog~aph marks the conclusion of the State Court Finance 
Project, it is fitting to thank all those pe~sons ~ho have cont~ibuted 
their knowledge and support to the Project during the course of its 
existence; in particular, Harry Lawson, who has been a mainstay in 
writing, research,* technical assistance and training; Barbara J. Gletne, 
who has been a major collaborator of Harry Lawson · in assisting the 
Project; Gerald Kuban, who has provided the Project his expertise on 
personnel management; Barry Mahoney of the Institute for Cout-t 
Management, who has organized the major 
*The major research products of the Project were state-of-the-art 
monographs co-authored by Harry 0. Lawson and Barbara J. Gletne, Workload 
Measures in the Court, National Center for State Courts, 1980; Fiscal 
Administration in State-Funded Courts, National Center for State Courts, 
1981. 
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conferences for the Project; Sue Dosal of the National Center for State 
Courts; Ron Stout of Administrative Office of .. the Court~ for New. 
of"+:....:''\'~-:·· ... ,: _.l:J:: .... :.· -··: .· Lo:.-.,'1; 
York; Keith Bumsted, NCSe Controller; and members of the Project Staff, 
1\ 
both past and present, Linda Sweeney, Alan I. Herman and Richard Hoffman. 
Particular thanks for help are extended to Einar Bohlin, foDmer State 
Court Administrator/ from Michigan. who edited this monograph and ~ 
contributed to the content from the perspective of a State Court 
Administrator,~ 
Robert W. Tobin 
Project Director, 1981 
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INl'RODUCr!ON 
This monograph deals with the financial and pet'sonnel management 
aspects of transition from local to state financing of courts. It is 
WLitten from the perspective of a state-level court administt'ator.l 
Viewed nar~Hly, the period of tt'ansition starts with legislation 
outlining the scope and timing of state assumption and concludes with the 
advent of state financing. Viewed broadly, the period of tt'ansition 
starts prior to the implementing legislation with attempts to strengthen 
the statutory provisions on management and concludes with the development 
of mature management systems several years after the switchover to state 
financing. 
This monograph takes the broader view of transition, dividing the 
process into five stages, which are not neatly sequential, but which 
gener~lly reflect the evolution of personnel and management systems under 
state financing. Table 1 summarizes the five stages. The remainder of 
the monograph discusses the management activities needed in each stage. 
TABLE 1 
Stages of Development in Court Management Systems 











Characteristics of Stage 
Efforts to ensure sound 
management provisions in 
implementing legislation. 
Choosing management 
team; making consultant 
choices; developing the 
work plan. 
Constructing the job 
classification and 
pay plan; classifying 
employees; bringing trial 
courts into state budget 
process in time for budget 
subnission. 
Time Sequence 






completion of #2 
until budget 
sul::mitted. 
lAo article written from the perspective of a trial court 
administrator has been prepared as an appendix. See Effects of State 

















Characteristics of Stage 
On D-day, the actual switch-
over date, management 
control must be asserted by 
having accounting, payroll, 
inventory and personnel 
management systems in place. 
Adding management infor-
mation features and systems 
linkages which go beyond 
mere control to management 
analysis and planning; 
adding systems for 
facilities management, 
fiduciary accounting, 
cashflow control, and other 
special management systems. 
Time Sequence 
Overlaps the initial 
budget cycle but 
runs beyond date of 
budget submission to 
D-day and beyond. 
Occurs roughly 2-5 
years after switch-
over to state 
financing. 
It should not be implied from Table 1 that improvement in management 
systems is found only in states progressing toward state financing, court 
reorganization, or both. Improvement may be required and, in fact, 
instituted in court systems where state financing is partial and no major 
reorganization is anticipated. However, experience indicates that there 
is a special cause-effect relationship, between state financing and 
improvements in management systems. The simple fact is that state 
financing leads to close scrutiny of management systems and to changes in 
. those systems. 
These changes occur in the context of policy debate on such issues as 
centralization within the judicial system and judicial independence fran 
executive branch systems. Policy is often fluid and shifting, thus 
blurring the time sequences in systems developnent. In short. Table 1 
portrays with artificial neatness what is actually a politically dynamic 
process. 
A. Pre-Legislation Stage 
1. Participation of Administrative Office of Courts in Basic Policy 
Decisions on State Financing 
A ccmnitment bv the state to pay the operating costs of trial 
courts, or at least a substantial part of these costs, involves a set 
of major policy decisions, usuallv reflected in statutes which are 










the scope of state assumption; 
state assumption; and deciding the 
be allocated to .the supreme court 
courts. These decisions have 
sometimes made without due 
The risk judiciary, in particular the state court 
administrator given management tasks which cannot be 
successfully implemented within the specified policy guidelines. Two 
particular policy a great effect on the management 
responsibilities a state court administrator: (1) the degree of 
centralization in systems; and (2) the degree of dependence on 
executive branch management systems. The management burdens of a state 
court administt'ator have a direct, proportionate relationship to the 
decision made on these issues, yet these issues are often resolved 
in a _politico-philosophical context which includes scant consideration of 
management concet'ns. 
Unfortunately, no canned approach one may find in the 
literature (ot' this monograph) to insure that proper attention will be 
paid to the management effects of changes from local to state financing 
of courts. The is determined by the local political 
environment, attitudes toward management and administrators, and 
the personal style and stature of a particular administrator. Subject to 
these constraints, some attempt to provide an operational management 
perspective is necessat'Y, usually something more than routine educational 
presentations and something less than personal ventures into the 
political process. ·A court manager must somehow make policy-makers aware 
of the management implications of their policies before those policy 
decisions are made final. 
2. The Management Implications of Basic Policy Decisions 
a. tion 
transition to state financing is timed to 
beginning of a state fiscal year. This 
of a state budget for courts which will 
at the beginning of a fiscal year, facilitating 
accounting and the implementation of all 
to the state fiscal cycle. 
actual date of switchover to state 
first day of a state fiscal year, the first 
must be submitted months in advance of the 
budget is linked. Moreover, the court 
prepared in final form before locally 
be integrated into a job classification 
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and compensation scheme. . In , time for transition must 
allow for the fact that budget preparation is contingent upon a 
canplex procedure employee classification and that budget 
sul:mission precedes by many months the actual date of 
transition. Therefore, transition periods of two years or more 
are usually required. 
Unfortunately, management considerations may not govern the 
length of a transition period. A legislature under heavy 
pressure from counties to relieve them of the burden of courts 
may act hastily.2 Problems not only occur from a speedy 
assumption, but from failure to initiate assunption at the 
beginning of a fiscal year. Such a situation may occur when 
state financing occurs in the context of a major court 
reorganization, and state assu:nption is timed to coincide with 
the date when newly elected or appointed judges take office. 
Choice of such a date may require seeking state funding for part 
of a budget period and local funding for part of a budget 
period, or some scheme of state reimbursement to counties. Both 
are complicated processes. Whenever the transition date ignores 
the chronology of fiscal years, some degree of chaos results. 
b. Ccmplex Methods of Assumption. 
The way in which a state assumes the financial 
responsibility for trial courts can create major management 
problems. Mbst states have phased in court financing in stages, 
although a ·few have made a one-time assumption. 3 VJJ:-,ile phased 
assumption may appear to be easier than one-time assumption, it 
carries its own management risks. The most significant risk is 
that the legislature will change its position in the middle of 
transition and leave the courts half-way between state and local 
funding.4 Typical methods of phased assumption are: 
2rn Massachusetts, the state assumed financial responsibility 
retroactive to the beginning of the state fiscal year in which the 
legislation passed. The only possible method of state assumption was 
reimbursement of counties. Extensive use had to be made of consultants 
to prepare systems prior to the next fiscal year. In Michigan, it 
appears that state financing will commence for a part of the system (see 
next page) on September 1, 1981. A new fiscal year begins October l. 
3E.g., AlabarE, Kentucky, ~fussachusetts (but even these states 
initially ani 















on toe state 
burden on the state court 
nntu"""'"",.., that phased assumption 
worth, since it drags out 
management problems can result when 
a fact of nature that 
Extending the period in 
an almost irresistible 
through appointment of 
concerns about legal 
missing when there is too 
three steps, taking in 
plans to start by 
courts and later 
Dakota and New York. 
, and not all of these. 
courts, it 
financed, while total 
courts is deferred. In 
all with largely 
personnel in general 
but sane motion 
some operating 
organized Circuit 






replacement, one o-r mcrre county 
depat'tments and may even · be requisitioned by those 
depa·ctments. , it not u-nusual for local officials to 
delay any p-cogram for irnp-covement court facilities in 
the hope that this will soon be a state p-coblem. This may occur 
even if state assumption facility costs is uncertain. 
c. Overly Scope of Assumption 
Mo-ce often than not, legislatures seek some means of 
limiting the scope state financial assumption. usually for 
monetary reasons rather than management reasons. Thet:e are, 
however, linpot:tant management linplications in the scope of 
assumption. This not to say that a particular cost should 
not be assumed because it raises management pt:oblems, only that 
management problems should be considet:ed as a factot:. 
Invariably sane, perhaps all, trial court personnel will 
beccme state employees by reason of state financing. It is 
inevitable therefore that the management issues related to this 
cost assumption must be addressed. There are, however, a numbet' 
of othet: costs which frequently are not assuned by states, at 
least in the initial phases of state assumption. Assumption of 
these costs ~2y deferred to reduce the cost to the state, but 
also for some of reasons noted below. 
Cost Area Reasons for Deferring Assumption 
Facility expense most complex and costly element of state 
It involves facility surveys to determine 
occupied by courts, need for improvement or 
of facilities; time-consuming negotiations 
governments; and negotiation with state 
aghast at the cost. Facilities 
may also require a sizable staff with 
technical skill, again increasing costs. 











An issue in state assumption of these costs 
is title to existing furnishings and 
equipment. If the state assumes full 
responsibility, it must pay for rental of 
existing equipment and for maintenance. This entails 
a transfer of title to the state, which in turn 
entails an inventory, which in turn entails an 
inventory maintenance system, which in turn requires 
linkage to purchasing and appropriations accounting 
systems. Some states simplify the transition by only 
assuming the cost of equipnent purchased after the 
date of state assumption, but even this requires some 
semblance of the various management systems outlined 
above. 
Tnis expense can involve substantial cataloguing of 
books, in effect an inventory. It raises on a llinited 
scale some of the same management problems associated 
'"ith furnishings and capital equipnent. 
Jury cost (primarily juror fees, mileage and meals) is 
a difficult item to assume since it involves hard 
choices. Centralization of juror payrr.€nt carries 
r ks of delay and bureaucratic red tape, but 
reimbursement of counties involves possible loss of 
control. To keep control, vouchers for individual 
jurors are typically processed centrally. Tnis 
requires a special jury management system that not 
only monitors juror payments, but has features which 
allm.; managers to keep jury costs within bounds. It 
is a managarent task not to be assumed lightly, since 
rrBny transactions and considerable management 
oversight are involved. 
Costs of indigent defense, medical exams and witness 
fees can be included in the scope of state 
assumption. They are costs which must be monitored 
closely and thus handled centrally. Like jury costs, 
they can escalate unexpectedly and wreak havoc with a 
hudget. 
d. Mnnngar.ent Authority am! Resources of the Administrative 
Office of the Courts 
The nightrmre of any state court administrator is to be 
saddled '~lith the major rntmagement res{XInsibilities of a 
state-financed court system without the legal authority and 
budgetary resources to perform the responsibilities. This is 
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not an ~~real fear judges, ~ not 
fully appreciate the stemning from state 
financing. Once implementing legislation passes it may be too 
late to obtain the necessary authority and resources. 
Toe ideal is, of course, for the state court administrative 
office to have authority and resources commensurate with 
responsibilities, specifically: (l) explicit authority to manage 
personnel and finances at all court levels; (2) authority to 
compel trial court judges and administrative officers to produce 
management info~tion; and (3) appropriations to hire a 
personnel manager, a financial manager, accountants and such 
other personnel as are required by the size and nature of the 
system. The need for personnel is dependent to a large extent 
on two policy decisions: (l) use of state executive branch 
financial and personnel systems in lieu of in-house systems; (2) 
decentralization of administration, using trial court 
administrators and clerks for many aspects of personnel and 
financial administration. There no all-purpose model, and it 
is quite possible to choose a low profile approach, delegating 
many functions and avoiding the potential charge of 
empire-building. 
B. Defining The Transition Management Approach 
l. The Management Team 
Tne Suprerre Court, or some advisory team of its choice, l!Jl'ay 
oversee the transition process, but the operational responsibility is 
likely to rest with the state court administrator, even if tbis 
responsibility is not formally assigned. Yet a state cooct 
administrator cannot handle the job alone. Help can be obtained from 
among the following sources: 
o <Jdministr.ative office staff, in particulaL" those persons 
with peL"sonnel, budgetary and accounting skills; 
0 new hires, in particular personnel who ~vill manage tlle 
systems being developed; 
0 executive branch officials, such as auditors, accounting 
staff of comptroller or treasurers, and personnel system 
managers; 
o trial court administrators and clerks, who r:rwy be the key 
to the tvhole effort since they have the knowledge and the 
grass roots support to obtain data and build support; and 
o contractors, in particular to develop a job classification 
and pay plan, but perhaps also for accounting systS!IIIS, 
payL"oll systems and inventory systems. 
-9-
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2. The Maoagerr.ent Plan 
Within a month after passage 
state court administrator should have a 
0 what tasks must be 
0 the tline frame for 




The work plan is keyed to two dates; transition (or D-day) and 
tbe date of budget sut:mission. not fix the time 
sequence tasks but also influence on contractors 
must be used. The choice of contractors may add several months to 
the schedule because of the procurement process, but it adds 
personnel resources that can be focused on discrete, complex tasks 
beyond the capability or available time of staff personnel. 
The closest date is the date of budget submission and the tasks 
related to that event have priority. Typically. are those tasks 
.qssociated with: (l) withdrawing locally paid court personnel from 
local government structures integrating them into a single state 
personnel system; and (2) bringing the various trial court 
organizational units into the state budgetary process. 
The other tasks are keyed to the transition date and involve 
preparation of those IT'.anagernent systerns •.;hich must be in place on 
D-day to ensure basic management control, typically: payroll, 
appropdat ions, cash accounting, personnel administration, and 
inventory systems. 
C. Pre~1ration For First Budget: The Personnel Management and 
Budgetary Steps. 
1. Grasping the Personnel Situation 
Personnel costs constitute the largest single in a court 
buclg,et. The key to the initial budget under state financing is to 
bring hundreds of trial court employees under the coverage of the 
state budget. Although in the long run the purpose of a state funded 
court personnel system is more comprehensive than a simple assumption 
of existing salaries (read: state reimburser~nt to counties) paid by 
local govet:'t1!1lents, a court system may not have any choices in the 
matter initially. The ultiiT'.ate goal is to integrate each trial court 
employee into CJ uniform classification and pay plan, usually 
accompanied by the other normal features of a personnel system. It 
is no small feat to classify hundretis of employees and to erect a 
personnel management structure in time to provide the salary data for 
the initial budget submission. 
-10-
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There follows a cursory listing of 
performed to organize a personnel system. 
the complexity of the undertaking. 
the tasks which must be 
They adequately indicate 
f113Jor Task f -\ Subtasks""' 
\ --- f-·'-lnitial Policy 
Cecisions:O 
Data Gathering 
To determine relation to or with the 
executive branch personnel system and general 
scope o.f system. 
To determine whether contracto-rs a-re to be 
used.ll 
The following steps are necessary to build a data 
base. 
o develofEent of background data on each 
employee: age, experience, education, 
skills, work history and salary record 
(i.e. , the data necessary to later classify 
employees and determine pay scales; this 
will nounally be done by questionnaire, but 
there may be existing biographical data that 
is accurate); 
o analysis of job functions by interviews r;.;ith 
individual employees (i.e., desk audits) or 
by questionnaires or by both; 
o survey of administrative personnel for 
system overview and job interrelationships; 
and 
o development of collateral data that will 
influence job classifications and pay: 
10Same policy may be set by legislation, concerning rights of 
employees, collective bargaining and use of the executive branch 
personnel system. Normally much policy will be made by the judicial 
branch, and reflected in rules. 
llDue to the technical aspects of job classifications and 
canpensation, contractors are C()(T[IX)nly used, requuwg: (l) that an 
estimate of contractor costs be made; (2) that funds be set aside or 
obtained; (J) that p-rocurement processes are set in motion, proposals 
appnised, And a contractor chosen; (4) that a contract is negotiated; 
and (5) that the contractual (,vork be ;:nonitored by in-house personnel (at 








- existing fringe benefits, 
rights, accumulated leave of 
employees; • 
- collective bargaining rights 
existing contracts; and 
- wage differentials between 
governments. 
Toe typical process for developing 
a job and pay structure :12 
0 developing a set job 
cations and descriptions; 
o relating current posit{ons to the 





0 determining the compensation scale to be 
used (often the executive bt"anch pay grid) 
and related issues of in-grade Increase 
steps and mmber of grades between jobs in 
the same promotional 
0 relating job classifications 
compensation scale· 
to 
o classification individual employees; 
the 
0 establishing a procedur-e for classification 
appeals; 
0 hearing classification appeals; 
0 revision of 
required; 
job classifications, as 
0 subnission of job classifications, pay 
scheme and employee classifications to the 
court for approval; and 
l2The process is not, in actual practice, very neat, as numerous 
initial adjustments must be made to accomnodate such situations as: 
senior employees who lack the qualifications required in the new system; 
existing pay differentials between employees doing essentially the same 
work; employeE's whose existing pay is close to or- exceeds the rnaximun pay 
in their new classjfication; and major pay increases for employees whose 
positions were undercL1ssified. Such decisions as "grandfathering" and 
placerrent of employees in the upper steps of a pay grade are likely to be 























o control of pt:ocess; 
0 employee status (e.g., exempt, probationary. 
permanent and temporary); 
0 promotion procedure and lateral entry; 
0 employee obligations and conditions of work; 
0 disciplinary and grievance procedures; 
0 work hours, ·leave, holidays; and 
0 travel. 
It is then necessary to enact rules containing 
personnel management policy and then: 
0 disseminate them for comment; 
0 revise them; and 
o promulgate them. 
It is necessary to prepare manuals and to conduct 
training sessions for the benefit of all persons 
affected by the personnel rules, specifically: 
o to clarify court policy and to spell out 
diffet:ences between the new and old 
environments; 
0 to clarify participant roles; 
0 to build understanding and support fot" the 
system; 
o to convey basic infot"mVtion about 
operation in a fot"um which 
questioning and free discussion; and 
system 
permits 
o to introduce persons responsible for 





2. Bringing Trial Courts into the Budgetary Process 
The lifeblood of any 
The first budget oE a 
important, since it tends 
inc-rements are determined. Moreover, 
under increased state financing 
establish, the ~.;0rking relationship 
administ-rative office and trial courts. 
test of the state court 
begins to 
state court 
provides the first 
with the 
legislatu-re on behalf of trial courts. 
budget. 
A lot the f:i rst 
Fortunately, there is no need to new budgetary 
process. The problem consists of integrating courts into a 
state budgetary process already familiar to the state-level 
judiciary. If state financing virtually total. trial courts not 
only are int~rated into the state budgetary but must 
withdraw from toe city or county budget process. , it is not 
ur~ommon for counties to retain some responsibility tr courts. 
requiring that courts participate in two budgetary processes. In any 
event, trial courts must be made part of state process. 
In a state where assumption is costs, the 
problem oE budgeting for trial courts is s from a 
state-level perspective) since the basic data the budget 
can largely be deLi ved from the data generated process of 
setting up a personnel system. Usually, hot11ever, state also 
assumes non-personnel costs, perhaps even facility costs. This data 
must be initially derived from budgetary formulated at the 
trial court level. This type of budgetary while 
salary levels are being determined ication of 
individual employees, since the implementation process 
does not depend on completion of employee classi 
State budgetary processes di in 
period, the type of FfE limits placed on 
of budgeting (e. g. , PPB, ZBB, MBO) and a var 
This makes it difficult to discuss the ini 
in fairly broad generic form. Below are noted the 
developing the initial budget.l3 
budgeting 
costs, the style 
of other details. 
steps, except 
principal tasks in 




a. Defining the 
identifying the 
.e. , 
State assunption of court is rarely 
accomplished with precision. statutory 
descriptions of the scope of state responsibility, there ace 
invariably gray areas, services or functions which fall between 
the cracks in the first budget cycle. 
~~reover, it is necessary to note that locally funded trial 
courts are rarely well-organized administrative entities with a 
single local budget for all court functions. In fact. in each 
trial court there may be separate budgets sul:mitted by two or 
more court components, or no formal budget presentation at all. 
Tne state court administrative office, pursuant to the 
irnplrn~nting legislation, must identify which official can speak 
for the organizational units to be included in the first state 
budget. 
Often the implementing legislation defines entirely new 
management responsibilities at the trial court level, further 
complicating the process. 
Further problems may be encountered if the state budgetary 
p'Locess features a great deal of sophisticated esotedca. It 
~~y be prudent to seek waiver of fancy requirements in the first 
budget cycle, since the basic mechanics of a new system are 
enough burden. 
b. Suprerre Court Policy on the Budget 
Early in the process the policy of the supreme court must 
be reflected in some fo~n of budget directive, outlining roles 
and responsibilities in the judicial branch budget process. 
Some of these directives may be pro forma application of state 
budgetary procedures to trial courts, but others will reflect 
the degree to which budget formulation to be centralized 
within the judicial branch. The supreme court may also reflect 
its policy in dealing with the other branches, perhaps 
indicating departures from normal state budgetary process to 
protect judicial independence, for example, presentation of a 
lump sum budget. 
The policy decisions on centralization may be prompted by 
the legislature, which may choose to deal with individual trial 
courts directly. rbre often, the supreme court has the 
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It will be necessary to tr courts with budget 
subnission forms so the central office does not have to 
reformat se?arate budget submissions (states should already have 
forms -the slinpler the better, especially the first ttne). The 
state review may involve budget hearings at which local budgets 
are presented, explained, and defended. 
Although perhaps at a disadvantage initially, due to lack 
of detailed knowledge regarding trial court expenditures, the 
state court administrator and staff can again build good will 
and reliable budget figures by taking care to enlist the aid of 
the trial judges and staff. 
The initial process can prove to be quite long due to lack 
of familiarity with the state system. The budget directives 
should anticipate such delays, so that the final submission is 
on tline. Psychologically, a timely submission is tmportant for 
credibility with the other branches. 
e. Integrating Personnel Costs 
The s::ilary data derived from the creation of a personnel 
system must also be received in time to meet budget deadlines. 
It must be combined with the budget for non-personnel costs 
obtained from trial courts. It should be noted that this salary 
data pertains to existing personnel and would not preclude 
requests for additional personneL In fact, there is a cudoos 
dilemma posed for courts in the first budget - a desire to avoid 
overstaffing before a full r.eview of needs can be made and a 
cot..rnter-desire to avoid being trapped with FTE levels that are 
Ear too low. 
f. Budget Submission and Defense 
The first court budget is judged by fairly simple standards: 
o Was it prepared on time? 
o Did it avoid omissions? 
o Was it sufficiently well prepared to be 
credible to the other branches? 
No one expects great sophistication or total grasp of trial 
court details in the first budget. Adequacy is expected. The 
state court ar:!:-ninistrat:or must establish the office as the 
budgetary focal point for trial courts, a ne~.; role. How far to 
go in enlisting support of trial court judges, clerks, and 
administrators is a judgment call. Some authot:"ity may be 




D. D-Day Financial Systems 
1. D-Day, the ~"oment of Truth 
Cn the date of switchover to a predaninantly state-financed 
system, the state court administrative ice must be ready to 
discharge its increased responsibilities for financial and personnel 
management:. :Management systems to meet these responsibilities must 
be in place, already tested and ready to operate.l4 The months 
immediately following switchover are somettmes a frenetic period 
chat:"acterized by ongoing modification and adjustment of management 
systems in the light of day-to-day operational realities. 
The initial set of management 
sophisticated in a management sense. 
rudimentary level. The acid test 
crucial, but less visible are those 
maintain basic management control. 
control must be asserted are: 
systems do not have to be 
They simply have to work on a 
is the first payroll. Also 
sys terns required to obtain and 
Typically, the areas where 
0 expenditures of appropriated funds 
o cash receipts and disbursements 
o property belonging to courts 
0 personnel functions 
Stated briefly, the state administrative office ~ust be able to 
control money, propeL'~] and personnel as of D-day. 
2. Payroll 
Paying trial court employees with state checks would not appear 
very ccmplex, but the first payroll is a crucial system test. It 
demonstrates that the system will work in an area cf basic employee 
concern. It also syrrul._x}lizes the administrative unification of the 
system in a very tangible way. 
Fortunately, there is an existing state paYLoll system on which 
to build. Payt:"oll for state-level judicial branch ca:rrponents 
(e.g., supreme court, inteLmediate appellate courts, administrative 
office of courts) is already pr~luced by the state payroll system, so 
that system requit:"ements are already defined. PaYLoll data on each 
employee, the form of the payroll, verification procedures and 
updating procedut:'es are set. The essential changes brought about by 
state firwncinc, are the sheer nlJU'ber of employees added to the 
payroll and their geographic diffusion. A state judicial payroll of 
50 - 400 persons may grow to 1. 000 to 3, 000 persons, pet:'haps 8, 000 
persons in lat:'ge states. 
14. For a systen1tic review of financial manngement systen~ in state 
court administrntive offices, see Fiscal Administration in State-Ft..rnded 
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Such a large leap n~hers poses its own systems problems and 
may require automation at the state level to prepare and certify the 
payroll to the state agency which writes the checks.lS The 
essential demand upon the system is to produce accurate checks for 
all employees and to have these checks in their hands on time. Same 
state-wide systems fail at the distribution level, rather than at the 
check preparation level. To insure that the first payroll is not a 
fiasco, slinple precautions are necessary: 
o all state-paid employees should be identified; 
0 fot" anployees covered by a personnel survey, salary data and 
fringe benefit data should be obtained; 
0 the payroll data base and address data should be constructed and 
then squared with the budget and with personnel records; 
0 the data should be field-verified; 
0 liaison with the appropriate state agencies should be 
established; 
0 if software is to be used, selection of the package should be 
made and the data base converted to machine-readable form; 
0 payroll verification and updating pocedures should be 
established and communicated to the field; and 
0 the timing and distribution elements of the payroll cycle should 
be analyzed exhaustively, so that delays are avoided. 
3. Appropriations Accotmting and Expenditure Control 
The state administrative office of courts must be able to 
account for expenditures of appropriated moneys on a scale of 
expenditure previously unknown. It does not follow, however, that 
the judicial branch must have its own accounting system. There are 
several options: 
lSThis agency may or may not mail the checks. If the judicial 




o reliance on the executive 
0 reliance on the executive branch with maintenance of a backup 
system; and 
o creation of a judicial branch system. 
In a state with a small administrative office and a carmitment 
to keep it small, heavy reliance on the 
appropriations accounting may be 
expenditure control will depend largely on 
from the executive branch. Rarely do such 
pre-audit purposes or to locate overspending 
specific courts. Even where heavy reliance 
executive branch, it is advisable to: 
executive branch for 
means that 
timeliness rep~ts 
reports suffice for 
or underspending in 
is placed upon the 
0 negotiate with the executive branch a series of changes in 
charts of accounts and coding of information, so that the 
administrative office can oversee and even provide feedback 
reports to each organizational component of the court system; 
0 maintain some running record of expenditures against major 
budget lines to facilitate pre-audit of expenditures; and 
0 maintain some running record on relatively volatile costs. 
In short, it is- possible to be overreliant on the executive 
branch, leaving the jud-icial branch without adequate controls in key 
areas. To guard against this possibly the state court administrative 
office may choose to maintain its own accounting systems to ensure: 
0 timeliness of data; 
0 reports tailored to the management needs of courts; and 
o control of expenditures. 
The use of a backup system will require the addition of 
accounting personnel, perhaps software linked with the payroll sytem 
and perhaps consultant support, if the basic state accounting system 
is not to be fully adopted. The additional costs, both one-time and 
ongoing, must be weighed against the benefits gained in control. 
TI1e ultimate system is a totally in-house system with the court 
assumiD.g full responsibility for appropriations accotmting. This 
obviously requires high-quality staff and (probably) contractor 
support for basic system design and autanation, and IJl.ay be too much 
to take on imnediately in terms of costs and risk. A possible 
altern<ltive is to build a backup system with a view to latet" assUJ!ing 
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4. Cash Accounting and ~bney Control 
The advent of state financing often involves a shift in the 
allocation of coutt-generated revenues, with the state receiving a 
higher portion and local governments a reduced portion. There may 
be, in fact, a major restructuring of the system of fines, costs and 
fees. Almost inevitably, the state court administrator is given ~e 
authority and responsibility for the collection and distribution of 
these court-generated revenues. 
The money collected at the local level takes certain basic fo~: 
0 fines assessed against defendants in criminal and traffic cases; 
0 costs and fees collected from criminal defendants and civil 
litigants; 
0 restitution, support, alirony, and proceeds from other civil 
judgments paid through the court for speedy disbutsenent to 
beneficiaries of a judgment; 
0 cash bail; and 
0 money paid into holding accounts (e.g.. trusts or condsnnation 
money) to be held for a period of ttme before distribution. 
The first two categories of money flow involve distribution to 
governments and are, in a sense, revenues. The other money flows do 
not inure to the benefit of governments, but rather go to individuals 
or various non-government organizations. 
These monies are typically collected at the local level by 
clerks, occasionally by probation offices or sheriffs. Usually, 
state auditors exercise some com:ol over the accounting for these 
monies, but a great deal of latitude is permitted in types of cash 
accounting systems, use of business machines and choice of 
depositoties. Due to the complexity of the money flows and the local 
politics involved in choice of banks, state court administrators may 
defer an attempt to h~se controls on the system. This is. in most 
situations, unwise, since if p-roblems or scandals occur, they will be 
attributed to the unified system, once it is state-financed. 
A state court administrative office should: (1) identify the 
principal money flryNs; (2) establish a cash accounting systeml6 
that is a general ledger, double entry system with a uniform chart of 
16Fiduciary accounting can usually he deferred a while. 
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accounts ;17 (3) develop 
bookkeeping practices; (S) 
chosen; and (6) ensure that 
treasury without delay. 
manuals; (1-~o) upgrade 
de?Qsitories are wisely 
the state reaches the state 
This undertaking usually involves use of consultants, assistance 
frcm state auditors, and a majot' training and orientation program. 
Ideally, the state court administrative office should have a staff 
adequate to monitor the system (including auditors), to provide 
training, and to account for and report on revenue collection, in 
particular that part of revenue destined for the state treasury. 
Revenue projection is, in fact, part of the budgetary process, as 
well as a means of detecting possible problems in specific cout"ts 
when actual revenues deviate significantly from projected revenues. 
5. Property Control 
States generally tr.aintain inventot'ies of state-owned equipment 
and furnishings. Even in a court system funded largely by local 
governments, the state-funded segment of the court system (i.e., the 
appellate courts, state court administrative office, state law 
library) will have property purchased with state funds and therefore 
included in the inventory of state property. Property used by trial 
courts is normally reflected in county or city inventories of 
property. Al.l inventories nonnally carry a separate section for 
property purchased from federal funds. 
A state court administrative office must be prepared to assu:ne 
control of all court-used property. If title to court propet'ty is to 
be switched to the state, this means that: 
o all court property must be inventoried; 
o the inventory must be cleared with local governn1ent officials, 
so that no misunderstandings arise; 
o the judicial branch must make arrangffilents to add the 
inventoried property to the state inventory or to set up a 
separilte judie branch inventory, (which means developing the 
identifiers to be carried on each type of property and 
automating this inventory); and 




0 there must a system 
property through a central point, so 
IY,?dated .18 
inventory is 
If the state does not assume title to property purchased for 
courts by local governments, the first two steps in the above process 
are unnec~ssary. It is only necessary to build an inventory as the 
state starts to purchase property. While this seems easier, it 
creates problems for local courts if the locally-owned property has 
to be serviced or maintained. Problems also arise where equipnent 
has been rented. 
6. Personnel 
The personnel system designed during the transition period is 
not self-operating. It requires an ongoing administration at the 
state level, even though basic functions of recruitment, hiring. 
supervision, and dismissal may be handled at the local level. At the 
state level at least one person, maybe several in a large system, are 
required to: 
0 monitor trial courts to ensure compliance wth personnel policy; 
o record changes in employee status (Le., changes in compensation 
level, job classification, terminations, etc.); 
0 keep track of leave or other data affecting employee benefits of 
compensation; 
0 oversee employee evaluations and maintain evaluation records; 
o provide information to trial courts in personnel matters and 
assist them in recruitment; 
o review job classifications and descriptions; and 
0 where necessary, handle collective bargaining problems. 
grievances and enforcement of equal opportunity programs. 
Thus on D-day a personnel office must be ready to enforce the 
court rules, keep the job and pay plan current and generally to 
process all transactions affecting the status of individual employees. 
18. Small purchases, which do not qualify as equipment, could be 




Budgeting systems in their early stages of develop:nent at:e not 
usually viewed as year-round opet:ations with ongoing management use. 
They are generally focused entirely upon the routine of budget 
preparation and become active only in the months Unnediately 
proceeding budget sub:nission. Even at this minimal level, a state 
court administrative office must be ready for its second budget cycle 
under state financing only a few months after D-day. If the second 
cycle is to be more sophisticated and management-oriented, the period 
between budget cycles must be used to upgrade the system and its 
procedures. At least one person must be devoted to this task at the 
state level. 
Tr.e budget system is not a D-day system in the sense that it 
must be ready to function on D-day. It should, however, be in a 
state of improvement to ready it for the budget cycle which follows 
D-day by a few months. 
8. Conclusion 
Sane states rr.ay be able to have very sophisticated systems in 
place by D-day. Most states won't have this luxury. Their goal must 
be to have the mintmally required rnangagement controls in place. 
E. Refining and Augmenting Basic Management SystEmS 
Eventually, a state administrative office of Courts will pass 
beyond the point where the principal objective of the office is to 
have simple control over key management functions. Once control is 
established, management focus can switch to efficiency, productivity, 
improved allocation of revenues and establishment of various systa:n 
linkages. Gradually, a network of financial and personnel management 
systems t·rill emerge. The scope and depth of the network and the 
extent of its decentralization will differ markedly among states. 
However different the eventual network may be, it should be the 
product of a planned evolution, rather than a random development. 
Table 2, which follows, provides a schematic means of looking at 
the evolution of w.anagement systems. It is unlikely that it would 
apply exactly to any state, but it is sufficiently representative to 
serve the following purposes: 
0 a check-off 1 ist to consider the planned develorment of 
systems; and 
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THE CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL SYSTEM* 
EXHIBIT I 
8100 
The Constitution of the State of California vests the judi-
cial power of the state in a Supreme Court, Courts of Appeal, Superior 
Courts, Municipal Courts and Justice Courts (Const., Art. VI, i 1). The 
Superior Courts, Municipal Courts and Justice Courts are the trial 
courts of the California judicial system; the Supreme Court and Courts 
of Appeal are appellate courts that primarily review trial court decisions. 
The Constitution also provide~ for agencies dealing with judi-
cial administration: the Judicial Council, whose principal function is 
to improve and expedite the administration of justice (Canst., Art. VI, 
§ 6); the Comm~ssion on Judicial Appointments, which must confirm all 
gubernatorial appointees to fill appellate court vacancies (Const., Art. 
VI, §§ 7, 16); and the Commission on Judicial Performance, which deals 
with/the admonishment, censur~, removal or retirement of judges for 
misconduct or disability (Const.) Art. VI, §§ 8, 18). 
The California judicial system had a total of 247 courts 
and 1,246 judges as of April I. 1980. The names of all judges of 
the Supreme Court, Courts of Appeal and superior courts are listed in 
the Official California Reports, which also contain decisions of the 
appellate courts (commonly referred to as "court opinions"). About 8 
million cases, exclusive of traffic parking violations, are filed each 
year. Parking violations annually result in another 10 million cases 
Over 14 million case3 arc disposed of each year by the courts. The 
annual cost of the judicial system exclusive of capital outlay for 
facilities is about $4/.5 million, of which about $55 million is paid 
by the state and the re111ai:1der by local counties. Court revenues from 
fines, forfeitures, penalties and ~ourt fees are approximately $280 
million annua:~y and are distributed to the state, counties and cities. 
SUPREME COURT 
The Supreme Court is California's highest court and its deci-
sions are binding on all other courts of this state. 
~I This summary was prepared by the Administrative Office of the 
Courts, which is the staff agency of the Judicial Council of 
Californiu, 601 McAllister Str0.et~ San Francisco. California 94102. 
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The Supreme Court a Asso-
ciate Justices. It has original jurisdiction involving 
special writs: mandamus, certiorari, habeas corpus. It 
also exercises re.viewing power under its to 
transfer to itself for decision, appeals taken to Courts of Appeal 
either before or after the Courts of Appeal have handed down final 
decisions in these appeals (Const., Art. VI, §§ 10 and 12). This re-
viewing power enables the Supreme Court to on important legal 
questions and to maintain uniformity in the law. Any may petition 
for a hearing in the Supreme Court after by a Court of Appeal, 
and if the hearing is granted the decision the Court Appeal be-
comes a nullity. All Supreme Court decisions are published the 
Official California Reports. 
Members of the Supreme Court are appointed by the Governor and 
must be confirmed by the Commission on Judicial Appointments. To be 
qualified for such an appointment, a person must an admitted 
to the practice of law in California or have as a judge of a 
court of record in this state for 10 years immediately preceding his 
appointment (Const. ~ Art. VI, § 15). After ~onfirmation, the juoge 
serves until the next gubernatorial election when he must run unopposed 
for election on a nonpartisan ballot ., Art. Vl, § 16). The Su-
preme Court judges are elected for 12-year terms. 
Regular sessions are held by the Court in San Francisco, Los 
Angeles and Sacramento. The Court may also hold special sessions else-
where. Over 3,500 matters are filed in the Court each year, of 
which about 2, 900 are pet:i.tions for hearing in cases previously decided 
by the Courts of Appeal. 
In addition to its o~her responsibilities, the Supreme Court 
reviews the recommendations of the Commission on Judicial Performance .. 
and the State Bar of California concerning, respectively, the disci-
plining of judges and attorneys. 
COL"RTS OF APPEAL 
The Courts of Appeal, established pursuant to a constitutional 
amendment in 1904, are C:1llfornia's intermediate courts of review and 




when superior courts have original 
, they also have 
aw~c~~, certiorari and pro-
~ prescribed statute. the 
original jurisdiction in habeas corpus, 
hihition proeeedings (Const., Art. VI, I 
original proceedings are filed and heard 
Over 13,000 appeals and 
The state is divided into five appellate districts, each 
having a Court of Appeal composed of one or more divisions. Each divi-
sion is composed of three or more judges appointed by the Governor and 
confirmed by the Commission on Judicial qualifica-
tions. election and term of office are same as for Supreme Court 
~udges. The Legislature has the constitutional authority to create new 
appellate districts and divisions of the Courts Appeal (Canst., Art. 
VI, I 3). Currently, the five appellate districts have 13 divisions and 
59 judges. The headquarters for the five appellate are: 
First District. San Francisco; Second District, Los Angeles; Third 
District, Sacramento; Fourth District, San Diego and San Bernardino; and 
Fifth District, Fresno. 
Cases are decided by three-judge panels of Courts of 
Appeal. Their decisions, or opinions, are published in the Official 
California AppellaLe Reports if they (1) establish a new rule of law or 
alter or modify an existing rule, (2) involve a legal issue of contin-
uing public interest, or (3) criticize existing law (Const., Art. VI, 
f 14; Cal. Rules of CouYt, Rule 976). About 18 percent of Court of 
Appeal opinions are anuuc..lly certified as meeting the standard for 
publication. 
SUPERIOR COURTS 
The superior ~ourt is the trial court of general jurisdiction 
in the California juG1cial system. It is sometimes called the trial 
court of residual jurisdiction; that is, it has original trial jurisdic-
tion in all causes except those given by statute to other trial courts 
(Code Civ. Proc. § 82). Tne superior cou~c aisc sits as a probate 
court, juvenile court and conciliation court. (See Prob. Code § 301 et 
seq .• ; Welf. and Inst. Code§ 500 et seq.; Code Civ. Proc. § 1730 et 
qeq.) In addition, the superior court has trial jurisdiction of all 
felony cases. The superior court tries all civil and criminal matters 
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above the of 
VI I 10; Code Civ. Proc. f 
There is a superior court 1n 
number of judges is fixed by the 
The n\l'Ober of in each court 
counties to 196 in Los Angeles County, 
state. (See Gov. Code § 69580 et .) 
and about 600,000 cases are 
eluding some 49, criminal matters 
Superior court judges serve 
the general election on a nonpartisan 
., Art. 
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voters county 
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(Const., Art. VI, § 6(b) and ; Elect Code f ) . are 
filled by appointment of the Governor. A 
must be an to the 
have served as a judge of a court 
10 years immediately preceding election or 
§ 15). 
The superior courL also hears 
the 
in 




• , Art. VI, 
mu-
nicipal and justice courts t., Art. VI, § 1 except 
department 1n in small claims cases are heard by a 
each county. Appeals to the superior court are rules adopted 
by the Judicial Council t., Art. , § 6 . Proc. §§ 
117.10, 901; Pen. Code§ 1468). Appeals from 
the superior court to the Courts of Appeal • Rules , Rules 
61-69). 
COURTS 
Th£: municipal cou-.ct is one of two of trial courts 
the superior court; the other is the justice court. Currently, there 
are 83 municipal courts and 4 72 judges. State authorizes 
each county board of super-visors to the county into judicial dis-
tricts. When the population of a judicial exceeds 40,000, a 
municipal court is established in that district (Const., Art. VI, § 5). 
Municipal courts have original trial jurisdiction in criminal 
misdemeanor and infraction cases (Pen. Code § 1462), and in all civil 




( involved is $15,000 or 
also exercise a simplified .. ..,.. ........ 
$750 (Code Civ. Proc., i 116.2). 
to conduct preU.min.aiy hearings cues to 
reasonable and probable cause to hold a ,.,.e.~.c~.uu:~.u 
trial in SUOP'~"ior court:. 
courts 
in cases not exceeding 
trates 
~-··~-"~ whether there is 
proceedings or 
About 6.~ million cases or over 90 percent o£ state's 
nonparking cases are handled by the courts 
some 5.2 million traffic 
year total another 10-million cases. 
court are 
nonpartisan ballot by voters of the 
courts are located (Gov. Code § 7 
municipal court judge are filled by the Governor 
Municipal court judges are required to attorneys 
, including 
each 
terms on a 
§ 71 
to 
practice of law in California for at least five years immediately pre-
ceding election or appointment (Const., Art. VI, § 15}. 
COURTS 
Justice courts are established in judicial dist~icts 
having a population of 40,000 or less (Const., Art. VI, § 5). There are 
.100, justice courts and 101 judges,. and they handle about a 600,000 non-
parking and 200,000 parking cases each year. 
Since Januart 1, 1977 the justice courts have the same 
civil and criminal jm.::i&dic.t:ion as municipal courts (Code Civ. Proc. I 86; 
Pen Code § 1462). 
Justice couYt judges are elected for six-year terms and vacan-
cies are filled by lot::''--'~ county boards of supervisors, which also set 
the number and hounda:d .. es of justice court districts in their respective-
counties. Prior to Febr~ary 18s 1975 the judges could either be attor-
neys admitted to the California State Bar or have passed a qualifying 
examination given by the Judicial Council. (See Hennessy, Qualification 
of California Justice Cou~t Judges: A Dual System, 3 Pacific L.J. 
439 (1972).) Under legicl£.tion (Chapter 1493 of the 1974 Statutes) 
which became effective '' i.::·a the denial of a writ of certiorari in 
Gordon v. JuE.E}ce Court 11-971•) 12 Cal.3d 323, justice court vacancies 
5 
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must be filled by attorneys (Gov. Code f 71701). ·The Gordon case ~stab­
lished a right for a defendant facing charges that carry the possibility 
of incarceration to have his case heard by an attorney judge. 
Many justice courts have only a part-time,caseload, and the 
judges supplement their judicial compensation a private law prac-
tice. However, under legislation adopted subsequent to the Gordon case 
the Chief Justice baa designated 11 incumbent judges as circuit justice 
court judges. These circuit judges are required to devote their full 
time to judicial duties and receive salaries fixed by statute and paid 
through a state appropriation. 
Judges of the Supreme Court, Courts of Appeal, superior courts 
and municipal courts may not practice law and are ineligible for other 
public employment and public office. A superior or municipal court 
judge may, however, become eligible for election to another public 
office by taking a leave of absence without pay before filing his decla-
ration of candidacy for that office. Acceptance of that office is a 
resignation as a judge (Canst., Art. VI, § 17). A justice court judge 
who is an attorney may practice law, but not before any justice court in 
his own county (Gov. Code§§ 68082-83). 
No judge or judicial officer may receive a court fine or fee 
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COURTS OF APPEAL 
(13 Divisions judges) 
Second District-los Angeles I r-------~------------Firs~ District-San Francisco 
4 Divisions with 
Third District-sacramento 
5 Divisions with 
4 judges in each division 4 Ju~es ~n ~ch division 





2 Divisions with 
5 judges in San Diego 
5 judges in San Bernard~no 
I[\ . 
Fifth District-Fresno 




58 (onf! for each county) 
with total of -69+ judges. 
f., ::t g 
Jt::risdiction 
Civil-.Over $15,000 
Criminal-Original jurisC.i.ction iu all causes except those 
given by statute to municipal or justice courts. 
Appeals-To Court of Appeal of the district. 
r-----~--------------~----~--------~ 






























--8-3- with total of -4-Tl:- judges. i-&(Twith total of -1-fTt judges. 
?f 'lfi 
Jurisdiction 
Civil- $15,000 or less. 
Small Claims--$750 ox less. 
Cricinal--Misdemeanors & infractions. 




Ci~il--$15,000 or lesa. 
Small Clatms--$750 or less. 
I Criminal-Mis4emq.nora .& infractions. Appeals--To A~pellate Depar~ent of 
Superior Court. 
LINE OF APPEAL 
_,...._ _ __.,._ .• LINE OF DISCRETIONARY REVIEW 
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a. Powers of Judicial Council 
The Judicial Council is the 
California judicial system. The Constitution 
improve the administration of justice by 
body of the 
the Council to 
judicial business and 
making recommendations to the courts, making recommendations annually to 
the Governor and the Legislature, and adopting rules court adminis-
tration, practice and procedure not inconsistent with statute. The 
Council also exercises other functions provided by law (Const., Art. VI, 
I 6). The staff agency of the Council is the Administrative Office of 
the California Courts~ which assists the Couucil and Chairperson in 
carrying out their duties under the Constitution and laws of this state 
(Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 991). 
b. Chairperson of the Judicial C~!::>ncil · 
The Chief Justice of California is Chairperson of the Judicial 
Council. The Constitution imposes on her the duty to expedite judicial 
business and equalize the work of the judges and to provide for the 
assignment of any judge to another court, only the judge's 
consent if the court is of lower jurisdiction. Retired judges may be 
assigned with their consent to any court. Judges must report to the 
Chairp .. er_son aa she directs conc:_erning the condition of judtc:.ial business 
in their courts, must cooperate with the Council and must hold court as 
assigned. (Const., Art. VI, f 6.) Assignment of judges from courts with 
light caseloads to those with crowded calendars has helped greatly to 
reduce congestion and delay in the courts. More than 2~000 judicial 
assignments are issued by the U,;.irperson annually. 
c. Hemhership of Council 
A Judicial Council of 11 judges was established pursuant to a 
1926 constitutional amendment. The Constitution was amended in 1960 to 
provide for a Council of 18 members and in 1966 the number was increased 
to 21 members. The Council now consists of the Chief Justice of California, 
one associate justice of the Supreme Court, three judges of Courts of 
Appeal, five judges of superior courts, three judges of municipal courts, 
two judges of justice courts, four attorneys, and one member of each 
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and serves as a liaison 
admir.lstraticu. (S~e Cal. Rules of Court, Rules 
e. California Rules of Court 
.) 
judicial 
The Judicial Council has adopted rules of court administration. 
practice and procedure for th~ various courts which are published as the 
California Rules of Court. They consist of the Rules on Appeal to the 
Supr~e Court and Courts of Appeal; Rules on Appeal to the Superior 
Court; Rules for the Superior Courts; Rules for Municipal Courts; 
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results of this study 
reported to the 1961 
Report (1961) 17-80). 
More recently, the 
Revision of the Judicial Article 
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made comprehensive of numerous 
court jurisdiction the 
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determining branch court loc.s.tions; to to using re-
porters in courLs; to to measure judicial 
impu.ct of billE a·•J.::tit: :.slative co11.sideration; to este:, &. basis 
for measuring s and to a method 
for assessing a court 1 '-' n"'eds fo:c judicial manpower. 
Far a complete review of all Judicial Council studies, see the 
Judicial Council biennial and annual reports, beginning with the first 
report in 1927, and the A.O.C. Newsletter published bimonthly by the 
Administrative Office of the Courts. 
h. Council-Sponsored Institutes, Seminars and Workshops for Judges 
The Legislature in 1961 enacted a completely revised juvenile 
court law Which provided that the Council hold confer-





( The first 
June 1962. 
Several 
of the proceedings 
tributed to all juvenile court 
Code, enacted pursuant to 
Council also seminars 
orientating judges to new j 
new developments in the law and 
dure. Statewide sentencing institutes 
the Judicial Council's 
1973 and Judicial Council institutes 
judges concerned with traffic and 
between 1964 2. 
published and distributed to 
Workshops for judges in 
for presiding judges of superior and w~•"~~-· 
Appeal judges are usually held each 
management and court administration. 
Institute and a s workshop on data 
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courts as well as 




In 1973, the Council a grant to 
establish a Center for Judicial Education and Research. The Center is 
now governed by a board members are jointly chosen by the Cali-
fornia Judgea P..esociat.i.on and the Judicial Council. 
the Judicial Council assigned responsibility 
In the same year, 
organization of 
judicial education pr:ograms to the Center 11 and since then. the Center 
has organized several sentencing institutes, and institutes for juvenile 
court j~dges and for municipal and justice court judges. The Center 
also is developing benchbooks for judges of the various trial courts and 
is presenting orientation programs for newly appointed judges. The 
Center also presents an annual college session. 
The Judicial Council will continue to organize workshops for 
judg~s on topics relating to court administration. 
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an office in 
officer. 
Following a 1934 amendment to Article VI of the Constitution, 
all appointees of the Governor to the Court Courts of Appeal 
must be confirmed by a commission now Commission on Judicial 
Appointments. The Commission consists of the Chief Justice, the Attorney 
General, and the senior presiding justice of the Court of Appeal of the 
appellate district affected (Const., Art. VI, § 7). When a Supreme 
Court appoint~e is being considered, the senior presiding justice, 
statewide, of the <;curta of Appeal becomes the third member. 
The Commission convenes when Governor nominates or ap-
points a person to fill a Supreme Court or Court of Appeal vacancy. 
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Before confirmation the Commission, which holds veto power over the 
nomination or appointment, conducts one or more public hearings to 
review the person's qualifications. The Commission may also ask the 
State Bar to make a formal investigation. No appellate appointment is 
final until the Commission has filed its approval with the Secretary of 
State (Const., Art. VI, § 16). 
Other California Organizations in Judicial Administration 
CALIFORNIA JUDGES ASSOCIATION 
The California Judges Association is the professional organi-
zation of judges of courts of record in this state. It formulates prin-
ciples of ethical conduct for judges that are set forth in the Code of 
Judicial Conduct (see Cal. Rules of Court, Appendix). Additionally, 
the Association conducts educational workshops for judges and sponsors 
and reviews legislation affecting the judiciary. The Association's of-
fice is located at: Suite 416, Fox Plaza, 1390 Market Street, San 
Francisco, California 94102. 
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA 
The State Bar of California is a public corporation in the 
judicial branch of government. All attorneys licensed to practice law 
in California must be members of and pay annual fees to the State Bar 
(Canst., Art. VI, § 9; Bus. & Prof. Code§§ 6008, 6008.2, 6140 et seq.). 
The State Bar examines all candidates for admission to the 
practice of law and certifies to the Supreme Court those who meet the 
admission requirements. The State Bar also formulates and enforces 
rules of professional conduct that, upon approval by the Supreme Court, 
become binding upon lawyers. Additionally, it investigates allegations 
of misconduct by attorneys. The State Bar may impose private or public 
reprovals and may recommend to the Supreme Court that an attorney be dis-
ciplined by suspension or disbarment. These penalties can only be imposed 
by the Supreme Court. 
The State Bar administers programs for certification of law 
specialists, law corporations, and lawyer referral services, and it 
15 
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enforces the law prohibiting legal practice by unauthorized persons. 
The State Bar aids in the administration of justice and at 
each legislative session the State Bar sponsors measures to improve laws 
and the justice system. It also investigates and reports to the Governor 
on the qualifications of persons being considered by the Governor for 
appointment to judicial office. 
The State Bar, through University of California Extension, 
sponsors California Continuing Education of the Bar, a self-supporting 
educational program for practicing attorneys. 
Headquarters of the State Bar are located at: 555 Franklin 




STATE Of CAliFORNIA 
COMMISSION ON G RNMENT EFORM 
(916) 445-8582 
Sute Capitol, Room ~1-45 
~cumento, CA SS614 
IFA'{Sd!JIAL OF TASK FORCE POOJECI FJ,FDRT 
Date: October 4, 1978 
TO: 
FR011: 





SUBJECT: Report on Project No.- I-11 ---------------------------
Attached {s the report on the above noted project as received from 
the Task Force. Copies of the report have also been provided to 
members of the Task Force and to the State library for public 
reference. 
lhe Conmission Staff wishes to offer the following comments on this 
repor·t: 
cc: Ot~er Con~ission Menbers 
Stoff {3). files (2), State library (3), Task Force Nembers (7) 
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rAn: OF CMII'OitNIA EDMUND G. IIIOWN Jlt., Governor 
~EPARTMENT OF fiNANCE 
~et.AMENTO 
October 2, 1978 
Mr. A. Alan Post, Chairman 
Commission on Government Reform 
State Capitol, Room 1145 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Dear Mr. Chairman: 
The task force group for Project I-11, "Transfer of Program Responsibility 
from Local Government to the State--Courts," is pleased to submit its final 
report. 
We have endeavored to provide you with a concise and objective report on the 
fiscal alternatives and implications of the State•s assumption or financing of 
all or selected elements related to the existing trial court system. 
We are available to answer any questions you or your Commission members may 
have concerning this study. 
Re~~ecyu lly:{ t}/• 
/M -, ~r---__. 
~harles C( ~~per, Chairpe~ 
Program Budget Manager 




TRANSFER OF PROGRAM RESPONSIBILITY 
FROM LOCAL GOVERNMENT TO THE STATE--COURTS 
(PROJECT I-ll) 
THIS REPORT HAS BEEN PREPftRED BY A TASK FORCE OF KNOWLEDGEABLE INDIVIDUALS 
REPRESENTING DIVERSE INTERESTS AND POINTS OF VIEW FOR DISCUSSION AND USE BY 
THE CO~iiSSION ON GOVERNMENT REFORM. THE REPORT DOES NOT REPRESENT THE VIEWS 
OR OFFICIAL POSITION OF THE COMMISSION, ITS COMMITTEES, OR INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS. 
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I 
TRANSFER OF PROGRAM 
GOVERNMENT TO 
Rudo Aros 
Western C on law 
Ra 1 ph Gampe l1 
Administrative Director 
Cal ornia Courts 
Judicial Council 
Charles C. Harper, Chairperson 
Department of Finance 
Warren Marsden, Retired 
Admin ative Office of the Courts 
J icial Counc 1 
Richard T 
Chief Counsel . 
Senate Judiciary Committee 
Steven Zehner 
County Supervisors Association of California 
y· 
Note: The i ividual ers of this Task Force not necessarily support 
.all of the various proposals contained herein and do purport to represent 
the views of the organizations by whom they are employed. 
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. To prov the Coomission on 
objective report on the fiscal al 




ions State s 





several feasible transferri 
res pons i b i1 i exist -tri 
the State. The S Court 
report si nee are funded 
is examini existing and alternative court 
be reporti on potential economies 
Although this report is pr 
system could be nancia1ly supported 
proposed would ire changes in 
i 
accounting procedures of the courts. To 
efficiencies. 
suggested the need for change in t exi i cou 











management and control under various levels of State i 
To gain as broad an input as sible in a short time, 
Y.-
force meetinas were held in Sacramento and San Francisco. 
"' 
In addition to the 
broad base of knowledge and experience provided by the task force members, 
outside i ntere parties offered ir t and expertise to assist the 
task force were invited to attend so that their ideas could considered. 
Participants included representatives from the California Judges 1 Association, 
the Assembly Office of Research, and iation of California. 
financial data was provided from several sources and considerable 
time was devoted to reconciling· differences to arrive at an acceptable level 
of accuracy. Sources of d~ta 1nc1uded a Judicial Council telephone survey 
conducted in June 1978; the 1976-77 •Annual Report, financial Transactions 
Concerning Counties of California," prepared by the Controller's Office; and 





of the 1977-78 actual exRenditures. 
4 
accounting, budgeting 2 and reporti~ 
OPTION 5 




The California Judicial cons sts of Supreme Court, five 
Courts of Appeal, 58 Superior Courts, 89 Municipal Courts, and 107 Justice 
Courts. The Superior. Municipal, and Justice Courts are trial courts. while 
the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal are appellate courts that primarily 
review trial court decisions. The system is comprised of 260 courts and 1,178 
authorized judgeships. 
About 7.6 million cases, exclusive of traffic parking violations, 
are filed each year. Parki violations annua 1y resu t in another 9 million 
cases. Over 14.6 million cases are disposed 
annual cost of this system, exclusive of capi 
each year by the courts. The 
outlay for facilities, is 
over $400 million. Approximately $50 million is paid by the State and the 
remainder by counties. 
Appellate Courts 
The Supreme Court is California's highest court) and its decisions 
are binding on all other courts of this State. It is made up of the Chief 
Justice and six Associate Justices. The only cases the Supreme Court must 
hear are death penalty cases. The other cases are chosen by it for hearing 
depending mainly on the importance of the matter presented, and whether there 
is a conflict of decisions at some lower level. Nondeath penalty cases 
comprise the bulk of the courts• workload. 
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Members of Supreme 
be confirmed by the 
a justice serves until next 
for election on a nonpartisan ball 




by • and must 
confi ion 
on runs 
in sco, Angeles, 
and Sacramento. The Court may also hold special sessions elsewhere. 
In addition to its other responsibilities, the Court reviews 
the recommend ons of Commission on Judicial P the State 
Bar of Californ a concerning, respectively, dis plini judges and 
attorneys. 
The Courts of Appeal are C ifornia 1 s i i courts of review. 
They have appellate jurisdiction when Superior Courts have original 
jurisdiction, and in certain other cases prescribed by statute. like the 
Supreme Court, they also have original jurisdi 
proceedings. 
,.-
The State is divided into five appe11 
on in various writ 
stri having a 
Court of Appeal with one or more divisions. Cou of Appeal Justices are 
appoi e1ec n same way as Supreme Court ices. The five 
appellate districts have a total of 13 divisions and 56 authorized judgeships . 
.. s. 
-?OR-
The Superior rt s 
original jurisdiction in all causes, 
al courts {California on 
appeals from the Municipal and Justice in 
(California Constitution Article VI, Section 11). 
jurisdiction with Supreme Court and Courts 
proceedings and in those proceedings for 
mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition (California 
Section 10). 
There is a Superior Court in each 
of·judges is fixed by the Legislature. There are 
Court judgeships. These judges are e ec 
nonpartisan ballot by voters of the~ounty. 
appointment of the Governor. 
i i 
statute other 
on ) . It so hears 
1 divis on 
t concu 
1 in habeas corpus 
reli in re of 
i on Art ic 1 e VI , 
58 ies and number 
ed Superior 
ies are filled by 
The Superior Court generates revenue by means of ling in its 
civil branch, and by means of fines, penalties and i forfeitures assessed 
in the criminal division. All such revenues are transmitted to the county 
treasurer for disposition according to statute (Penal Code Sections 1203.1 and 
1307; Government Code Sections 24350, 24353, and 69994.6). 
The primary expenditure of the Superior Court is salaries of court 
personnel. The salary of judges is paid largely from State funds, with the 
portion paid by the State dependent on the population of the county in which 
the judge sits (Government Code Section 68206). The salaries of all other 





Since January 1, 




of Civil Procedure Sec on ). 
1 c aims cases 
Sections 116 ) . 
ici ce 
pre 1 imi nary hearings in ony cases 
and probable cause to hold a 
Superior Court {Penal Code 
Revenue is 
from fees from bail forfei 
performed and l n vil 
the county treasury and s 
districts, the county 
Code Sections 1463, 
71006). Counties are s ble 
judges and support personnel, incl 
The State pays the employer's contri 
for Municipal Cou judges. Ju ice 
























The pOHers boards of isors are l ted to those 
expressly granted by the California Consti on or by statute, toget with 
powers that arise by implication from those expressly granted. These powers 
include authority to divide the Superior Court into not more than 11 judicial 
districts (Government Code Sections and 69645). also include the 
authority to divide the Municipal and Justice Courts into as many distric as 
public convenience requires (Government Code Section 71040}. Boards of 
supervisors must provide the trial courts with suitable rooms and facilities 
for.their operation {Government Code Sections 68073, 71002, and 25351.3(a)). 
When the population exceeds 40,000, a Municipal Court is established in that 
district. Justice Courts are established in a11 judicial districts having a 
population of 40,000 or less {California Constitution, Article VI, 
Section 5). Superior, Municipal, and Justice Court judges are elected on a 
nonpartisan ballot by voters of the judicial districts in which their courts 
are located. Vacancies in the Office of Superior and Municipal Court Judges 
y· 
are filled, between elections, by the Governor. Vacancies in the Offices of 
Justice Court judges are filled by county boards of supervisors or by vote at 





:aspects of cou i 
fiscal, st 
costs (see Appendix A co 
1. 
2. 
3 • . 
5. 
6. 
"" ~ The task force con sev , 
arriving at the 
that the most i 
financi ic on ( 
and then discuss ariou 
with the major issues ec s 
deals th sever a p a1 e ir 
selection. In addition, 1t 11 its 
own propos a 1 with data i s 
options meet with Coornission le s as 
preferred methods of fi nanc i a 1 p icipation ( seems have 
advantages the other a1 atives )t it 
2 2 
that the fiscal realities 1 t approach. This is 
primary reason that the task force did not select one option as the "best 11 or 
,..,- only way to go. 
I. Methods of Financial Participation 
A. Buy-Out 
•suy-Out" is defined as the permanent transfer of the local court 
costs of the county to the Stat~, with a resulting increase in the 
State's authority to supervise court operations. 
The major considerations in dealing with the buy-out proposal are: 
1. Buy-Out would permanently shift these costs from the property 
tax to State revenues, and would permit both the counties and 
the State to plan ahead. 
2. Would impose major new supervisorial duties upon the Judicial 
Council and other State agencies. 
3. Would reduce counties' overhead costs and would add some 
comparable amount {g~ter or lesser) to the Judicial Council's 
-budget for additional management costs. 
4. Would ensure equality of services statewide, but probably at an 
additional cost. 
5. Would open the way to reforms in court organization and 
procedures. 
6. Would create a more uniform system--court procedures, 
accounting systems, reporting methods, etc., should vary less 
from county to county. 
7. Could create a more flexible system in which emp1_oyees, even 







with li le or no increase in 
The major cons ions in 
1. Ba l-Out would 1 
varyi i 
demonstrated needs the cou es 
could impede county f seal anni 
resulting uncertainty 
2. Could be based on a simple 




owever is exibility 
ause of the 
as a ven 
() 
3. Would require a n 
court programs. 
1 over 




,. court aniz on and 
5. Would continue disparities in the levels of services 
counties. 
res, 
6. Would retain the present degrees 1 loca 1 
responsiveness. 
C. Reimbursement 
This approach involves payment in arrears for costs 
determined be eligible for nanci p ic ion bas 
on c 1 aims submit ted to the State. ' 
All of the points discussed under the bail-out ternative would 
apply to the reimbursement method th itiona1 problem 
counties wou 1 d face a cast¥ flow prob i em. is, would 
expenditures for the programs, submit claims and paid in arrears 
rather than being provided funds as or expenditures are 
The task force does not favor this method for fiscal participation 
by the State. Reimbursement offers no positive advantages over the 
bail-out method, would contribu to the ies 1 cash ow 
problems, and would be more costly to imp ement due to the 
complexity of the claims process. 
D. Shared Revenue 
This would involve providing funds to counties on a block grant 
basis with strings attached to require a given level of service in 
the court system. 
·12-
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The task force d 
method of nancing. 
If ss on 
that local governmental 
revenue basis, there appears 
requirements for- the court system. 
i s potenti 
isl 
on a shared 
maki special 
county board of supervisors 
should have reasonable authority to locate 
a priority basis. In addition, Government 
revenue funds on 
on 68073 
provides a mechanism to assure a reasonable level of 
funding. 
II. E1ements of the System 
A. Superior r J ) 
The Superior Courts are funded by the counties except for the major 
·portion of judges• salaries, an 
State for each Superior Court ip 
,000 ock grant from the 
after January 1, 
1973, and the employer cohtribution to the Judges 1 Retirement Fund 
(8 percent of salary). 
Bu1-0ut Issues 
1. Enhancing the author ty of the Judici Council serve as a 
channel of supervision communi ion from the Admini ion 
and the Legislature to the courts in various counties. The 
Council could enforce efficient management actices, and could 
also assume new duties. such as the preparation of each court 
budget for submission to the Department of Finance. 
2. Determining the bas1s for compensating counties for the use of 
their courthouse facilities. 
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3. id i s 
State 
:'f comni oners, 
Comment: 
This 1 
_. the Superior 
B. Munici 
The Munici es 
except for F 
which is provided 
Buy-Out Issues 
1. Sh i the au i t 
boundaries from sors ici a 1 
Counc i1 th, as an , some 1 is ve 
() 
confirmation. 
2. Enhanci State - . i1. s1on 
3. Determining a formula cou ies t 
use of courthouse i1 t es. 
4. Determining which of ' 
if s d 
become State employees. 
Comnent: 
The task force recommends out 1 nc 1 
Municipal and Superior Cou 
c. Justice Courts (108 Judges) 




1. Shifting the power appoi Justice Court jt;D:;'J!.'S from the 
county boards of supervisors Governor. 
2. Shifting the authority to draw justice court ~r~~rfct boundaries 
from county boards of supervisors J~icia1 Council. 
3. Enhancing State supervision by the Judicial Co';~.cil.. 
4. Determining a formula for the compensation of the counties for 
the use of courthouse facilities. 
5. Determini which of the supporting employees should become 
State loyees--i.e., clerks, constables, etc. 
Co!1111ent: 
Since Justice Courts are more significantly a creation of loca1 
government than the other trial courts, the task force believes that 
a usefu1 buy-out proposal could exclude them. How~ver, if the money 
is available, the task force recommends that the entire court system 
be part of any buy-out propQsa1 • 
District Attorneys 
District attorneys are presently funded enti 
~ux-Out Issues 
b)' the counties. 
1. Determining how effective State supen~s~:;:'l, ~tssitated by the 
State nding, could be imposed upon t"'e :ist···~~ &!torneys who 












and, in ies s of 
county counsels, serv nue 
paid by 
4. Decid whether siveness 
str 
responsiveness 
1t could or 
5. Dec ing 











ec i attorney or 
s ectively 
are S 1oyees? 
Because District Attorneys are ocal elected officials, and 
because of the problems connec therewith, this task force 
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be nanced the S 
sentencing process, 
sentencesj shou d 
dered a p 
on of 
State if the court for i 
completed is so 
b. If this function of 
>'-
State-funded, sho~ld 
2. Deciding whether any probation 
.employees, or whether the State 
rely 
various sian 
on ions should 
ons are an i 1 part of 
to felony 
igations be 
funded by the 
such invest ions are 
ion is 
State-funded? 
1d become State 
ld wi the 
counties to provide investigatory or other services. 
Corrrnent: 
This task force recommends on presentence inve igations 
of the county prob ion department be part any buy-out proposal, 
that a11 probation employees remain county_emp1oyees, and that the 
State funding be handled by means of contracting for services with 
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i cia 1 
pub 1 i c 
tant sp 1 it 
The task force is aware the exity of standardizing employment on 
a statewide basis. Appendix C, regarding current retirement systems as 
well as necessity to wi varying salary levels serves to 
illustrate that the employment issue will not be an easy one to solve. 
The ~obey Reportl1 dealt briefly wi this issue but also did not 
solve this problem. It will undoubtedly be necessary to provide for a 
phase-in approach to resolving the employment problem. 
OPTION 2 
Bux-Out the Superior, Municipal, and Justice Courts including transfer 
of employees to the State system ($375.8 million transfer from county to 
State). 
If sufficient funds are not available for Option 1, the task force 
recommends that a buy-out include these elements. This option would 
en~ure that all personnel immediately associated with the operation of 
the trial courts would be funded by the State. If available funds would 
not cover all three levels o~trial courts, Justice Courts could be 
omitted because of their inherently local nature. 
OPi!ON 3 
Bail-Out (as a temporary expedient} the cost of Superior, Municipal and 
Justice Courts; District Attorney; Public Defender (presentencing 
probation costs}, or any combination thereof, based on a percentage of 
the 1977-78 actual expenditures (up to $673.1 million transfer from 
county to State). 
This is a flexible option which can be adjusted to accommodate the 
availability of any level of funding. By adjusting the percentage of 
1977-78 costs that are to be assumed by the State, any dollar figure can 
lf"Report of the Advisory Commission to the Joint Committee on the Structure 





Cost X A. 
( .8 i or $5 .2 mi 11 ion 
transfer from 
is al involves ass s bi ity for the 
courts, but the cou es wou d the 
s. option State 
i nvo 1 vement 1 overs li es. The 
propos differs bai -out isms se s more permanent 
nature. 
OPTION 5 y· 
($29.9 million excess cu 
State's ). 
This option 1 nanc is for the 
Comn iss ion's consi on i t ev ci are not 
avail le one of ous t so desi 1e 
from the standpoint be easy as 1t involves no 
substant1ve program changes. In consi i this option the task force 
does not recommend t t ice j be transferred to the 
Judges' Retirement System. That system currently has a substantial 
unfunded liability and such a transfer would increase the unfunded 
liability. 
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JUSTICE SYSTEM COSTS RESOURCES 
4r· Justice System Costs 
The total estimated 1978-79 Justice System Costs21 of $790.9 million 
includes both the counties' costs of the Trial Courts, County Public Defender, 
District.Attorney and Probation (Presentencing), as well as the State's share 
of ·trial court costs. A complete summary of Justice System Costs appear in 
Appendix A. 
The estimated counties' operational costs of the trial courts for 










State contributions for the operation of the Courts for 1978-79 are as 
y· 
Superior Court Judges• Salaries $22.5 million 
Judges' Retirement Contributions 8.0 million 
Assigned Judges .3 million 
Block Grants 3.8 million 
Supreme Court 3.3 million 
Court of Appeals 12.3 million 
Court Appointed Counsel .8 million 
Justice Courts Temporary Judgeships ~million 
Total $51.6 million 
Grand Total, State and County $427.4 million 
l7Inc1udes Superior, Municipal and Justice Courts as we11 as court-related 
services of county clerks, bai1iffing, ancilliary court services, county 
public defender, district attorney, and probation (presentencing). 
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Trial Court Revenues 
Three major sources of revenue were identified in the State 
Controller's "1976-77 Annual Report--Financial Transactions Concerning 
Counties of Ca1ifornia11 (1) fines, forfeitures, and penalties, (2) civil 
process service fees, and (3) court fees and costs. 
The combined estimated total trial court revenues for 1978-79 is $279.0 
million. Approximately $139.6 million is r~tained by counties, $96.6 million 
goes to cities, and $42.8 million goes to the State. 
Of the $139.6 million that goes to counties, approximately $30.9 
million is restricted as to use per Vehicle Code Section 42201 and 
approximately $68.6 million of the $96.6 million for cities is restricted as 
to use per Vehicle Code Section 42200. The State's portion of $42.8 million 
is largely earmarked for driver education, road improvements, peace officer 
training and fish and game conservation. 
In addition to the major revenue sources identified in the State 
Controller•s 111976-77 Annual ReportYof Financial Transactions Concerning 
Counties,~~ there are additional revenues (Federal/State grants, 
reimbursements, etc.) collected by the Public Defender, District Attorney and 
Probation; however, due to the lack of readily available fiscal data for these 
sources of funds, these estimates have been omitted from this study. 
A major factor to be considered with ~y proposed State financing 
option would be the possible reallocation of existing trial court revenues 
(see Appendix B). 
ln view of the limited time that the Task Force had to deal with this 
entire report, there was not sufficient time to deal in depth with the 




The task force concurs with the observations contained in the 1971 
Booz-Allen & Hamilton report "California lower Court Study" which stated: 
The value or priority o{ such programs as driver education, 
road improvements, peace officer training, and fish and 
game conservation may change but their funds from court 
revenues continue unless the distribution formula is 
altered. Therefore, these programs are not subject to the 
same scrutiny as those governmental programs which must 
compete for general funds at the State, county, or city 
level and do not have special earm~rked revenues which can 
be used to help defray their costs. 
The court revenue distribution system in its present form 
allows all governmental units who share in these revenues 
to profit, to some extent, from the volume of court 
business. This condition conflicts somewhat with accepted 
court financing objectives, which seek to divorce court and 
related criminal justice or other program expenditures 
completely from the revenues generated by the courts. 
The questionnaire survey recommended in Appendix A should also include 
the collection trial court revenues so that current and accurate revenue data 
can be obtained. 
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1976-77 Actual Cos~/ 
Estimated IndirjCt Costs 
(20 percent )l 
Estimated Total 1976-77 
Actual 
Estimated 1977-78 
(15 percent growth) 
Estimated 1978-79 
(10 percent growth) 
Estimated 1978-79 
Bailiffing Costs 
Total Estimated 1978-79 
SUMMARY OF ESTIMATED 1978-79 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT COURT COSTSl/ 




















7901020 27 J 308 1 ~.5!;i_ 
$1413912517 $375 1761 J 5Jl 
!!Includes direct and indirect costs of Superior, Municipal and Justice Courts, 
court related services of county clerks, bailiffs (to the extent that counties 
reflected these costs under the courts) and ancillary court services. Excludes 
grand jury costs (1976-77. actual $2.0 million) as task force felt the majority 
of these costs were not related to court activities, and fixed assets 
(miscellaneous furnishings and equipment) 1976-77 actual $718,000. Also not 
reflected is approximately $930,000 (1976-77 actual) for jury commissioners that 
was not included under the respective courts in the State Controller's "1976-77 
Annual Report, Financial Transactions Concerning Counties." 
£/source--State Controller's "1976-77 Annual Report, Financial Transactions 
Concerning Counties." Since 11 Staff Benefits" are not reflected under the 
respective budget units, (i.e •• they are reported under "Other General .. ), a 
derived basis was used to determine and allocate these costs. 
3/Represents Countywide Support Services costs allocated to budget units. 
!I Growth factors were not app 1 i ed to "Just ice Courts" which have experienced a 





SUMMARY OF COMBINED (STATE AND COUNTIES'} 
COURT SYSTEM COSTS!/ 
Counties' Share: 
Superior Court 









Superior Court Judges' Salaries $22,471,546 
Judges' Retirement Contribu~ipns 8,036,461 b/ 
Assigned Judges 300,000 
Block Grants 
Supreme Court 
Courts of Appeal 
Court Appointed Counsel 











a7£xclusive of Capita1 Outlay Expenditures. 
b/lncludes $3,488,052 to cover the estimated deficiency between receipts and 




ESTIMATED 1978-79 COUNTY COSTS 
FOR PUBLIC DEFENDER, DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
~~D PROBATION (PRESENTENCING ONLY) 
Total 1976-77 Actuall/ Amount 
Estimated Staff Benefits (13 percent) 
Estimated Indir~ct Costs 
(20 percent)Y 
Total Estimated 1976-77 Costs 
Total Estimated 1977-78 (15 percent growth) 
-
Total Estimated 1978-79 (10 percent growth) 
Less State Reimbursements1/ 









1/source--State Controller's "1976-77 Annual Report of Financial Transactions 
Concerning Counties." Excludes court appointed counsel which is reflected 
under the respe~tive court budgets. 
£/Indirect cost estimate based on budgeted expenditures of 24 counties with 
Public Defenders' offices. The remaining counties generally rely on 
contract services for court-appointed counsel and may not have a budget 
unit to which countywide administrative costs could be allocated. 
3/As provided by Penal Code Section 987.6. 
~Excludes State reimbursement for the cost of investigations associated with 
the defense of capital cases as provided by Penal Code Section 987.9. At 
the tim~ Chapter 1048/77 was enacted, the annual cost was estimated to be 
Sl million. However, since actual cost data was not available, and 
because of the uncertainty as to the magnitude of total costs, the figures 






.· . 1976-77 Actual Cost~ $129,146,304 
Estimated Staff Benefits 
(13 percent )11 16~789,019 
Estimated Indir;ct Costs 
(20 percent).i 25,829,260 
Total Estimated 1976-77 Costs $171 '764, 583 
Estimated 1977-78 Costs 
(15 percent growth) 197,529,270 
Estimated 1978-79 Costs 
(10 percent growth) $217,282,197 
l7Represents all D.A. costs includi~- Criminal Investigation and Prosecution; 
Public Administration and Family Support. Does not include any city 
attorneys' costs. 
~Source--State Controller's "1976-77 Annual Report, Financial Transactions 
Concerning Counties." 
1/staff benefit rate derived from sample of county budgets and based on 
total budget expenditures. See explanation under cost methodology. 
!!Represents countywide support services costs allocated to budget units. 
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PROBATION {PRESENTENCING ONLY) 
1976-77 Actual Costs (Total Probation)l/ 
Estimated Staff Benefits (15 percent)fl 
Estimated Indirect Costs (20 percent}~ 
Total Estimated 1976-77 Costs 
Estimated 1977-78 Costs (15 percent growth) 
Estimated 1978-79 Costs (10 P.ercent growth) 
Estimated 1978-79 Presentencing Costs~ 









1/source--State Controller's "1976-77 Annual Report, Financial Transactions 
Concerning Counties. 11 Y · 
1/Staff benefit rate was derived from ·sample of county budgets and is b on 
total budget expenditures. See explanation under costing methodol 
~/Represents Countywide Support Services costs allocated to budget uni s. 
~?resentencing ratio of total probation costs was based on information 





The State Controller's •1976-77 Annual Report on Financial 
Transactions Concerning Counties of California," served as the starting point 
·· ·estimating the 1978-79 cost of Superior, Municipal, and Justice courts, 
County Clerks (court-related activities), District Attorney, Public Defender, 
Probation (presentencing). The ba11iffing costs were estimated on the 
s of budget year staff1 ng projections. 
The Task Force group estimates that 70 percent of the County Clerks' 
costs are court related. After making adjustments to the 1976-77 actual costs 
staff benefits and countywide indirect costs and applying growth factors 
15 percent and 10 percent respectively for 1977-78 and 1978-79, the 
estimated 70 percent portion related to the courts was allocated on the basis 
of the number of actual filings in 1976-77. 
. y· 
The cost for bailiffing servfces is usually included 1n the Sheriff's 
budget. However, some counties account for these costs under the respective 
court receiving the service. Since the expenditure data reflected in the 
ller's •1976-77 Annual Report of Financial Transactions Concerning 
does not identify bail1ffing in either case, s~aff developed an 
imate of statewide bailiff1ng cost for 1978-79, using the number of 
ips and the average salary of a Deputy Constable, Deputy Sheriff I and 
11 I. The bailiffing costs for justice courts reflects the frequency of 
court sessions. To the extent that counties reported bail1ffing costs und~r 
courts, our estimate would be overstated. 
A-6 
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Countywide Indirect Costs 
order reflect the total costs the justice 
the located central services costs of county government based on 1 
actual costs was used to develop an average overhead rate of 20 percent whi 
was then .applied to 1976-77 total actual direct expenditures. Normal 
overhead rate is derived by using salaries wages as the base; however, 
since is data was not readily available an equivalent rate ed on 
expenditures was used. 
Although counties direct charge some countywi central service s 
to varying degrees, the majority of these costs are not direct-charged 
would not therefore be reflected in the State Controller's "Annual Report 
Financial Transactions Concerning Counties.•• 
The Countywide Central Service Plans typically include the cost 
Grant Coordination 
Purchasing and Clerical 




Parking Lot Maintenance 
Record Retention 
Building Rent, Security and ntenance 
,. . Equipment 
liability and Bonding Insurance 





The Controller•s Annual Report Financial Trans on 
consequently, staff used a sample of 1977 budgets to· ive an 
est staff it rate for each 
A-7 
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on. respective rates were 
lied to the 1976-77 actual costs for each function. As with the 
irect costs rate the staff benefit rate was derived by using total budget 
un expenditures as the base as opposed to using Salaries and Wages as the 
Staff benefits typically reflect the employer's contribution for 
rement Benefits, Health Benefits, Social Security (OASDI) and Workers' 
Compensation. 
Growth Factor 
After adjusting the 1976-77 actual expenditures for staff benefits and 
countywide indirect co.sts, a growth factor of 15 percent was applied for 
1977-78 and 10 percent for 1978-79. The 15 percent growth rate was felt to 
represent a reasonable average increase in the total justice area. Staff 
reduced this factor to 10 percent for 1978-79 in order to reflect the probable 
impact Proposition 13 will have on county budgets in the judicial area. 
1976-77 Actual Expenditures ,.-
It should be noted that although the State Controller provides each 
with reporting forms and guidelines for reporting expenditures there 
are numerous differences in how counties account for and therefore report 
expenditure data. Consequently the total cost data reported for any 
unit function may not accurately reflect the statewide cost of that 
tion. 
for example, some counties reflect the cost of bai1iffing under the 
• a few report these costs separately while most include these costs in 
Sheriff's budget unit. The aggregate summary classifications used in the 
A-8 
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Controller's Report precluded the isolation and identification of baili i 
costs reflected under the courts. While this is considered to be a minor 
amount, to the extent that counties reported these costs under the 
total estimated costs would be inflated. 
st our 
·Given the limited time frame for completing this study, staff was 
compelled to rely on readily available cost data, which did not ways 1 
itself to verification and reconciliation. In some cases, staff relied 
the expert judgment of Judicial Council staff, county auditors 
administrative staff to estimate selected items of costs. In those i 
where more than one cost estimate was available, staff always favored 
higher estimates. 
Comprehensive Cost Survey 
T.he general consensus of the task force group is that 1978-79 
data contained in this report should be viewed as reflecting a reasonable 
•ball park" estimate of the actual _posts that would be assumed by the 
the event of a 11 bail-out" or ."buy-out." If it is the Comnission's intent 
recommend an increase in the level of State funding, staff recomnends that a 
comprehensive cost survey be made by Judicial Council. is antic 
more uniform and consistent reporting of revenue and cost data by 
activity would be obtained from this survey. Since counties will be 
in 
actual 1977-78 revenue and expenditures to State Contro11er's al 
Government Fiscai irs Division by October l 1978, more 
revenue and expenditure data would be available. Judici Council 
estimates that 60-90 days would be required to gather, summarize, 




on for justice court judges and nonjudicial 
so exc 1 udes f i 1i ng fees a 11 oca ted to Superior and 
Municipal Judges' Retirement fund. 
2. Health Benefits--Excludes State's contribution for Superior 
Court judges and Municipal Court judges enrolled in a State 
Health plan. 
3. OASOI--Social Security--Reflects counties' share of OASDI for 
judicial and nonjudicial employees. 
4. Workers' Compensation--Since some counties are self-insured. 
reflects· only those premiums paid by counties carrying Workers' 
Compensation Insurance. 
C. Service and Supplies: 
The following items of costs are typically reflected in county 
.budgets: communications, data processing, expert witness fees, jury 
expense/jury commissioner, court reporter, transcripts, professional 
services (appointed psychfitrists), transportation services, 
conciliation court, witness fees, facilities--rent, maintenance and 
uti·lities. and court-appointed counsel. 
D. fixed Assets: 
Includes expenditures for office machines, office fixtures (desks, 
chairs, etc.). Excludes capital outlay expenditures. 
II. County Clerks 
A. Full-time and part-time salaries and wages, overtime and premium pay. 
B. Staff Benefits: 
Including counties' contribution to employee retirement, FICA, 
health insurance, OASOI, and workers• compensation insurance. 
A-ll 
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DESCRIPTION OF JUSTICE SYSTEM COSTS 
·The following description of costs. typically reflected in 
budgets, is intended to provide Commission members with a general overview 
the cost structure of the various justice system components included in is 
study. It is by no means an exhaustive or definitive listing as there is 
considerable variation among the counties in terms of the classification 
accounting treatment of expenditures. 
I. Superior. Municipal, and Justice Courts 
A. Sal aries and Wages: 
~ull-time and part-time salaries and wages of judicial and 
nonjudicial employees. (Does not include State share of Superior 
Court judges salaries.) I~ludes salaries and wages of judges, 
judges• secretaries, court reporters, commis.sioners and 
clerk administrators (law requires each municipal court one 
deputy clerk administrators such as supervisor staff, courtroom 
clerks, working deputies, counter clerks, acting personnel, O.P. 
personnel, microfilming personnel, etc. 
B. Staff 
Includes the counties': contribution 
employees not otherwise paid by the State. 
ic ic a 
1. Retirement and Death Benefits--Excludes the State's share 
(8 percent) of Superior Municipal judges. 1 ec 
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ice and supplies: 
1. Communications/telephone services 
2. Maintenance--equipment 
3. Office expense 
. 4. Postage 
5. Data Processing Services 
6. Rents--equipment 
7. Microfilm supplies 
8. Printing and binding 
9. Transportation 
10. Facilities rent (when applicable) 
Fixed Assets--Includes equipment purchases and office furnishings 
(desks, chairs, etc.). Excludes capital outlay. 
b He Defender 
Full-time and part-time salaries and wages, overtime and premium pay. 
Staff Benefits: 
Including counties' contr.ibution to employee retirement, FICA, 
health insurance, OASDI, and workers' compensation. 




















9. Data Processing 
10. Rents--equipment 
11. Rents--structures (when applicable) 
12. Printing/binding 
~~. Transportation 
D. ·Fixed Assets--Includes equipment and office furnishings 
IV. District Attorney 
A. Full-time and part-time salaries and wages, overtime and urn 
B. Staff Benefits: 
c. 
D. 
Including counties' contribution to employee retirement, FICA, 
health insurance, OASDI, and workers' compensation. 
Service and supplies: 
1. Comnunications 
2. Equipment--Maintenance 
3. Office expenses 
4. Jury Expense y· 
5. Transportation 
6. Travel 
7. Membership/Educational Expense 
8. Reporter fees 
9. Professional and Specialized Services 
10. Rents and leases--Equipment 
11. Rents·-Building (when applicable) 
Fixed Assets--Includes equipment purchases and furnishings ( 






A. full-time and part-time salaries and wages, overtime and premium pay. 
B. Staff Benefits: 
Including counties• contribution to employee retirement, FICA, 
health insurance, OASOI, and workers• compensation. 
C. Service and supplies: 
1. Communications/telephone services 
2. Maintenance·-Equipment 
3. Medical-Dental-Lab Supplies 
4. Office Expense 
5. Postage 
6. Professional and specialized services 
7. Rents--equipment 
8. Transportation 
9. Rents--Building (when aQpl1cable} 
>" 
10. Auto mileage 
11. Clothing and personal supplies/juvenile 
12 •. Educationa1 expense 
13. Printing and binding 
0. Other Charges 
1. Supply and care of persons 
2. State Institutions 
E. Fixed Assets--Includes office equipment and office furnishings. 











Fines, Forfeitures. Penalties 
Vehtcle Code Ftnes 
Other Court ftnes 
Forfe1tures and Penalttes 
Charges for Current Servtces 
C lv 0 Process Services 
Court fees and Costs 
TOTAl 
ttnt:s!/ -
F1nes and 'enalttes 
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Penalttes on Trafftc Yiolattons 
Orher Training 
Peace Off1cers Training 
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8,499,860 9,009,851 • 
4,007,352 • 4.247,793 
428,218 453,911 





State Controller's R~ts--Ftnanctal Transacttons Concerntng Counties and Cities. (Adjustment 
~&Ge to reflect San Francisco County under ~counties• instead of •cities.• 
lclb1 Council. 
percent Vehicle Code F~nes restr1cted as to use Vehicle Code Section 42201. 
1 Yehlcle Code floes restricted as to use per le Code Section 42200. 
1 St~te Trial Court Revenues restricted as to use by the statute oertainlnq to the resoecti~e funds 
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County of Sacramento 
EXHIBIT K 
ECOR E 
J. A. SIMPSON, CLERK-RECORDER 
November 10, 1981 
Mr. Ray leBov, Counsel 
Assembly Judiciary Committee 
State Capitol 
Sacramento, California 95814 
Dear Ray: 
Thanks for the invitation to appear at the November 18th 
hearing in San Francisco regarding "State Funding of the 
Courts 11 • 
As I mentioned previously, ~he County Clerks' Assoc1at1on has 
conducted a survey of the current shortfall being made up from 
local general funds. It looks to be in the neighborhood of 
$190 million. In addition, I have tried to lay out costs 
relative to court consolidation. Therefore, the attached 
report deals with status quo funding and a hypothetical 
version of court consolidation. 
I will represent our association at the hearing and will be 
accompanied by Carl Olsen, San Francisco County Clerk. Our 
association takes no position on "State Funding of the Courts", 
but rather we would provide information which we believe is 
critical, should AB 1820 be amended and state funding become 
a reality. 
Sincerely, 
Of.cp~~ ~~~unty Clerk-Recorder 
JAS:deh 
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"Dedicated to Public Service" 
INTRODUCTION: 
The County Clerks 1 Association appreciates the opportunity to provi 
input regarding possible state funding of California trial courts. The 
Association has long recognized the fiscal problems facing the court system 
and the obvious disparity between revenues and costs. Based upon this 
concern, the Association sponsored AB 2361 during the 1980 session which 
became Chapter 1372. The increase in fees helped somewhat to a11eviate 
the shortfall between the cost of processing civil and probate cases and 
the filing fee. The deficit will grow after January 1, 1982, when SB 1152 
(Chapter 1049~ 1980 Stats.) goes into effect. This legislation exempts 
most subsequent probate, and some civil documents, from the $12.00 filing 
fee. As a result, the shortfall will widen next year and local government 
will be required to subsidize this workload to a greater extent. 
DISCUSSION: 
In your counsel's October 13, 198i letter, inviting our association to 
appear, three questions were posed regarding state funding: 
1. What costs ought to be included within the trial court budgets 
if state funding is to occur? 
2. How should the fines and forfeitures collected by the courts be 
distributed? 
3. How much authority should the state assume over job classifications, 
salary levels, and workload standards of trial court personnel? 
The County Clerks' Association takes no position on the desirability 
of state funding for trial courts. However, it wi11 provide fiscal data 




Therefore, our input addresses two options: (1) the situation remains 
status quo, i.e •• funding of separate superior, municipal, justice courts 
and county c1erks, and (2} the situation changes and courts are consolidated. 
CURRENT FUNDING SITUATION: 
The data presented below assumes that the state would leave the 
current orgdnization as is and only pick up the shortfall. It does not 
address the question of what to do with fines and forfeitures, other than 
continue the present distribution. 
Since it is difficult to obtain fiscal information regarding cost 
and revenue from any one source, the County Clerks' Association conducted 
a survey of the 58 counties and asked for the following information from • 
the FY 1980-81 budget: 
1. County cost of County Clerk, Superior, Municipal and Justice Courts. 
2. Total income generated. 
3. Net cost to the county. 
Based upon a 69% response rate, representing approximately 85% of 
the population (40 counties reporting), the following results were obtained: 
TOTAL COUNTY COST 
$315,829,043 
TOTAL COUNTY INCOME 
$153,102,178 
NET COUNTY COST 
$162,726,865 
The shortfall currently being subsidized by local government general 
funds for these 40 counties is $163 million. That is a "business as usual'' 
budget and does not consider additional and justified needs that have not 
' 
been funded. No attempt was made to cost out any new judicial positions 
and support staff that become effective January 1, 1982. 
For the missing 18 counties, an attempt was made to project net cost 
-2-
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by comparing them to counties similar in population and total case filings. 
This projection of net costs shows that another $26.4 million is being 
subsidized in these 18 counties. If the state desires to fund the trial 
courts and leave the current organization and fines and forfeiture distri-
bution as is, then it would cost an additional $190 million. 
POTENTIAL FUNDING SITUATION - CONSOLIDATED COURTS: 
Currently, there are two measures pet1ding in the legislature to 
consolidate trial courts, and the POST Commission report of 1978 
recommended some form of consolidation. The Association believes that 
the Assembly Judiciary Committee should not only consider "status quo" 
funding, but also costs that would be associated with consolidation. It~ 
is assumed that the question regarding the state's authority over job 
classifications, salary levels and workload standards of trial court 
personnel deals with possible consolidation. Therefore, the Association 
developed the hypothesis that all trial courts would be consolidated 
into one state-wide system. We did not consider the district attorney, 
public defender or probation functions as part of consolid~tion. Our 
cost estimates deal with those common features that would have to be 
funded to successfully consolidate the trial courts. 
1. One superior court - all judges elevated to 
~ superior court judge status with a 
boost in salary to that level 
2. Current court employees to become state employees 
under a uniform salary and benefit schedule 
3. -Central indexing to merge superior, municipal 
and justice court indicies 
4. Evening court schedule for selected counties 
(1 night per week) 
S. Increase in grand and trial court jurors pay, 
plus boost in mileage allowance 
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l Increase 





6. Increase in witness fees in criminal cases 
7. Ongoing overhead and implementation costs 
for the judicial council to manage unified 
court system 
8. Additional court reporters for courts with 
upgraded judges now handling cases requiring. 
a reporter 
9. Miscellaneous items, such as consolidating court 
file facilities, revising court forms, personnel 
training and new procedures development 
Total estimated additional costs to 
consolidate 
Current estimated shortfall subsidized 
by local government 
Increases include both start-up and ongoing costs 
3.0 mi11ion 
10.0 mill iom 
1 0. 0 mi 11 ion 




One item not covered by the Association's analysis is the problem of 
what happens to court facilities. Currently, they are maintained by 
counties, but if courts are to become the state's responsibility, what 
arrangements for their use would be made? Purchase? Lease? Left for 
counties to provide as a local expense? The problem of real estate is 
very significant and must be considered if the state decides to fund 
a consolidated court system. (No information was available to the 
Association to make a cost estimate on r~al estate.) 
CONCLUSION: 
From the data presented, it is apparent that the state would assume 
a new and costly burden if it decides to fund the trial courts. It would 
assume an even greater burden if it decides to fund a consolidated court. 
It does not appear that the state is in a position, at this time, to 
as~ume this responsibility, since the budget surplus is gone and a deficit 
is occurring. Although local government has been extremely frugal when 
dealing with courts' budgets, by and large courts are managing to 
accomplish the workload. 
-247-
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It may very well be true, as the Judicial Council points out thdt 
" ••. in view of fiscal pressures being exerted by boards of supervisors on 
the courts ••• ", it is necessary for the state to fund trial courts. It 
may also be true that funding would be adequate to include money to offset 
the current shortfall. However, it is also quite possible that with 
state funding, a resultant bureacracy would develop that would be less 
efficient than under the current system. 
Respectfully, 
A tj. _ J;~tn~ . A. Simpson hairman, Legislative Committee 
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STATEMENT OF SENATOR OMER L. RAINS BEFORE 
ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COW1ITTEE 
November 18, 1981 
EXHIBIT L 
Throughout most of our history, English common law systems have 
been self-supporting through court fees, fines, and forfeitures. 
While this has certain shortcomings in that it contributes to t 
public's suspicion of judicial bias in criminal matters, a 
critical feature in our form of government--judicial independence--
is strengthened when there is no reliance on other branches of 
government for essential funding. 
In California we have a particularly complex and unwieldy system 
of trial court financial support. Very little of court revenue 
(fees, fines, and forfeitures) actually goes to court operation. 
The lower courts, municipal and justice, are largely funded out 
of the general fund of each county, while the superior courts 
receive a greater share of state funding, and, finally, the 
appellate courts are wholly state funded. 
This rather convoluted funding equation raises certain basic 
questions: Does the need of lower court systems, and to an extent 
superior court systems, to appear before parochial Boards of 
Supervisors for the funds affect the quality of justice or ir 
judicial independence? The same question may be asked as to e 
appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, whi must depend 




A recent report preliminarily submitted to the National Institute 
for Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice of the LEAA now under-
going revision has concluded that among the examined nations, the 
United States, and in particular California, has dramatically 
fewer judges per population and yet strikingly greater numbers of 
lawyers per judge. Both factors obviously increase judicial 
workload. Also, as might be expected, California has a far 
greater number of both civil dispositions and filings per judge 
than other sampled countries, which included the U.S., England, 
Germany, and Sweden. Finally, the survey notes that California's 
judicial budge~ is about .20% of state income, while 
West Germany's for example, is nearly .30%. 
Moreover, other studies have illustrated that California is the 
lowest state in the union with respect to state funding of the 
court system, at 11.5% of the combined state-local expenditures 
for courts. 
It is no secret that in my opinion a unified trial court system is 
a fundamental step toward improving our delivery of justice 
services effectively and economically. (By that, I mean a 
uni rmly administered single trial court in each county.) In 
assessing the scope of court unification nationally, four or five 
factors are generally considered. Two of them (sometimes combined) 
relate to money: First, state funding (with fines and fees paid 
to the state treasury), and, Second, statewide unitary budgeting 
(that is, a judicial budget prepared centrally without executive 
branch review and oversight). 
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In this study the authors combined unitary budgeting and state 
financing as one factor; California received a score of 2, whi 
with the exception of Texas, was the lowest in the U.S. in 
connection with state funding of trial courts. Even so, we 
achieved a unification ratio of .38; that is, we are classified as 
38% unified. Incidentally, we also received a mid-range score 
the category of trial court consolidation, the result of our 1950 
elimination of police and city courts. 
I strongly favor state funding of our trial court system for two 
reasons: 
(1) The trial court system should be free from localized 
bureaucratic in-fighting in order to insure adequate 
funding of its operations. The judiciary can hardly 
be an independent, co-equal branch of government if 
it is beholden to 58 Boards of Supervisors. 
(2) Secondly, I believe the funding issue is inextricably 
linked to a truly unified court system. How can we 
ask counties to pay for courts if they are to be 
centrally administered and organized? Conversely, 
how can a properly unified trial court function if 
separately funded by 58 separate Boards of Supervisors? 
In conclusion, irrespective of the progress of my trial court 
reform measure, I will examine carefully the testimony presented 




revenues as set forth in Penal Code section 14b3 and other 
statutory provisions toward finding appropriate formulas to fund 
a truly independent judiciary while, at the same time, providing 
for fair support of those various objects of judicial bounty 
existent under the present system. 
I am aware of the great volume of research, negotiation, in-
ting and debate involved in the 1953 struggles to apportion 
in rior court fines and forfeitures after the 1950 court 
reorganization plan. I expect that many of the points made then 
w 11 be made again today, and properly should be heard. It would 
seem to me, at the very least, that the current formulas, 
admittedly political compromises, are complicated and difficult to 
administer. Indeed, I suspect that no one fully understands how 
the courts or other recipients are really financed. If my 
suspicions are correct and if, indeed, we do not understand the 
subject matter fully, I would propose that a major survey and study 
undertaken once again to insure that it is fully understood. 
SOURCES: 
B ar, Carl. Separate but Subservient: Court Budgeting in the 
American States. National Center for State Courts. 
Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1975. 
Johnson, Earl, Jr. and Ann Barthelmes Drew, "This Nation Has 
Money for Everything--Except Courts," The Judges Journal 8 
(1981). 
Torr, G. Alan. ''Court Unification and Court Performance: A 
Preliminary Assessment,'' 64 Judicature 356 (March 1981). 
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EXHIBIT M 
TESTIMONY OF THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 
INTERIM HEARING ON STATE FUNDING OF TRIAL COURTS 
ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 
NOVEMBER 18, 1981 
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 
Your Committee's hearing is focused on three specific questions 
which relate to the main issue before you: Should the State assume funding 
of trial courts? Our testimony today will provide the County of San Diego's 
response to each of these questions from two perspectives--first, from 
the perspective that the State does assume funding of trial courts and 
secondly, from the perspective that court funding remains primarily a 
county responsibility. 
Before outlining our response to each of the specific questions, 
v.Je would like to provide some comments on the central issue: State funding 
of trial courts. As indicated in your hearing notice, AB 1820 (Berman) 
and this hearing have been prompted by concerns of the State Judicial 
Council. Specifically, the Judicial Council advocates State funding of 
trial courts ''in view of fiscal pressure exerted by boards of supervisors 
on the courts ... (which) threaten ... the ability of the court system, as a 
separate branch of government, to carry out its constitutionally mandated 
responsibilities." 
We would agree, counties are exerting fiscal pressures on the courts. 
But this fiscal pressure is no more, and actually considerably less, than 
the fiscal pressures that are of necessity being exerted on all levels of 
county funded programs and services. The fact of life is that we in 
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government, at all levels and in all branches, do not have the abundance 
of revenue we have had in years past. And, at least on the local level, 
the situation has gone beyond cutting out the services and programs whicl1 
are not essential. It has progressed to the point that we must streamline, 
and deliver essential services and programs more economically. 
Why then should the courts be exempted from the real fiscal pres-
sures that the rest of the government is experiencing? More importantly, 
can they be exempted? We think the answer is NO, whether the courts are 
funded by the State or by the counties. It is somewhat shortsighted to 
believe that changing the source of funding will remove the courts from 
fiscal pressure. The courts, and the criminal justice system as a whole, 
must share in the fiscal pressures all of us in government face and share 
in our responsibility to streamline and economize our systems of government. 
We would point out to your Committee, that the courts in San Diego 
County have acknowledged the fiscal problems of the County and have accepted 
responsibility for streamlining and economizing their operations to the 
extent possible under existing law in response to these fiscal problems. 
For example, our four Municipal Court districts have been successfully 
working together, and with the County, to standardize forms and procedures. 
and personnel policies. Moreover, they have participated, also quite suc-
cessfully, in an experiment by which the Municipal Court judges sit as 
Superior Court judges for certain types of cases. This experiment has 
assisted significantly in reducing the backlog of our Superior Court. 
Finally, as Judicial Council statistics will show, the judges in our 
County have one of the highest case1oad per judge in the entire State. Our 
courts are to be congratulated for these efforts. 
In concluding on this central issue, it is the San Diego County 
Board of Supervisors 1 position that the operation of the judiciary and the 
riminal justice system has been traditionally a matter of statewide 
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concern. The Statt~ for the most part 111andates th(~ procr:dut·c":; and opr'tdl ion 
of the judicial system and even the lcve·l oF stJffin~J. Until UH· pct•;•_,.i(J(' o 
SB 90, counties had little or no control over the courts. Our sole role 
vJas to come up with the money. , SB 90 gave counties some control over the 
growth in the courts• budgets. As a result of Proposition 13, we have had 
to use that control, and have exercised it in a responsible fashion, mind-
ful of the need to protect the judicial system as a constitutional right 
for all our citize~s. 
Nonetheless, the San Diego County Board of Supervisors does support 
the transfer of responsibility for funding the trial court system from the 
counties to the State. California presently provides the lowest percen 
of State aid to the trial court syste~ of any state. Because the tri 
courts are subdivisions of the State judicial system, State financing is 
entirely appropriate and will serve to provide greater uniformity in the 
delivery of justice v1ithin the State. 
With that we will now respond to the three specific questions posed 
by your Committee. 
State funding is to occur? 
Appended to our testimony is an outline of San Diego County's 
net costs for the operation of the criminal justice system in 
1980-81. This outline also generally details the judicial re-
lated programs you ought to consider in answeri the on: 
What costs should be included if State funding occurs? If 
State is to assume funding on the premise that the process 
justice is of statewide concern, then by necessity you s ld 
t 
process. It is not just the trie1 courts judges t 




people's prosecutors (DA); the provision of pre-sentencing in-
vestigation sel'Vices by ~wob,1tion l'ffil:,•r'~~ th,, pl'llvi-.it'll (d 
facilities to house persons found to be a threat to our society. 
2. How should fines and forfeitures collected by the courts be 
distributed? 
If the State assumes responsibility for funding the trial court 
system, 'i/e V/ould support distribution of a port·ion of the fine:~ 
and forfeitures to the State. But, you should be aware, that 
the revenues now derived from fines and forfeitures do not go 
solely into support of the trial court system. To the contrary, 
the largest percentage of ~hese revenues go into the general 
funds of cities. For example, in San Diego County, the cities 
receive approximately 79% of all the fines and forfeitures col-
lected and individual cities get up to 94% of the fines and 
forfeitures collected within their boundaries. In addition, the 
County uses a portion of its small percentage in support of the 
law enforcement programs of the Sheriff as well as the trial 
courts. 
Therefore, if the State assumes trial court funding we \vould 
support transfer to the State of that portion of the County's 
share of fines and forfeitures that is used to suport the courts 
and in addition a portion of the cities' share of these revenues. 
If the State does not assume trial court funding, we would also 
argue that the distribution of fines and forfeitures should be 
changed so that counties get a greater share more properly re-
flecting our court costs in processing the fines and forfeitures. 
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3. }jolt/_Jl~u_c_b_autho~j_i~y_ sh.oul_i_the State assume __ _r_jSJh cl il •, fie.~ 
tion, salary 1eve1s, and \'/Orkload standards of trial _c~_urt 
personnel? 
If the State assumes. trial court costs, then you should also 
assume (retain) total authorityand responsibility for court 
personnel. We wholehearted1y believe that financial responsi-
bility and budgetary control must go hand in hand. 
That hc~s not been the historical situation with r·ega tu 
trial courts wherein, prior to SB 90, you, the State, d eta 
the budget in effect and we, the counties, had the financial 
responsibility. SB 90 changed that situation by requir·ing t 
the State pay the costs of"any new or additional mandates on 
local government. As a result of SB 90, we now go through a 
process each year in which the courts plead their needs to you 
and you extract SB 90 waivers from us. We can only warn you 
that because of Proposition 13 and our total fiscal and servi 
responsibilities to our taxpayers, the waivers will beg 
lc•ss and lc)ss frequently. If the tr'iLI-1 cout"ts n:~:1~1in 
County's financial responsibility, we will and must exert 
budgetary control prerogative \ve now have as a result of SB 90. 
Moreover, we will propose and support legislation that gives 
counties tota1 control over court staffing. 
/1,s stated earlier in this testimony, the courts and the cri na1 
justice system as a whole must share in the fiscal pressures all 1 s of 
cJOVl'l'llllll'nt face. The ci'iminal justice system as \\fell as our systems for 
ice and re protection, water 
-258-
and sewer, must find and accomplish ways to streamline and economize. 
s challenge reaches all l('Ve1s and brM\ChPS of H11\t'l'liillt'li!; lhlllt' c.tll til' 
should be exempted. 
Thank you. 
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NET COUNTY COSTS - JUSTICE/PUBLIC PROTECTION 
1977-78 1978-79 ! 1979-80 1980-81 I 
AC'rUAL ACTUAL ~TUAL BUDGETED 
~ % % 9- % 0 Criminal • # ::--:~ce I 
Planning Xf Xf 8,477 0.01 18,708 0.02 
Super ,~ ', -:- t 4,638,947 7.3 3,881,494 6.6 3,350,159 4.7 3,975,196 5.0 
Ylunic 1 /~--: ·..2rts 9,322,587 14.7 6,721,493 
I 
11.5 6,071,508 B.S 7,006,963 8.9 
Sheriff 21,113,007 33.2 21,100,795 36.1 26,147,368 36.8 30,620,021 38.8 
Yiarsha1 3,355,598 5.3 3,366,977 5.8 4,036,739 5.7 4,592,041 5.8 
Grand Jur:J 127,277 0.2 l 
112,292 0.2 128,792 0.2 130,000 0.2 
::ounty Cle;:-1: 1,065,156 1.7 1,244,924 2.1 1,178,195 1.7 1,668,326 2.1 
Di ct r. ·: torney 2,711,594 4.3 2,757,284 4.7 4,376,490 
I 
l 6.2 5,728,320 7.3 
Jffice of 0efender 
Services ~ 10,826 0.01 329,056 0.6 4,541,462 6.4 4,503,905 5.7 
Probat 1,252,901 33.4 18,981,806 32.4 21,249,619 29.9 
20,735,649 26.3 
63,597,893 jlOO .1 1 ss,499,121 j100. 0 
I 
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TESTIMONY BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 
November • 1981 
I am John McCamman, Administrative Analyst for Sonoma County. I am 
here today representing the County Supervisors Association of Cali a 
(CSAC). As a representative of the unit of government wi '1 the 
responsibility for funding the operation of the trial co1Jrts, CSAC has 
a long history of interest in the three specific questions posed in your 
counsel's letter inviting testimony. 
Some general remarks are in order before addressing the specific 
questions. The level of funding necessary to adequately operate the 
trial courts has been a matter of on-going debate in California's 58 
counties. The courts are but a single budget area. t1any counties report 
that court budgets have been growing at a faster rate than any other budget 
item. The causes of this cost increase are multi-fold, but one contributing 
factor has been the traditional failure of judges to recognize the need 
to operate efficiently. 
The budget restrictions and revenue reductions of recent years have 
resulted in funding limits for all county departments and agencies. The 
courts, like other departments, have been pressured by boards of super-
visors to d the line. The courts need to acknowledge the fiscal 
problems that beset all levels of government and to undertake 
efforts to operate more ciently. More efficient operation will 
probably not result in reduced levels of ng, but it could provide 
a basis for avoiding future cost increases and could provide an opportun 
to direct existing funds at the more critical areas within the courts. 
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE President QUENTIN L. KQPP, C1ty & County oi San FranCISCO filS! V1ce P•es1dent, THERESA COOK, Placer 
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Sacramento Office 
Washington Office 
I #201, 11th & L Bldg. Sacramento, CA 95814 915144'1-4011 
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As you know, the issue of state financing of the trial courts presents 
~yriad of complex issues and problems. The courts are a constitutionally 
separate branch of government. They are primarily funded by the counties. 
1he current staffing levels are dictated by the Legislature. The interplay 
between the different branches and different levels of government ensures 
that there is no simple solution to the issues being addressed today. 
CSAC favors a court system that is funded by the sta '"" and administered 
by the counties. Such a system would be less expensive than a state-
administered system, which would include uniform salu.ry levels statewide, 
nd its cost would be equitably distributed through the state general fund. 
A st<Jte financed system would probably result in closer scrutiny of judicidl 
budgets and would probably result in increased efforts to streamline the 
operation and practices of courts. 
I would now like to address the specific questions that were posed in 
your counsel's letter. I will not present cost figures, since costs have 
been outlined by the Legislative Analyst, the Judicial Council, and the 
County, Clerks Association. 
CSAC feels that, at a minimum, those costs related to the immediate 
support of the courts should be included in a state funding effort. Such 
costs would include salaries and benefits of judges, clerks, and bailiffs, 
as we11 as facilities costs. In addition, such costs should probably 
nclude probation pre-sentence responsibilities. These costs are directly 
and mmediately related to the operation of the trial courts. 
Other costs that have been suggested as potential state costs include 
:Jrosecution and public defense costs. Since these are currently services 
funded by the counties, the counties would certainly welcome having the 
tate relieve them of this financial portion as well. We recognize that 
~urrent finances would likely preclude such costs from being included 
in a state financing effort. 
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Earlier discussions of the issues before this committee today have 
resulted in the suggestion that state financing be limited to judicial 
salaries. In our view, such an approach would do little to put a brake on 
the escalating cost of operating the courts. The courts are a system and 
the state should recognize that the personnel needed to support judges are 
an integral part of the system. 
The question of distribution of fines and forfeiture' monies is 
difficult. Although CSAC's membership has not been polled on this issue, 
it is likely that, if the counties were relieved of t:1e burden of funding 
the immediate court support operation, they would gladly give up their 
portion of the fines and forfeitures. However, there are other points that 
must be considered in this area. First, the fine and forfeiture money has 
traditionally not been earmarked for court support. It has been directed 
toward law enforcement and road maintenance. Second, cities receive more 
in fine and forfeiture money than counties, although the courts are funded 
by the counties. It is unlikely that cities would willingly give up their 
portion of such monies. Third, if the state elects to take the fine and 
forfeiture monies, it should not limit the level of state funding to that 
amount recaptured through fines and forfeitures. Such a limitation would 
me~ly be a shell game and would not address the issue of escalating court 
costs. Fourth, taking the fines and forfeitures for court support raises 
the issue of jeopardizing the impartiality of the judiciary. 
The authority to control job classifications, salary levels and workload 
s:ructure should be a function of which services the state finances. If the 
s:;te is willing to pick up all the costs of operating the courts, then it 
s~:~ld have complete control over staffing levels and practices. If the 
st~te does not assume financial responsibility for all court personnel, it 
sr.:J1d give the responsibility to the counties. To do otherwise would 
es:ablish a potential for having different staffing and workload standards 
fc.·· court employees than for other employees in a similar classification. 
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y ary ttee Testimony 
:ng s ng ty tll budgetary responsibilities will result 
co>1s ·j s tent phi osophy and po 1 icy governing the operation of the 
my prepared remarks. I • ..rish to thank the Cornittee 
to appear today. and I will be happy to respond to any 
that you may have. 
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November 17, 1981 
LOS ANGELES, CALIF"ORNIA 90012 
F"RANK S. ZOI..IN, EXECUTIVE OFFICER 
Hon. Elihu M. Harris 
Chairman, Assembly Cormnittee on Judiciary 
California State Legislature 
State Capitol 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
STATE FUNDING OF TRIAL COURTS 
Dear Assemblyman Harris: 
EXHIBIT 0 
TELEPHONE 
12131 97 4-5401 
Thank you for inviting my testimony at your interim hearing 
on State financing of trial courts. This is a timely issue 
because present constraints on county revenues have severely 
limited the capability of co~nties to finance minimal levels 
of mandatory trial court services. 
These financial constraints are also likely to prevent the 
funding of anticipated and necessary expansion of California's 
trial courts during the 1980's because costs are increasing 
faster than revenues. 
Present State Financial Support is Minimal 
Increased State financial support of trial court operations 
is required to insure public access to the courts. As you 
know, State financial support of superior court operations 
is presently limited to: 
A. Funding all but $9,500 of a superior court judge's salary 
which is presently $62,670; 
B. Funding judges' retirement (8% of salary); 
C. Provision of a $60,000 block grant for each superior 
court judge authorized after passage of SB 90. 
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All other superior court costs are funded by county govern-
ment. 
State financial support of municipal courts is limited to 
funding judges' retirement (8% of salary). 
The last definitive studies of trial court costs were 
contained in Task Force Reports No. I-ll and III-18 submitted 
to the Post Commission on Government Reform established after 
passa?e of Proposition 13. Those reports indicated that the 
State s share of trial court operational costs in 1978-79 
was only $35.2 million or about 8.6% as compared to the 
counties' share of $375.8 million or 91.4%. 
Presumably, trial court operational costs now exceed 
$500 million and the State and county shares have remained 
approximately the same. 
The task force reports indicate that during 1978-79,trial 
court revenues collected-by counties totaled about $139.6 
million. Thus, net county costs (total county expenditures 
less revenue) equalled approximately $236.2 million. The 
State collected a total of $42.8 million from trial court 
revenues in 1978-79 which resulted in a surplus of $7.6 
million over the $35.2 million contributed to trial court 
operations. 
A study conducted by the National Center for State Courts in 
80 determined that 35 of the 50 states fund 25% or more of 
court operational costs. California is among the lowest of 
the 15 states which provide less than 25% of the total 
operational costs of the state court system. 
Future Growth Requires Additional Funding 
Caseload projections for the Los Angeles Superior Court 
indicate that a total of 300 judicial officers will be 
required in 1990. This represents an increase during the 
next nine years of 39 judges or about 15% over the Court's 
present authorized complement of 261 judicial officers. 
Based on past experience,this projected increase-- which 
averages less than 2% per year -- may be conservative. 
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Presumably, superior and municipal courts in California 
are experiencing similar growth patterns. Consequently, 
plans must be developed to finance State-wide trial court 
expansion in the neighborhood of 15%. The latest information 
available to me indicates that number of judicial o 
authorized for California's trial courts totals 1, 3. 
total is broken down as follows: 
Judges Commissioners Referees 
Superior Court 628 74 24 726 
Municipal t 488 71 9 568 
Justice Court 99 99 
Grand Total l ' 
A 15% increase trial court judicial officers would 
necessitate the provision of~about 210 additional judges 
by 1990 at a cost of roughly $52.5 llion. 
A State Subsidy or Block Grant Program with a Built-in 
Cost-of-Living Increase is Recommended 
The Post Commission reviewed five ions for transferring 
program responsibi and/or respons lity 
3 
the trial court system from s to the State. Although 
the Post Commiss generally the State should 
provide financial support to partially or totally 
relieve counties of their current responsibilities to fund 
trial courts, no specific program was recommended. 
After reviewing 
I recommend that 
tier block grant 
increase to support 
options considered by the Post Commission 
Committee consider provision of a two-
a lt- living 
trial court 
A block grant program providing 
superior court judicial officer 
$145.2 million revenue for counties. 
Consumer Price Index, should 
1 increases to keep 
-270-
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A block grant of $100,000 per year for every municipal and 
justice court judicial officer, with the same cost-of-living 
adjustment formula, would generate an additional $66.7 million. 
A two-tier block grant program -- $200,000 and $100,000 for 
superior and municipal/justice court judicial officers 
respectively -- is recommended in lieu of a uniform block 
grant because municipal and justice courts produce 
substantially more revenue, particularly from traffic fines 
and forfeitures. Provision of a single block grant would 
either underfinance superior courts which have historically 
been more dependent upon property tax financing through county 
general funds or overfinance municipal courts which are now 
largely supported by fines and forfeitures. 
The data provided in the Post Commission reports summarized 
above indicate that net county costs for trial courts in 
California totaled about $236.2 million in 1978-79. Assuming 
net county costs now approach $300 million the recommended 
block grant program would produce a total of $211.9 million 
and fund about two-thirds o~the costs now borne by the 
county general fund. 
It is recommended that counties retain financial responsibility 
to fund about one-third of the net operational costs for trial 
courts because: 
a. It provides a financial incentive to keep costs down; 
b. It provides incentives to generate additional user fees 
to establish a more appropriate balance between tax 
financing and user financing of court operations; 
c. It establishes a more equitable financial partnership 
between the State and counties than the present cost 
distribution. Under this proposal counties will retain 
financial responsibility to provide and maintain court 
facilities, and provide administrative support services 
(such as personnel, accounting, computer, purchasing, 
communications, etc.) which are not fully reflected in 
the estimated operational costs of trial courts. 
Considering total direct and indirect costs this block 
grant proposal approximates a roughly equal division of 
costs between the State and the county -- not considering 
county costs for prosecution, defense, probation, prisoner 
transportation, etc. 
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Administrative Advantages of the Block Grant Program 
I strongly recommend a program of block grants in favor of 
other options previously considered for the following reasons: 
1. A block grant program maintains home rule and respons ss 
to community needs; 
2. A block grant program retains theeffective and effi t 
coordination of fiscal and operational planning by all 
justice agencies -- courts, prosecution, defense, 
probation, law enforcement. A state "buy out" would 
disrupt these relationships and adversely affect operations; 
3. A block grant program is easily administered by the state 
because it merely represents an expansion of the block 
grant provided superior courts since the passage of SB 90; 
4. A block grant program does not impose any organization or 
administrative changes. Current personnel and retirement 
systerr will remain in p1.ace. Existing revenue distribution 
will be unchanged; 
5. A block grant program imposes less cost on the state than a 
total buy out. Based on the rough calculationsin this 
report a total state buy out would cost about $300 million 
as compared with $211.9 million. The state would also 
incur additional costs resulting from the equalizat 
of court employees' salaries and their inclusion in 
state retirement system; 
6. The concept of state financing of trial court operations 
through subvention or block grants was endorsed by the 
California Judges Association in December, 1978; 
7. The concept of state financing of trial court operations 
through subvention block grants was endorsed by the 
Superior Court Administrations Association of Cali a 
in November, 1978; 
8. The County Clerks' Association of California endorsed 
concept of a state subvention or block grants in December, 
1978; 
9. The Los Angeles County Judicial Procedures Commission 
endorsed the concept in May, 1976. 
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In summary, I recommend adoption of a block grant program as 
the most cost-effective and easily administered method of 
providing state financing for trial court operations. 
Admittedly, the calculations in this report are rough and 
require refinement, but I believe they are basically correct 
and demonstrate the greater utility and effectiveness of a 
block grant program compared with alternative methods of 
state financing. 
Committee Questions 
You requested responses to the following three questions. 
1. What costs ought to be included within trial court budgets 
if state funding is to occur. 
I believe costs elements should be approached incrementally, 
beginning with courtroom staff and expanding to cover 
direct support services and then indirect services that 
are provided uniformly by all trial courts. For example: 
Courtroom costs include: 
judicial officer salaries 
courtroom clerk salaries 
court reporter salaries 
bailiff salaries 
supplies 
libraries and equipment 
Direct support includes: 
court clerk filing and record keeping operations 
judicial secretaries and other clerical support 
jury staff, jury fees and mileage 
court interpreter costs 
law clerks 
Indirect support includes: 
-- administrative personnel 
-- psychiatric fees 
The cost elements listed above are not intended to represent 
a complete listing of all costs that fall within these 
categories. They are illustrative, however, of costs 
that can be appropriately funded by the state. 
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Special programs such as Conciliation Court and Own 
Recognizance release should be excluded because they are 
not uniformly provided by all trial courts. 
2. How should the fines and forfeitures collected by courts 
be distributed? 
This is an extremely complex question which can only be 
answered in relation to the level of state funding to be 
provided. If the state opts to fully finance trial court 
operations, all fines and forfeitures now collected by 
counties should revert to the state. If a block grant 
program is provided as recommended in this letter the 
distribution of revenues would remain unchanged. Other 
alternatives may justify a redistribution of revenues. 
3. How much authority should the state assume over job 
classifications, salar levels and workload standards of 
trial court personne ? 
Once again, the answer tb this question depends upon 
level of state financial assistance. Under a complete 
state "buy out" it would probably be necessary for 1 
court employees to become state employees. This would 
require the establishment of a state-administered court 
personnel system. Under such a plan a uniform system of 
classification and pay would have to be established. This 
would probably increase salary expenditures because 
tendency would be to establish uniform salaries close to 
or at the highest levels now paid to most classifications. 
This would probably require the inclusion of court 
employees in the state retirement system. 
In addition, a mechanism must be established to negotiate 
with court employee unions and establish workload standards, 
conditions of employment, etc. 
The block grant program I recommend would leave present 
personnel systems in place without change. 
Obviously, there are several alternatives to the two 
options I discussed regarding state responsibility to 
court personnel administration. 
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, I wish to thank you for the opportunity to 
~estify before your Committee. I hope my recommendation to 
establish a block grant program to finance trial court 
operations will assist your Committee in its deliberations. 
If I can provide additional information or be of further 
assistance, please do not hesitate to call upon me. 
Very truly yours, 
ftMaiL~ .· 
Frank Zol n 
Executive Officer 
FZ:ls 
cc: Presiding Judge David N. Eagleson 
Assistant Presiding Judge Harry V. Peetris 
Each Supervisor 
Chief Administrative Officer Harry L. Hufford 
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RALPH N. KLEPS 
COUNSELOR- LAW AND COURT MANAGEMENT 
P.O. BOX 31509 
S·AN FRANCISCO, CA 94131 
Assembly Judiciary Committee 
Hearing on State Funding of Trial Courts (A. B. 1820) 
San Francisco, Calif. 
November 18, 1981 
Statement by Ralph N. Kleps ~/ 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 
EXHIBIT P 
LE.GIBLATIVC COUNSEL f" CALif. 
ADMIN. OlRECTOR OF CALif. 
COURTS h96l~77} 
1 appreciate the invitation to appear here today. 
This is not, l might say, the first time I have appeared before 
a committee of the California Legislature although I have not done 
so recently. During a long career in state service I may have 
made hundreds of such appearances, dating back to my days in 
the drafting of the California Administrative Procedure Act, to my 
service .as Legislative Counsel and to my 16 years as the first 
Administrative Director of the California Courts. Yet, this is a 
first for me! It is the first time I have appeared in a California 
legislative hearing as a private citizen. I wondered, in fact, 
whether a personal point of view could have any bearing on the 
kind of topic you have laid out for yourselves here today. But 
your counsel and I finally agreed that, at least as to the back-
ground of the problem, a brief stateme·nt might be helpful and l 
hope that proves to be true. 
I. 
The questions posed by this hearing would not have 
been asked during the first 120 years of California's history. 
We have a trial court system that grew· out of the needs of people 
in their own localities. Both by history and by tradition, a conviction 
*I Summary of qualifications attached. 
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that trial courts should be instruments of local government is deeply 
rooted in the fabric of our society. It is true, of courSt', HHtt 
you can find many authoritative pronouncements to the· effect that 
we have a "state judicial system." For example, it has always 
been apparent that both the structure of the trial courts and their 
basic operating procedures come from state law. The Constitution 
has always prescribed the system's fundamentals, and state 
statutes have always regulated trial court procedure, to a greater 
degree in fact than in most states. Anyone who leafs through 
the Code of Civil Procedure, the Probate Code, the Evidence Code 
or Title 8 of the Government Code will have no difficulty in agreeing 
that state government plays a deteriminative role in establishing 
our trial court system. But that is the extent to which what we 
I 
have can be called a "state trial court system." 
And, after one gets past the fundamentals and the 
generalities, the situation looks far different. Taking judges 
as the starting point: it is true that they a're state officers, but 
upon occasion they have also been classified as local officials for 
particular purposes. So long, in fact, as they depend upon local 
elections for their teilure in office, local concerns will continue to 
outweigh state policies in their thinking. But beyond the judges, 
the support staffs upon which they depend and the facilities that 
are necessary for their success are, and always have been, the 
responsibility of local governments. In their daily operations, 
in fact, the trial courts· are subjected to the budget forces and 
processes that apply to county government generally. 
II. 
So, when we come to the area of today's inquiry, that 
is, to iiwestigating the state's financial interest in the operation 
of the trial courts, we have a pretty clear picture. Although 
the state's share in financing has been rising modestly in recent 
years, it still remains a minor element in the equation. I note 
that the 1975 Cobey Commission reported that California's state 
share ·in financing the trial courts was the lowest among the 
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among the 50 states at that time. contribution has· been rated 
for many years at abot;tt 11 percent of the. total operating costs 
for the trial courts. Historically, the state has limited its 
financial support for trial courts to the provision of some (but 
not all) judicial salaries, to financing a 1udicial retirement system 
for most (but not all) judges, and to appropriating funds for programs 
of special state interest almost on a case-by-case basis. For 
example, when it was necessary in 1974 to create a travelling 
"circuit judge" program at the justice court level, the state 
picked up the costs. In 1975, when an educational program for 
trial court judges was needed, the state assumed the cost. 
Similarly, the state has accepted a portion of the cost of establish-
ing new superior courts under its program for reimbursing local 
governments for "state mandated costs" imposed upon them by new 
legislation. 
To the extent that the state's sharing in trial court 
costs goes beyond judicial salaries and judicial retirement contributions, 
the increases have taken place within the past 10 years or so, 
for the most part. And it cannot be said that have made 
any significant change in the level of state funding for the trial 
courts. All of these factors illustrate why I say that today' s 
q_\Jestions about the appropriate level of state funding for trial 
courts would not even have been asked prior to 1970 or so. 
California's history in this regard is not dissimilar 
from that of most states. A new and different approach was taken, 
however, when Alaska and Hawaii became the 49th and 50th states 
of the Union. As part of statehood planning, it was determined 
in both instances that the entire judicial system should be a 
responsibility of state government, and thus both systems were 
set up to be funded and administered by the state. Since then 
states, led by Illinois, Colorado and Idaho, have been 
influenced by this approach and have taken major steps in that 
direction. lt should be remembered, of course, that the two nf'w 
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states worked with, a clean slate and came out of a background 
in which before statehood the Federal Government had providt~d 
all of the judicial services. The new state-administered judicial 
systems were small and a relatively simple takeover of what had 
previously existed was all that was involved. 
During the 1970 • s, as a result of these new developments, 
a nationwide momentum developed for the "unification" of state court 
systems, a movement in which a major element was full state 
funding of the trial courts. The Cobey Commission Report, for 
example, notPd that virtually all recent court improV{'ment studi0s 
throughout the nation had endorsed "court unification" of one sort 
or another. An excellent summary of the unification movement 
(Berkson and Carbon) states that state funding is almost always 
included in unification proposals and is usually accompanied by 
increased state supervision and administration of the trial courts. 
In fact, relief for the local taxpayers furnished what was perhaps 
the major incentive behind unification proposals in a number of 
states. So we should not be surprised that any inquiry into increased 
funding for trial courts leads inevitably into a consideration of 
how such an increase can be combined with better administration 
of th<· courts. (See, my column: "State Funding as the Moving 
Force for the Consolidation of Trial Court Districts," L.A. Daily 
Mar. 26, 1979, attached.) 
California has not ignored these questions during the 
st decade, but it certainly has been unable to come up with 
acceptable answers. Judiciary cor:nmittees of both the Senate 
and the Assembly have had these issues before them continuously 
since 1972. ln that year the Legislature was confronted with three 
major ptoposals in this field, all of which were referred for 
further study. This is the background that l would like to review 
for you in some detail because l think it illustrates the intractable 
nature of the problem. lt was intractable, incidentally, when the 
o.l;!lc had a substantial surplus, and i't will be even more so 
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now that state fiscal experts are projecting a $750 million or so 
deficit in the state's 1981-82 budget. 
III. 
In 1969 I was responsible for securing a Federal 
Highway Safety Administration grant some $200,000 that funded 
a two year consultant study of the structure and operation of Calif-
ornia's municipal and justice courts. The Highway Safety Admin-
istration was only interested in the traffic court aspect of our 
problem, of course, but that fit nicely into the priorities of· the 
judicial leadership of that day. We wanted to pursue and obtain 
further reductions in the 300-plus judicial districts that still 
remained after the· sustained attack that had been mounted in the 
1950's on the 700-p lus than then existed. The Booz, Allen and 
Hamilton Lower Court Study was due in late 1971, and it came to 
us with a recommendation for a 58 unit, county-based lower court 
system. Insofar as state assumption of lower court costs was 
concerned, it contemplated only a state pickup of the s costs 
for all judges, commissioners and administrators. The 
Council of that day accepted the recommendation and, in the 1972 
legislative session, bills that would have carried out the substance 
of the proposal were introduced on its behalf by Senator Donald 
Grunsky, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Senate 
member of the Judicial Council. 
the meantime, Assemblyman James Hayes who was 
Chairman of the Assembly Judiciary Committee and the Assembly 
member of the Judicial Council, has already committed himself in 
1971 to the concept of a fully-unified, state-funded single trial 
court." He was, needless to say, disappointed with the Council's 
opposition to his 1971 bill (on the ground that it was premature 
in the face of a pending study) and with the limited nature of 
the Council's 1972 lower court proposal. In each house the 
riv;d plans n'Ct' v~'d favorable recommr·nclation'3 from both the 
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and fiscal committees, but in both instances the proposals were 
defeated on the floor. 
But that doesn't complete the story. In early 1971 
Governor Reagan suggested to then-Chief Justice Donald Wright that 
an intensive study should b~ made of the causes of trial delay 
in California. This resulted in the appointment of a Select Committee 
on Trial Court Delay, representing the Governor, the Chief Justice 
and the State Bar - each of whom designated three members of 
the committee. It made a number of operational recommendations 
in its 1972 report and spent a major part of its effort on the 
question of whether a "unified trial court" was possible in California. 
It obtained a $38,900 LEAA Federal grant through the GoVernor's 
Office and undertook a study of the problem. Relying on the 
expertise that Booz, Allen and Hamilton had acquired in its two 
year examination of the lower courts of the state, it hired the 
consulting firm to do a four month study of the feasibility of 
creating a unified trial court in this state. The consultant 
recommended such action and the Select Committee approved the 
proposal. Bills were introduced in the Senate on behalf of the 
committee but, after the failure of the Council-proposed lower court 
reorganization and the Hayes single trial court proposal, the Select 
Committee's recommendation went to interim study also. 
This complicated background of nine years ago laid 
foundation for a still-continuing interest in the dual problems 
of trial court reorganization and state funding. The Judicial 
Council considered the matter in depth in late 1973 and prepared 
a 1974 proposal that would have created a two-level, unified trial 
court system. In that proposal state financing ·would have been 
limited to the payment of the salaries of jL:dges and commissioners, 
consistently with the Council's earlier lower court proposal. By 
March of 1974, however, after intensive discussions with the judges 
and lawyers of the state, it was decided that there was no point 
in pur:suing the matter at that time. The Council was unable, 
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in fact, to secure ·the support of a majority of either the judges 
or lawyers of the state with whom the matter was discussed. 
Senator Alfred Song, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary. Committee, 
continued his interest in the matter, however, by sponsoring the 
1974 resolution under which the Cobey Commission was organized 
and under which it prepared its 1975 report. 
IV. 
The later chapters of this story were written almost 
entirely within the legislative environment. The 1975 Legisla-
ture did not deal kindly with the Cobey Commission's proposals; 
n0r did the 1976 Legislature show much interest in a proposal for 
a two-level, unified trial court with state funding of judicial salaries 
that the Judicial Council and the State Bar were agreed upon. 
A similar result followed in 1979-80 with respect to unification bills 
offered in the Senate, and as I read the newspaper comment on 
the current proposal offered by Senator Omar Rains, the opposition 
seems to be following a familiar pattern. 
At this point, after some ten years of continuing 
debate on the issue, it seems to me that most knowledgeable observers 
will agree that there is simply insufficient support for the concept 
of trial court unification to make it a feasible option for California. 
On the positive side, however, it should be noted that during the 
1974-1975 p~ricxi,when all of this unification discussion was at its 
height, California did manage to accomplish a complete reorganization 
of the justice court system, with state for those justice 
courts whose judges were designated to serve as "circuit riders." 
The 1978 passage of Proposition 13 raised the funding 
issue from a somewhat different point of view. Within four days 
after the June primary election at which the proposition was 
the Judicial Council met to urge that the state take over from the 
counties the funding of trial courts at a cost of some $300. million. 
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So far as 1 can ~certain, this funding shift was not accompanit'd 
by any proposals for ctJ.ange in the structure or administration 
of the trial courts. lt was simply designed to highlight one of 
the possible options that could be used in the crisis-like effort 
to "bail out" local governments in the aftermath of the revenue 
loss that was certain to hit them under Proposition 13. 
This particular option for shifting governmental costs 
was adopted by the Post Commission, an advisory body set up by 
Governor Brown to devise possible ways to meetthe revenue problems 
inherent in Proposition 13. The commission suggested a "transfer 
to the state of full financial responsibility for the superior, municipal 
and justice courts but [with] retention of administration at the 
local level." The Post Commission calculated a $375 millicm cost for 
this· shift which, although it sounds substantial, constituted only 
about nine percent of the $4.1 billion that the commission was dealing 
with. In the end, neither the Governor nor the Legislature paid 
much attention to the commission's recommendation in this respect. 
"Bail-out" legislation was passed in that, and succeeding sessions 1 
that dealt primarily with educational and welfare costs of the counties 
and had no concern for the problem that concerns us here today. 
v. 
Coming to the present, it is my understanding that the 
1981 Judicial Council requested that Mr. Berman introduce A. B. 
1820 in the form of what we used to call a "spot bill." Its 
purpose, I assume, was to trigger a further inquiry into the issues 
of trial court organization and funding which have been studied 
so intensively in the past. In the light of the background I 
have sketched for you, you can understand why I could not recommend 
an ambitious program of court unification and state funding to 
you. I do not believe that there is much support for trial court 
unification in the bench or bar of the· state, and I believe that 
a sirnplP switch in funding without a plan for improved administra-
tion would be a waste of state funds. 
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And yet! there is action that you could take . in this 
field that would offer tangible improvement in trial court 
operations, albeit of a ·modest nature. You will note that, at 
least until Proposition 13 came along, most of the recommendations 
in this area had a consistent theme. That theme was that all 
salaries should be paid by the state, and H continues to be my 
conviction on the subject for reasons that I will develop further 
in a moment. 
If it were thought desirable for some reason to make 
a $375 million (or perhaps by now a $450 million) shift in local 
court costs to the state, it should be done as the Post Commission 
recommended and not by trying to establish a state administrative 
structure to operate the trial courts. In my native state of New 
York something like that was attempted within the past few years, 
and the personnel classification and Salary schedule problems that 
were involved in moving court support staff to the state payroll 
converted the State Administrative Office into a glorified personnel 
office. The problem in California would be worse! If such a 
purely monetary shift is attempted, California trial court employees 
should be left on local payrolls and the trial courts should be 
reimbursed by the state for the cost of their salaries. Such a 
program would have nothing to do with improved judicial administra-
tion, the issue which I believe to be of primary concern here, and 
its justification would be fiscal rather than judicial. 
To my way of thinking, proper way to approach 
this issue is to follow the that have worked in the pa 
The state should put its money into system changes only 
when a program that offers improvement in judicial administration 
is the rrason for doing it. In respect to salaries, there 
is a substantive benefit to be achieved and such a step would 
not create any state-level administrative problem. As you know 
a major portion of superior court 
furnished by the state, which also 
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al salaries is already 
the salaries. But in 
I 
But in the municipal courts, even though the state establishes the 
salaries, the county governments pay them. And with justice courts, 
except for the "circuit judges," salaries are both established and 
paid by local governments. The .cost of picking· up all of these 
judicial salar>s at the state level would be modest; a 197!, cal-
culation by the Cobey Commission put the figure at about $20 million 
and I doubt that the current figure would be unreasonable. 
Why is it, one might ask, tha,t the state's payment of 
judicial salaries would accomplish an improvement in the system. 
The reason is that judges throughout the state would be taken off 
local payrolls where the cost accounting system becomes outrageous 
when a judge is moved from one county to another to help out. 
A system of local 'cost cross-bi_lling. has been created to make sure 
that each county is fully reimbursed for any services rendered 
by one of "its" judges to another county, and the consequences 
of this system have to be seen to be believed. Fiscal considerations 
have affected the question of whether a particular court can accept 
assistance when it is available. Freedom from such accounting 
and operational problems would increase flexibility in the use of 
judgepower throughout the state, and it would also increase the 
judges' sense of responsibility to the judicial system as a whole. 
Beyond the issue of flexibility in the use of judges, it is also 
clear that salary uniformity could be obtained at the justice court 
1evl'l (as has been done elsewhere in the system), a step which 
would be consistent with their having jurisdictional equality with 
the muncipal courts. And, since the administration of judicial 
salaries has been carried on for years by the State Controller's 
Office, no problems in administration would be created, 
The step I have proposed has been a consistent goal 
of those who have studied this problem over the past decade. This 
comittee will accomplish a long-awaited reform if it successfully 
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STATE FUNDING AS THE: MOVING FORCE 
FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF TRIAL COURT DIST-RICTS 
Court unification has been the favorite goal of court reformers for over 
70 vcars. F'rom 1906 to todav, from Hoscoe Pound to the American Bar 
Association's latest Standards of Court Organization, experts have agreed 
that it is necessary to umfy state court systems if they are to operate effi-
ciently. All national conferences on state court reform. including the most 
recent one, have repeated thai call. 
Two s.cholars, however. have warned that. in the light of a wealth of 
business experience, centralization of administrative ana management 
decisions could be a serious mistake. (See, David J. Saari and Goeff 
Gallas. < 1976) 2 Justice Svstem Journal, 19·33 and 33-35. J 
California's drive to\vard a more organizect judicial system has con-
tinued for some 50 years. if measured from the 1926 creation of its constitu-
tional Judicial Council. Progress has been slow, and during some periods 
non-existent, wiJich is not surprising in light of the state's powerful tradi-
tion of local autonomy. The state recently was ranked 40th when compared 
to the most unified of tlle 50 states; One could say that the degree of 
unification is about 20 percent oi what California reasonably could have 
been expected to experience over the 50 year periOd. <See, Berkson< 1978) 3 
Justice System Journal264-280.! 
"Uni'fication," of course, has proved to be a slippery concept. To some 
it means an authoritarian central administration. To others it means a 
single-level trial court system. And to still others it means full state fun-
ding of the judicial system. The situation reminds one of the classic story 
of the blind Hindu scholars whose efforts to describe an elephant from sen-
sations received by touching different parts of the animal left their 
students thoroughly confused. 
The four factors most frequently used in measuring unification in state 
court systems are: simplicity in court structure, central rult·making, cen-
tral administration and state funding. Aithough it was nflt adequately 
assessed in thro comparative study referred to above, California has a 
highly-regarded judicial rulemaking process. and ils organization for cen-
tral judicial administration is sufficient to do what needs to be done in the 
. state. In both h1stances. the Judicial Council is the constitutional agency 
created to carry out those functions. 
If one uses court structure and state funding as the t...,o remaining 
bases for assessing the California court system. it would be easy to con-
clude that more unification would be helpful to the state. lt is obvious that 
California has more judicial districts than it needs. with 250 Superior and 
lower court districts. It is widely conceded that the state's support of its 
judicial system is too meager. In fact. California's 11 percent proportion of 
state contribution is rated last among the 50 states. 
If increased court unification can be described as providing a simpler 
court structure with more state funding, a strong case can be made for 
more of that kind of unification in California. ' 
In the experience of other states. it is significant that inade-
quate local property tax revenues have been the incentive for increased 
state funding, and for significant court reorganization, in many instances. 
F'rom Colorado's 1969 response to its local governments' needs, to 
New York's answer to its fiscal disaster, a financial squeeze has pro-
duced a more unified court in state after state. 
·As rvcryone in California now discovered, Proposition 13 has pro-
duced the same governmental pressure at the local !eve! that other states 
previously have experienced. As a result. increased state ftinding of the 
Califomia court systf·m has been recommended by many agencies, in-
cluding {;overnor Brown's Commission Oll r;ovenune'll Reform. 
Thb commission has targeted ~ome S375 million in state funds for the 
annual support of the Califon]ia triai courts, thus intending to relieve local 
governments of that portion of the property tax burden. The 1979 
Legislature will have this issue beforP it during the next several 
months and the futu;·p of the judicial svstem can be affected 
significantly by i1ow ll deals with the problem. 
A big question which remains unanswered in California: If the state 
moves toward full funding of its trial court system, will any court 
reorganizJtion accompany the shift in funding? Or willlhe iever that has 
proved effective in securing better court organization in other state be ig-
nored here? , . . . . J 
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EXHIBIT Q 
TESTIMONY BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY 
REGARDING STATE FUNDING OF CALIFORNIA'S TRIAL COURTS 
NOVEMBER 18; 1981 
MY NAME IS ALEXANDER AIKMAN; l AM SENIOR STAFF ATTORNEY IN 
THE WESTERN REGIONAL OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE 
IN CASE YOU ARE UNFAMILIAR WITH OUR ORGANIZATION; THE NATIONAL 
CENTER IS A RESEARCH AND CONSULTING ORGANIZATION SERVING THE NATI 's 
STATE COURTS, IN OUR TEN YEARS IN EXISTENCE; WE HAVE WORKED Wl 
SEVERAL STATES AS THEY HAVE MOVED FROM LOCAL TO STATE FINANCI 
OR CONSIDERED SUCH A MOVE -- AND RECENTLY COMPLETED A PROJECT OF 
NATIONAL SCOPE ON STATE FINANCING OF THE COURTS, THIS SPRING I 
COMPLETED AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF POSSIBLE STATE FINANCING OF 
THE SUPERIOR AND JUSTICE OF THE PEACE COURTS IN ARIZONA, MY REMARKS 
TODAY ARE BASED ON MY OWN WORK IN ARIZONA AND THE OTHER WORK DONE 
THE NATIONAL CENTER STAFF IN THIS AREA OVER THE YEARS. 
IN HIS LETTER TO THE NATIONAL CENTER ANNOUNCING THIS HEARl 
MR. RAY LEBOV 1 COUNSEL TO THIS COMMITTEE; ASKED THREE QUESTI S: 
1) WHAT COSTS OUGHT TO BE INCLUDED WITHIN THE I 
COURT BUDGETS IF STATE FUNDING IS TO OCCUR? 
2) HOW SHOULD THE BONDS AND FORFEITURES COLLECTED BY 
~, 
E STATE B~ DISTRIBUTED? 
3) HOW MUCH AUTHORITY SHOULD THE STATE ASSUME OVER J 
CLASSIFICATIONS; SALARY LEVELS AND WORK LOAD 
TRIAL PERSONNEL? 
IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE AT THIS POINT FOR THE NATIONAL C 
WHAT 
IONS 
STATES HAVE DONE 






A CALIFORNIA CONSIDERS WHETHER THE STATE WILL ASSUME A GREATER 
E OF THE OF ITS TRI COURTS. 
ltl£LUD£U COSTS 
WITH RESPECTS TO THE COSTS FOR WHICH THE STATE MIGHT PAY~ 
ON THE 
FOR BY TWENTY 
E ICATES THOSE ELEMENTS OF EXP E BEl 
SURVEYED IN 1980, IN GENERAL1 MOST OF 
STATES HAVE ASSUMED ALL OF THE PERSONNEL AND OPERATING COSTS OF 
E JUDICIAL SYSTEM EXCEPT FACILITIES, ONLY TEN OF THE TWENTY STATES 
ICH INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE FUND JUVENILE PROBATION SERVICES 
SEVEN PAY FOR ADULT PROBATION. IN CALIFORNIA~ BOTH ADULT AND 
ENI PROBATION TRADITIONALLY HAS BEEN REGARDED AS PART OF 
IVE BRANCH'S RESPONSIBILITY AND THUS MIGHT APPROPRIATELY BE 
EXCLUDED FROM STATE FUNDING OF THE COURTS HERE, PERSONNEL INCLUDED 
IN STATE FUNDING USUALLY INCLUDES ALL STAFF SERVING THE JUDGES~ 
NC ING CLERKS~ ALTHOUGH THE CLERK'S OFFICE IS NOT FUNDED IN 
VE AND WEST VIRGINIA. 
THE QUESTION OF PAYING FOR FACILITIES HAS BEEN A PROBLEM FOR 
S HAVE MOVED TO STATE FINANCING. ONLY SEVEN OF THE 
S RECENTLY SURVEYED INCLUDE THE COST OF FACILITIES, IN 
STATES~ LOCAL JURISDICTIONS MUST RETAIN THE FULL COST OF 
INING THE FACILITY~ EI WITH NO COMPENSATION FROM THE STATE 
WITH THE STATE PAYING RENT FOR SPACE USED, THE QUESTION OF 
FACILITIES GOES BEYOND EXISTING FACILITIES~ HOWEVER, LEGISLATION 
HOULD INDICATE WHO MUST BEAR THE COST OF REFURBISHING OR 
R IRI EXISTING SPACE AND E COST OF ADDITIONS TO EXISTING 
E. E QUESTION OF WHO WILL PAY FOR ~ FACILITIES ALSO 
U BE SED. 
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ELEMENTS OF EXPENSE PAID 
(BAS 
ALL OF 
OF 20 STATES INDENTIFI 
FINANCING OF THE JUDICIAL 












JUVENILE PROBATION PERSONNEL 
SERVICE OF PROCESS 
FAC I UTI 
ADULT PROBATION PERSONNEL 
DOM IC RE 
J I D 





S I J I I IN HARRY 0, 
-292-
OF 




















IF LOCALITI ARE SUPPOS TO SUME THE OF a.n E A 
AS EXISTING FACILITIES; BUT EVERYTHING ELSE IN THE ICl 
IS FUNDED BY THE STATE) THERE WILL BE LITTLE REASON FOR THE 
TO EXP SCARCE RESOURCES TO BUILD A NEW FACILITY FOR A 
AGENCY, THE MIGHT WANT TO PAY FOR NEW COURT FACILITIES 
IF IT CHOOSES TO REQUIRE LOCALITIES TO PAY FOR EXISTING 
FACILITIES, 
NEW FURNITURE AND EQUIPMENT NORMALLY ARE REGARDED AS OPERATI 
COSTS OF THE STATE-FINANCED SYSTEM, BUT) IN ADDITION) LEGISLATION 
S ADDRESS WHAT HAPPENS TO EXISTING EQUIPMENT AND FURNITURE. 
IF E STATE APPROPRIATES THAT EQUIPMENT AND FURNITURE--WHICH NORHALLY 
IS E WITHOUT COMPENSATION TO THE COUNTIES--THE BILL PROVIDING FOR 
STATE FINANCING ALSO SHOULD PROVIDE FUNDS FOR THE INVENTORYING OF 
SUCH EQUIPMENT AND FURNITURE PRIOR TO THE STATE'S ASSUMING TITLE, 
JURY AND WITNESS FEES ARE MANDATED COSTS OF THE JUDICIAL 
AND ARE UNCONTROLLABLE IN SONE DEGREE. SOME STATES HAVE LEFT 
J AND WITNESS FEES AS LOCAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN AN EFFORT TO 
R E THE TOTAL BILL ASSUMED BY THE STATE. THE DECISION REGARDING 
WILL PAY JURY AND WITNESS FEES CARRIES WITH IT SEVERAL IMPORTANT 
EMENT COSTS; EITHER FOR THE LOCALITIES OR THE STATE1 WHICH ALSO 
E CONSIDERED, THE PRINCIPLE ONES ARE THE COST OF STAFF 
NE TO ASSURE PAYMENT AND THE NEED FOR UNIFORMITY IN APPROACH IN 
A -FUNDED SYSTEM, 
FEES FOR ATTORNEYS APPOINTED TO REPRESENT INDIGENTS AND FOR 
L PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICES ALSO MUST BE ADDRESSED, AGAIN 1 MOST 
ALL OF THE STATES HAVE ASSUMED THE COST OF COURT-APPOINTED 
CO SEL, NON LESSJ IF A STATE'S FUNDS ARE LIMITED1 THIS IS 
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TABLE 2 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF FINES AND FEES 
TO STATE AND LOCAL FUNDS 
BY STATE FUNDED JUDICIAL SYSTEl-1S 
8 Sic " 20% 0 100% 
Alaska 90 % 0 0 
Colorado 100% 0 9 9 
100 0 0 0 
100% 0 100% 0 
100% 0 100% 0 
100% 0 100% 0 
d d 100% 0 
ssouri 80 20% 0 0 
0 100% 40% 60% 
Ne\v York f f f f 
North Carolina 49.89 50.11 49.89 50 .11. 
South Dakota o9 100% o9 100% 
W:;st- Virginia 0 100% 40%h 60% 















0% of the D.U.I. fines side the city limits) are to the 
State Highway Users Fund; the municipalities receive the o 
0 Interest collected by the Court of Chancery in New Castle County 
spl 50/50 between the state and county. 
00% of all nes are paid to the state, while 100% 
the counties; depend upon the type of 
Circuit fees are 
80/20 rat , 
between the state and counties on a 5 
on the type of case involved. 
100% of all fees go to the state, and 100% of the fines 
loeal governments by the , limited, and special 
courts. The justice of the peace courts, which were not 
s table·, 100% of their fees to local government 
the rnajori s, for violations of spec l 
statutes, such as the Environmental Conservation Law, 
able to the state, with the local governments receiving a 
of five dollars. 
5% of municipal fines are paid to the state. 




2) STATE REIMBURSES COUNTI FOR DOC EXP ES. 
3) THE STATE PAYS EACH COUNTY A BLOCK GRANT; BAS 
NUMBER OF JUDGES} POPULATION; OR FILINGS, 
THE SIZE OF CALIFORNIA'S TRIAL COURT SYSTEMS AND THE DIVERSI 
AMONG THE COUNTIES MAKES THE CHOICE AMONG E VARIOUS METHODS 
DIFFICULT, NO METHOD IS WITHOUT PROBLEMS. 
MOST STATES THAT FINANCE TRIAL COURTS USE FIRST 1 LI 
APPROACH, TRIAL COURT STAFF ARE TRANSFERRED FROM COUNTY TO 
EMPLOYMENT AND THE PERSONNEL SYSTEM IS ADMINISTERED AT THE 
LEVEL. THERE ARE SOUND REASONS FOR THIS APPROACH, TWO OF THE MOST 
IMPORTANT ARE LEGISLATIVE REVIEW AND CONTROL OF THE ALLOCATI 
STATE MONIES AND ASSURANCE OF A MINIMUM LEVEL OF FUNDING AND S ICE 
THROUGHOUT THE STATEJ UNAFFECTED BY THE EXIGENCIES OF LOCAL FI 
ING THIS APPROACH} HOWEVER} NECESSARILY IMPOSES SIGNIFI 
ISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE OFFICE OF E STATE COURT 
ISTRATOR AND AFFECTS THE ADMINISTRATIVE FREEDOM ENJOYED BY 
COURTS, IT CANNOT BE KNOWN TODAY WHETHER E ADMINISTRATI 
NEEDED AT THE STATE LEVEL TO ADMINISTER A STATE JUDICIAL 
SY IN CALIFORNIA WOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER THAN THE 
P SONNEL ADMINISTRATION STRUCTURE THE LOCAL COURTS, IT 
WOU REQUIRE A F OF PERSONNEL EXPERTS NOT NOW AVAILABLE IN E 
ADMINISTRATI FICE OF THE COURTS 1 HOWEVER, 
THE SECOND APPROACH; COST REIMBURSEMENT~ IS PREFERAB TO 
LINE-ITEM BUDGET APPROACH FOR SOME BECAUSE FISCAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONTROL REMAIN LARGELY AT THE LOCAL LEVEL AND PERSONNEL DO NOT HAVE 
TO BE SHIFTED TO A STATE PERSONNEL SYSTEM, THERE ARE SEVERAL PROBLEMS 
ASSOCIATED WITH THIS APPROACH} HOWEVER, FOR ONEJ IF E STATE E 
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E 6 
REI SE COSTS Fl YEAR.~ PAYMENTS 
COSTS INCURRED, IF COSTS 1 E 
F TO YEAR,.. A F OF COSTS TO THE STATE CANNOT BE 
MIGHT BE RELUCTANT 
ESS THIS IATI ON THE BASIS OF COUNTIES' 
BUDGETS.~ SINCE E 
BUDGETS CAUSING THE 
ENDITURES MAY NOT BE AS GR 




PERHAPS MORE CRITICALLY.~ ERE IS THE PROBLEM OF COSTS 
WI BE REIMBURS FOR EXAMPLE; ONE COUNTY MIGHT PAY A CLERK 
.J WHILE ANOTHER COUNTY PAYS A CLERK PERFORMING ESSENTIALLY 
SAME DUTIES $18.~000. OR.~ ONE COUNTY MIGHT CHARGE THE STATE 
5 AN HOUR FOR A COMPUTER PROGRAMM WHI ANOTHER CHARGES ONLY 
HOUR, WILL E STATE BE WILLING TO PAY THE COUNTIES' BILLS 
SUBMITTED.~ OR WILL A 
COSTS BE REQUIRED? IF 
OF ALLOWED COSTS OR MAXIMUM ALLOWED 
R.~ THE STATE MAY NOT BE REIMBURSING 
S I 
; IF E E LITTLE OR NO CONTROL OVER 
F E ATTEMPTS STANDARDIZE CATEGORIES OF 
IN MINIM PROBLEM OF DIFFERENT AMOUNTS BEl 
BY DIFF ENT THE SAME SERVICE.~ SOME COUNTIES 
CREATE A NEW 
ER TO ISOLATE E 
w ING ASSUr1E 
lNG SYSTEM FOR THE JUDICIAL SYST 
REIMBURS BY THE STATE, THEY MAY OR 
BURDEN IN ORDER TO RECEIVE THE 
CE. THE COUNT ES ALSO MIGHT HAVE TO EMPLOY ADDITIONAL STAFF 
TO ASSURE DOCUMENTATI OF EIR COSTS, WOULD THE STATE ASSUME 
IE COST OF THESE ADDITI P ONNEL? IF SO.~ WOULD THE STATE BE 







0 I ON,~ BLOCK G 
INVOLVES THE L 
IS APPROACH TOO,~ HAS INHERENT 
E E PROB MIGHT BEST BE I 
IN ARIZONA, CALCU ING THE IES' 
I I R 
TO 
E COUNTY THAT SPENDS E MOST PER-J ARI 
$700.~000 MORE THAN E COUNTY THAT SPENT 
? 
E S 
BUDG S ON A POP ION BASIS THE DI B 
COUNTY THAT SPENT THE MOST ON ITS COURTS ON A POPULATION BASIS 
WAS SPENDING 7 TIMES THE AMOUNT SPENT BY THE COUNTY SPENDI 
LEAST AMOUNT. ANY BLOCK GRANT THAT COVERED THE COST OF THE 
THAT SPENT THE LEAST WOULD BE UNFAIR TO OTHER COURTS. YET 
BASING A BLOCK GRANT ON THE COSTS OF MOST EXPENSIVE IES 
WOULD RESULT IN A SIGNIFICANT WINDFALL TO OTH COUNT! 
} 
TYPE OF DISPARITY RESULTED 
PER-FILING BASIS, 
E STS WERE CALC ON A 
IT WAS APPARENT IN ARIZONA THAT NO R HOW EXI I 
WERE COMPARED.~ IT WAS VERY HARD 








PROGRAM IS LOST AND E PROG 
REIMBURSEMENT PROGRAM. 
THE BENEFIT 





EXPE ITURES IN ST 
K G 





NriES FUND COURTS A SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER LEVEL THAN 
OTHER COUNTI WILL HAVE AN INCENTI MAKE MORE RESOURCES AVAIL-
AB THE BLOCK-GRANT MAY,~ IN E ECT,~ PROVI A F ON 
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RESOURCES AVAILABLE IN EACH COUNTY TO THE JUDICIAL BRANCH, l!IL 
DISPARITY AMONG COUNTIES WILL BE LESSENED AND THE QUALITY OF JUSTICE 
IN SOME COUNTIES IMPROVED. 
AS CAN BE SEENJ THE QUESTION ABOUT THE DEGREE OF CONTROL OVER 
TRIAL COURT PERSONNEL IS TIED DIRECTLY TO THE METHOD OF FINANCE, 
THE ISSUE WILL BE DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE IN CALIFORNIA, THE CHOICE 
DEPENDS UPON THE RELATIVE WEIGHT OF SEVERAL FACTORS: 
1) THE DEGREE OF LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT AND CONTROL DESIRED 
FOR JUDICIAL BRANCH EXPENDITURES, 
2) THE LEVEL OF CONCERN REGARDING THE SIZE AND INFLUENCE 
OF THE SUPREME COURTJ JUDICIAL COUNCILJ AND THE OFFICE 
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR OF THE COURTS. 
3) THE INTEREST IN MAINTAINING LOCAL DETERMINATION OF 
JUDICIAL BUDGETS, 
4) THE VALUE OF LOCAL TRIAL JUDGES NEGOTIATING FOR THEIR 
BUDGETS WITH COUNTY GOVERNMENTS VERSUS NEGOTIATING FOR 
BUDGETS WITH THE SUPREME COURT (OR JUDICIAL COUNCIL) 
AND LEGISLATURE, 
5) THE VALUE OF HAVING ALL JUDICIAL BRANCH EMPLOYEES IN A 
STATE JUDICIAL-BRANCH PERSONNEL SYSTEMJ THEREBY PRO-
VIDING SIMILAR COMPENSATION FOR SIMILAR WORK, 
6) THE RISK ASSOCIATED WITH ALLOWING COUNTIES TO SPEND 
MONEY PROVIDED BY THE STATE AS THEY CHOOSE, 
7) COUNTIES' WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT SOME RESTRICTIONS ON 
THE USE OF OR ACCOUNTING FOR STATE FUNDS IN RETURN 
FOR THOSE FUNDS. 
8) THE MANAGEMENT ADVANTAGES AND PROBLEMS IN A SYSTEM AS 
LARGE AS CALIFORNIA'S, 
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A NUMBER OF COURTS IN CALIFORNIA USE DATA PROCESSING, IN 
CASES E SUPPORT FOR THE DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM IS PROVIDED BY 
PERSONNEL. IF THE STATE ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL THESE 
S COSTS COULD BE ENORMOUS, IF THE STATE ATTEMPTS TO ENTER 
SERVICE CONTRACTS WI LOCALITIES FOR THESE SERVICES; THE 
CO MAY CHARGE THE STATE FOR COSTS THAT THE COUNTIES DO NOT 
EGARD AS JUDICIAL-BRANCH COSTS. FURTHERJ THE COURTS MAY 
E PROBLEMS GETTING NEEDED DATA PROCESSING SUPPORT BECAUSE THEY 
LONGER ARE PART OF COUNTY GOVERNMENT, IN A WORLD INCREASINGLY 
NT OF DATA PROCESSINGJ THE QUESTIONS OF CONTROL OVER AND 
RIOR ON A COMPUTER ARE VERY IMPORTANT. 
REGARDLESS OF THE SCOPE AND METHOD OF FINANCING CHOSENJ ANY 
ADDITIONAL STATE FINANCING WILL HAVE SOME IMPACT ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
F E OF THE COURTS. THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE NEW ROLE FOR 
NISTRATIVE OFFICE MAY BE MORE APPARENT THAN REALJ IN THAT 
RE MAY BE NO MORE THAN A SHIFT OF PERSONNEL FROM LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
E INI I OFFICEJ BUT IN A SYSTEM AS LARGE AS CALIFORNIA'S 
E OF A MAJOR INCREASE IN STAFFING AT THE STATE LEVEL IS 
EV THEN AGAIN; THERE MAY NEED TO BE A REAL INCREASE IN 
IVE STAFF SIMPLY BECAUSE OF THE SIZE OF THE NEW SYSTEM 
E INISTERED. NOT ALL THE INCREASE WILL BE LIMITED TO THE 
AT LEVELJ EITHERJ AS LOCAL COURTS MAY NEED TO HAVE STAFF TO PERFORM 
SE CES NOW PROVIDED BY OTHER COUNTY DEPARTMENTS OR TO RESPOND TO 
R R ENTS OF THE NEW STATE SYSTEM. 
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E IONS ASSOCIATED WI ASSUMING A GR ER 
SHARE THE COSTS OF TRIAL COURTS E NUMEROUS COMP E 
CHOICES THAT MUST BE MADE CANNOT ADEQUATELY BE MADE NOW B E 
MUCH OF INFORMATION NEEDED TO MAKE REASONABLE JUDGMENTS IS 
AVAILABLE. THIS COMMITTEE MIGHT CONSIDER E ADVISABILITY OF 
CREATING A SPECIAL STUDY COMMI AND/OR OBTAINING SPECIAL 
SULTANT SERVICES TO ADDRESS THESE AND OTHER ISSUES ASSOC 
WI STATE FINANCING, IF STATE CHOOSES TO ASSUME MORE 
COS OF THE OPERATION OF TRIAL COURTS; IT SHOU HAVE SOME ID 
OF THOSE COSTS WI BE. ; EVEN IF THIS COMMITTEE THE 
ISLATURE BELIEVE THAT STATE FINANCING OF THE TRIAL S 
ULTI 
RAMIFI 
LY IS DESIRAB , MORE INFORMATION IS NEEDED BEFORE 
IONS OF THAT CHOICE CAN IT TAKE A 
TWO TO OBTAIN THAT INFORMATI TIME WELL SP 
E FU 
OR 
I AP lATE THIS 0 B E I 




STATEMENT TO THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE 
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 
NOVEivlliER 18, 1981, HASTINGS SCHOOL OF LAW, 
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 
BY BEATRICE HOFFMAN, 
COURT RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, 
EXHIBIT R 
2145 Jackson Street, San Francisco, CA 94115 
Thank you for allowing me to testify today. My name is 
Beatrice Hoffman. I represent no organization, only myself, 
a California resident interested in the preservation of a 
strong and independent judiciary, which I believe is critical 
to the maintenance of the separation of powers concept so 
intrinsic to our form of government. 
I own and operate a small consulting firm, and have provided 
research or technical assistance to individual courts or 
state court administrative offices in the states of California, 
Colorado, Indiana, Idaho, Louisiana, Kentucky, Michigan, 
Missouri, Maine, New Hampshire, and Oregon. 
Prior to opening my firm, I was Director of Research and 
Development for the Colorado State Judicial Department. I 
started there in 1970, at the time state funding was first 
implemented. Over a seven year period, my responsibilities 
have included data collection and analysis, planning for 
courts and probation departments, data processing services, 
records management, and budget. 
From 1978 to 1981, I was a member of a two-person evaluation 
team which semi-annually reviewed and evaluated the progress 
of the State Courts Administrator's office in implementing 
Missouri's new unified state court system. 
The other member of that team, Professor Harry 0. Lawson, 
of the Denver University School of Law and former Colorado 
State Court Administrator, completed a study in 1979 of 20 
state funded judicial systems.l He found so much variation 
among the systems that it was virtually impossible to construct 
meaningful models for comparison purposes. 
1 
Lawson, Harry 0. et al, State Funding of Court Systems, 
An Initial Examination7 'Washington, D.C., American 
Univers~ty Law Inst~tute, June 1979. 
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I suggest that proposed legislation for state funding specify 
clearly that certain revenues be kept by local governments 
for their general fund, to cover, among other purposes, court 
facility and maintenance costs. 
I do not have a specific amount in mind, but suggest two 
possibilities. New York sends 100 percent of all fees to the 
state and 100 percent of all fines to local government, from 
both general and limited jurisdiction courts. Another option 
would be to make an 80/20, state/local, split in all fines 
and fees from general and limited jurisdiction courts, with 
100 percent of municipal ordinance fines going to the local 
municipality. 
I am aware that there are a number of state statutes 
already specifying various formulas for fine and fee distribution, 
and I realize my suggestion poses problems. There is an 
increasing proliferation of these laws, and they are getting 
bu.t:densome for the courts. A more uniform distribution, if 
one could be achieved with a minimum of exceptions, would be 
highly desirable. 
Another matter I wish to address is that of personnel. I 
believe strongly in a separate judicial personnel system. The 
American Bar Association and the National Advisory Commission 
on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals have stressed the need 
for a separate, independent judicial personnel system in order 
that the judiciary maintains itself as an independent and 
respected branch of government, on par with the executive and 
legislative branches, and in order to take responsibility for 
administering its own affairs effectively, efficiently, and 
fairly. 
There are other advantages to installing a state judicial 
personnel system. It allows for equalization of pay scales 
for like duties, permitting accountability to the legislature. 
It provides a career ladder for judicial system employees, 
allowing them to transfer within the system, from one court to 
another, one district to another. It fosters professional 
pride and loyalty and encourages cost-effective training 
programs. 
In most states where the court system has been state funded, 
state-wide personnel rules have been adopted by the Supreme 
Court. This transition from local to state classifications 
takes substantial time and work, with much review by judges 
and non-judicial personnel. Most states have taken a minimum 
of two years for the task, and it might take longer in 
California. In Colorado, the transition was administered by 
the Supreme Court; in Missouri, it was administered by a 
Personnel Committee composed of presiding circuit judges. 
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I think it is critical, for such a system to work well, 
that local jurisdictions be allowed to hire locally and 
administer the system locally, within the regulations of the 
state system. The state office should do reclassifications, 
have an appeals board composed of judges and clerks, and 
assist and monitor the local jurisdictions in complying with 
the rules.2 
If California decides to fund operating expenses and 
capital outlay as well as personnel and travel, then local 
involvement should be high in fiscal administration and 
budget preparation, as well as in personnel matters. I think 
this is a structural necessity in making a state system work 
with a minimum of red tape. In Lawson's study of 20 states, 
Colorado is the only one where judicial districts handle their 
own operating funds. It is one of a very few states that 
allows local purchasing. 
One other point: when state funding is proposed, neither 
the legislature nor the judiciary recognizes the need for 
additional qualified administrative staff to help 
operate the system and provide accountability. The fact is 
that, just as in the executive branch, a state judicial system 
needs administrative staff to make the transition smooth and 
the system operate efficiently. 
As you are aware, in the past decade there has been a 
dramatic increase in the number of court systems which are 
state funded, either totally or substantially. Eleven states 
were state-funded in 1972; as of this date, 27 states have 
state-funded courts or have legislation that provides 
for gradual implementation of state funding. 
State funding can work ... but careful planni~g, cooperation 
between various levels of government, ample transition time, 
and sufficient staff are all required. 
Thank you very much for allowing me to testify. 
2Lawson, Harry 0., H.R. Ackerman, Jr. and Donald E. Fuller, 
Personnel Administration in the Courts. Washington, D.C., 
American university Institute for Advanced Studies in 
Justice, February 1978. 
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• INTERIM HEARING 
"""' Assembly Committee on Judiciary 
AB 1820 (Berman) 
STATE FINANCING OF THE TRIAL COURTS 
• 
November 18, 1981 
REMARK OF 
·· John Campbell 
Executive Secretary 
Los Angeles County 
·Economy and Efficiency Commission 
163 Ha11 of Administration 
500 West Temple Street 
Los Angeles, CA 90012 
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The Economy and Efficiency Commission is a group appointed by the 
Board of Supervisors. It is charged by ordinance with studying any area of 
County government and making recommendations to the Board to improve the 
effectiveness, efficiency and economy of local goverment operations. The 
commission has 21 members, all of whom serve without compensation of any 
kino. I provide staff services to the commission in th-e conduct of its 
studies, under provisions of a personal.services contract with the County. 
Com!ll_i s s i o_n_ Wor~_on_the Court Sys tern 
In March, 1981, the Board asked the Economy and Efficiency Commission 
to review issues of congestion and delay in the court system. In October, 
we issued il report with fifteen recommendations for coordinated action by 
Board, Judiciary and 1cgislature. This analysis and reconmendations provide 
<l strategic basis for addressing conyestion in the system as a resources 
problem-- which is, after all, what the word congestion means. Th(' report 
contains an overview for planning, but the details of implementation are not 
present. On November 10, 1981, after a hearing, the Board of Supervisors 
adopted the recommendations for further joint development by county and 
court agencies. 
I have supplied your staff with a copy of the commission's report and 
recommendations. I have also supplied a.list of past Economy and [fficiency 
reconn1endations, since 1967, bearing on more narrowly defined court and 
court system issues. 
of the Trial Courts 
In past reports, our commission recommended full State funding of 
trial court system, marily thi~ the context of a comprehensive 
restructuring of local government systems. The Post commission made a 
s~imilar recommendation in 1979. The Board of Supervisc!h has consistently held 
the same position, and has supported a·variety of bills offered in recent 
years to implement State funding or revise revenue allocation formulas. 
In our report in October, our comm~ssion stated that it would not oppose, 
or recommend that Board oppose, fu~l- State funding of the court tern. 
~ '1 
However, we did not repeat or call "for increased emphasis on the· 
recommendation for full State funding. in Ange es County alone, 
funding of the court system -- including all departments and overheads 
State 
d 
require additional financing of at least $170 million. In the rerort, our 
commission pointed out that the State is apparently as deficient in tax revenues 
as Coun a that shifting cos ts~nnong a 1ternat ive tax bases wou1 d not 
be adequate to resolve the system's r~·ources problems. It does not appear 
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Instead, we reconmended that the State subsidy formulas be revised to 
prov de for a fixed proportion of total system costs, net of fines, fodcitun:s 
and s for service in each county. That would index the subsidy to costs; 
equivdlently, vJe ltJould •favor indexing the subsidy to inflation. The com~1ission 
furthur recormnended that the State fund~OO percent of any addi tionu1 court 
system costs attributable to the impact of new 1egislation on system caseloads 
or on case complexity. 
Your agenda today's hearing contained three specific questions. will 
ta hese up assuming that the State .funds 100 percent of the court systen1. 
\~hat costs? We would propose t!iat the State finance all direct and 
indirec cos the follo1ving: Superior Court, Municipal Courts, County Clerk, 
Sheriff's Civil Division, Marshal, and Mandatory Courts' expense. In direct 
irect costs we include all salar1es and employee benefits, all the costs 
of space and the maintenance of space, all the ad!llinistrat·ive overhead. In our 
, we provided an estimate of total annual system costs in Los Anqeles at 
million (includinr~.costs now funded by State subvention or subs·idy). 
D ·~tribution of Fine<; and Forf!~Hures. Our co111mission did not addre',s 
·;ubjc-\X.in-diita·iY~irl the-1Ycfob-cr--r-cl)(wT. We suqqe';tcd that UH: t~l1ou ion 
nnu a:;; be r·evised to take into account U1e proportionality amonq the vari(JUS 
jur·i•;dictional costs they are intended to finance. At prr~·:;ent, cities coll•·ct 
an average of 89 percent of fine and forfeiture revenue (exclusive of surcharqe). 
In what sense can we justify a statement that the cities, in performing la1·1 
enforcement and prosecutorial services bear 89 percent of the costs while the 
crmrts bear 11 percent? That seems t6 u~ to be the question to ;wswel~, 
rdless of whether the State assumes the funding responsibility and coJl,!cLs 
t revenue. Were 100 percent of current fines, forfeitures and fees fnr 
ice to be allocated to the court system, they would fund at most about nalf 
total cost of the system in Los Angeles County. 
State Authority. If the State assumes full financial responsibility for 
costsof-fhe-CourT system, then we believe the State should eliminate a11 
responsibility for the personnel and administrative functions. There is 
po nt in duplicating such functions. 
__ _£,J!JW o a c h 
In considering congestion, our commission sought to identify means 
ssing the lack of sufficient resources in three ways: 1) reducing costs, 
ncreasing revenues, and 3) modifying the incentives and programs to whicl1 
local legal community responds . 
• 
In addition to support of the programs established by the courts to 
ieve congestion, we propose a comprehensive program to restructure the 




In particular, we propose a rev1s1on of the fee r service sy~;l.em c1 
ies in the cow~ts. At present, the system of fi1inq fr~es, 111otion 
use fees r speci c services cannot be used to i11flu0nce 
demand or to steer lit nts and ir at lo lt";', costly ill Lcr·n.; iV(", 
when appropriate. Con ly, vJe see itt e incentive to promote 1c'>s 
costly alternatives· we see potential i~quities; and we see a continuing 
shift of costs from demandi services to the 1 taxpayer. 
Our report proposes a fee-for-service system in tlw cou \vhich would 
1) index fees to costs so that at least keep up with inflation, nd 
2) promote a 1 cost recovery polic~ when less costly alternatives a 
ava lable to li gants and lav1yers ~, 
' .. 
We identified three candidates initial application of such a 
policy in civil system: fees for court reporters, fees for jury panels, 
fees for process serving by public agencies. ( in, we did not s y 
details of how to i ement any new fee.) 
The fi1incJ fee ir( or Com·t pn:::;ently inclw!l·', $L3 for unnl. 
reporter. The fee has not changed for· at least ten ycMs -- so Luxpdyi·r:, "rc 
paying a larger share now, due to infla on, n vJhen the $13 lev<~l was ct. 
We tion the i incl i is in fi1i fee --a lorger po 
tion of the cases led settle, so some litigants are su ing o us 
of court reporters. st i nt, courts have tried in vain r years 
to obtain legislation enabling appropriate use of such less costly allernat ves 
as electronic ing or waiver when appropriate. More sensible pricing of 
the for service for the reporter create su c ent incentives to s 
implementation cost alterna ve~<;. We e the same kind a[~Lention 
to jury of a to -- and 




In its recent report, and Efficiency Co11nni upp ic( 
the 
program addressin9 court conqestion. Thf' commission' n:c l.i(J!i 1m the 
te funding question was that State su be inJcx£~J to cos (u!' Lu 
in ation) ra than to fi dollar amounts for vari s sources of cos . We 
did not repeat our past 11 State fincl!Kinq. Shou cl 
te assume res bili the court system, we uqqe 
tit pay 100 11 costs ~$1 11ion u1orc now); pr'Ot'dt 1 ' to 
County territory whatever s re cities wo d receive, 
sed on the police utorial servi s; 
ieve , salary a wo k oad 
sta s. 
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